An analysis of Dubai's socio-economic development strategies and performance between 1998-2008 by Thompson, Paul Anthony
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF DUBAI’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE BETWEEN 1998 ----2008 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
in the subject of  
 
 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
 
 
at the 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
             PROMOTER: Professor Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
    
              
                               NOVEMBER 2013 
 
i 
 
Declaration 
 
I, Paul Anthony Thompson, author of this thesis, do hereby declare that 
the work presented in this document entitled: “An ANALYSIS OF  DUBAI’S 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE 
BETWEEN 1998 AND 2008”, is a result of my own research and independent 
work except where reference is made to published literature. I also hereby 
certify that the work embodied in this thesis has not already been 
submitted, either in whole or in part, for any other degree in this University 
or other institute of higher learning.  
 
 
 
...........................................                                                                             ……………………….          
   PAUL A. THOMPSON                                                                                                    DATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
………………………………..                                              ……………………. 
PROMOTER                                                              DATE       
ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost and above all, honour and glory to Lord Jesus for giving 
me the requisite knowledge, wisdom, and persistence needed to complete 
this thesis. 
 
I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Professor 
Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni for his constant professional insightful guidance 
and constructive comments on the quality of my work throughout the   
research project. 
 
I wish to also thank the many interviewees who consented to being 
interviewed and special gratitude goes out the librarian at the Dubai 
Chamber of Commerce for responding to my many emails and also speaking 
to me over the telephone without any reservation regarding the many thesis 
related questions I had. I also would like to acknowledge the kind assistance 
rendered to me by the librarian at the Dubai Statistics Centre.  
 
iii 
 
Dedication 
 
I dedicate this work to the following very special people for their 
influence in my life and support throughout this research project: 
 
My parents and my five year old twins Amelié and Gabriel 
Thompson; who have had to tolerate me spending countless hours in 
front of my computer and cutting their playing time in the park short 
on many occasions.  
 
Also to ‘the special one’, my wife Zintle Siwisa-Thompson, who has 
been a tower of strength and great inspiration throughout the 
duration of this research. She has tolerated my many late nights to 
bed and early departure without a fuss. Without her support this 
project would still remain on my wish list. 
 
iv 
 
Abstract 
 
This study explores the socio-economic development path of the former 
Trucial State of Dubai, now an economic powerhouse within the Federal 
State of the United Arab Emirates. This thesis emanated out of the 
researcher’s  need to understand the development trajectory of Dubai from 
the perspective of a development discourse, as literature and debates on the 
city’s developmental trajectory have generally focused on micro-and macro-
economic variables and a sectoral emphasis without considering the total 
and complex development matrix. The author proposes a rentier, 
developmental and competition (RDC) Model as a basis for understanding 
the state-led social and economic development of the Emirate of Dubai. 
Empirically, the study examines a whole raft of home-grown social and 
economic development policies that fall exclusively within the domain of the 
Dubai Strategic Plans (DSPs). Conceptually, the thesis argues that although 
the Dubai Inc model has successfully changed the socio-economic landscape 
of the Emirate, nevertheless, a soft underbelly of the model displays the 
exploitative nature of unbridled free market capitalism.  
 
Methodologically, triangulation backed up the qualitative research 
methodology by utilising a mixed-methods approach to enhance the 
richness of the research.  Specific data collection methods used included in-
depth semi-structured interviews and non-participative observation, 
supported by documentation analyses of relevant documents. The research 
findings unambiguously demonstrated that the socio-economic 
transformation of Dubai, between 1998 and 2008, was a result of the 
aforementioned hybrid model, which this thesis uses as its theoretical 
framework. The conclusion drawn from the study is that there is no one 
path to development; the Government of Dubai is cognisant of that and has 
thus used the capacity of the state to transform the once impoverished and 
marginalised sheikhdom into a ‘commodified’ city-corporate entity. 
 
Key Words: Rentier, Developmental, Competition State, Emiratisation, 
State-Led Capitalism, Dubai Strategic Plans, Dubai Model and Emirate.
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 Chapter One: 
Research Outline 
 
“Money is like water,” “If you lock it up, it becomes stagnant and foul-smelling, but  
if you let it flow, it stays fresh.” 
 
His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum 
________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis is about post-Britannia Dubai, a developing city-state or 
sheikhdom within the Federal State of the United Arab Emirates, focussing 
on its exponential rate of socio-economic transformation and development in 
the period 1998 and 2008, which in historical terms, is a very short period 
of time. In particular, this thesis employs and is influenced by a hybrid 
rentier, developmental state (RDC) state paradigmatic model in order to fully 
locate and encapsulate Dubai’s transformation within a set of conceptual 
theoretical discourses. The author’s intent in employing such an approach is 
to make the point that the developmental path of Dubai requires more than 
a one dimensional analysis. The anticipated impact of this multi-
dimensional model is that it will engender debate across diverse African 
countries as well other countries seeking policy alternatives to those 
promulgated by international donor agencies and industrialized Western 
governments. 
 
The sheikhdom which has led Dubai’s socio-economic transformation and 
present development trajectory has defied the economic thought in vogue 
during that period; a position, which postulates that economic growth and 
development are only achievable through the dictates of the Washington 
Consensus’s neo-liberal orthodoxy and minimalist state doctrine. Khory, in 
summary, captures Dubai’s epistemic developmental path in stating that 
“...the city state has been able to lay the foundations for rapid and 
sustainable development by ‘by-passing’ the path to economic and political 
modernization similar to the one, the ‘First World’ had travelled” (Khory, 
2008:1-7). This development trajectory led the World Economic Forum 
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(2007:6) and Pradhan (2009:2), to comment, and in this author’s opinion, 
correctly so: “...Dubai’s economic miracle epitomizes the success of an 
innovative, state-led, capitalist growth model and has been a regional leader 
of innovative development plans.” In a similar vein “the sociology of 
development” (Gereffi 1989:505), in the Arab world has “...historically from 
the 1940s until now, embraced overall a model of governance and 
development that has been state-led, state-centred, and state-regulated, 
with a strong interventionist-redistributive orientation” (Richards & 
Waterbury 1996, cited in Yousef 2004:91-92; UNDP 2005:10). It is 
important to note that the state led development of Dubai’s economy co-
exists with the excesses of free market capitalism.  
 
The general terms of Dubai’s development trajectory have been well 
documented (Tamanini 2007:2), and are increasingly so, by a number of 
non-academic business magazines, journals and newspapers especially after 
the UAE and Dubai in particular “…threw off the shackles of colonialism” 
(Luiz 2000:229). The Emirate of Dubai (UAE) started its modern 
development journey with a modest economy and population, but a 
determined mindset and a clear vision to achieve international excellence 
and become a city of global standing (Ali Alyousuf 2008; Henderson 2007). 
From being an impoverished, quiet and insignificant entity, “...Dubai has in 
the 19th and 20th centuries metamorphosed from little more than a fishing 
and pearl diving township which had  over the years survived off the bounty 
of the sea, into a fully fledged sheikhdom with political stability and an 
established ruling dynasty” (Davidson 2008: 9; Ali Alyousuf 2008; 
Henderson 2007).  
 
The Emirate’s development strategies and plans hinged on the long-term 
socio-economic policies and programmes outlined in the Dubai Strategic 
Plan (DSP) 1996, as well as in the DSPs 2010 and 2015. Details of each 
strategic plan are expounded in Chapter seven of this thesis. It is imperative 
to note that the pursuit of socio-economic development is accompanied by a 
plethora of complexities and issues arising from various development 
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theoretical constructs and paradigms.  Avgerou argues differently, but in 
support of the above point, that “...development policy and action are 
entangled with the conflicting interests and power relations in the 
contemporary global and national politics” (2009:3). It is on this premise 
that the development policies and strategies of a country, including that of 
the city of Dubai, are will be informed, designed and shaped by its history, 
the international political economy and /or the developmental gaps in the 
society.  
 
This research incorporates the same view as Avgerou because the UAE, and 
specifically Dubai’s economy, does not operate in a vacuum, as observed 
during the 2008 global financial crisis. In essence, disentangling the state-
led, pro-competition and pro-market policy from the global economy is not 
possible. This thesis therefore explores and analyses Dubai’s socio-economic 
development strategies and performance from 1998 to 2008, precisely 
because there is such a paradoxical interplay of opposing forces, state 
involvement and neo-liberal dogma.  
 
1.2. Background to the Study: An Overview of the Middle East’s Social 
and Geo-Political Economy 
 
There are twenty-two states (see Figure1 below) that constitute the Arab 
world; Kumar (2006: 3) is of the view that countries of the “Arab world 
depict images of a society that is inward looking, docile, undemocratic and 
repressive.” Nevertheless, as Raffer (2006:13), states: “the Arab world is not 
homogeneous” and he further argues that these states “are quite diverse 
with the bulk of economic activities concentrated in a few countries.” The 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region comprises both the oil-rich 
economies in the Gulf and the countries that are resource-scarce in relation 
to population, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen (Gebara 2007:2).  The 
study focuses on Dubai and the rapid social and economic development of 
this important sheikhdom and “Islamic principality of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) federation” (IMF 1998). The UAE is one of the oil rich 
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countries in the southern Gulf, depicted on the map of the Middle East 
below.  
 
Map of the Middle East 
Figure 1.1: Map of the Middle East 
 
Source: Map extracted from Google Image 
 
Gadir-Ali (2008:4) opines that “a relatively large number of Arab countries 
shown on the map above [Figure 1], have experienced ‘development 
disasters’ over the period since independence.” Thus, it is not surprising 
that many countries across the region “...are facing significant 
multidimensional development challenges that profoundly affect social, 
economic and living conditions of the citizens.” (Mahjoub et al 2010:05; 
UNDP, 2003). The National Newspaper (2011) and the Arab Human 
Development Report (2002: v) have itemised some of the manifestations of 
the development disasters and deficits experienced in some Arab countries: 
“among them are indignity, mounting unemployment rates, poverty, 
marginalization, high illiteracy rates, gender inequality and exclusion and 
the feeling that one is living as a guest or persona non grata in his ancestral 
homeland.” The first Arab Human Development Report (AHDR 2002) 
characterised the Arab world as ‘richer than it is developed,’ as the story of 
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Arab economies since the 1970s is largely the story of oil (AHDR 2009: 99). 
But Al Ismaily (2009:2) aptly reminds us that “the Arab world economy can 
be divided roughly into two regions, namely, the resource rich, mostly 
hydrocarbons and the labour abundance.” [...] That description highlights 
the disjunction between the region’s material wealth and its real levels of 
human development, which point to a backlog of policy failures often 
overlooked by conventional economic analyses at the time (AHDR 2009:99). 
 
The political economy that prevails in the Arab region prevents mutual 
accountability between citizens and the state. Political life is constructed in 
ways that reproduce the dominant power structure. This power structure 
reflects an admixture of the interlocked interests that concentrates authority 
in a small circle and prevents rotation of power (UNDP 2011:11). 
Schlumberger (2004:36) and Hvidt (2009:400) both remarked that “it is 
uncontested textbook knowledge that Arab socio-political systems are 
characterized by strong neo-patrimonial forms of political structure and 
rule”; such a characterisation is applicable to Dubai in particular and 
generally across the UAE. Hvidt (2007:400) elaborates by noting that “oil 
money, however, significantly strengthened the ruler’s economic position, 
bettering his ability to ‘buy’ loyalty not only from the Bedouin tribes and the 
merchant elites, but also from society at large.”        
 
The Arab world has made considerable progress between 1960-1984 and 
1985-2000, most notably with regard to women’s education (Elbadawi 
2004:6), in spite of the lack of political pluralism and an interactive civil 
society in most Arab states. In general most Arab economies were doing very 
well with some economies performing better during the 1990s than during 
the 1980s, although some have not done so (Raffer 2006; Schlumberger 
2004). It is on that premise that this study was initiated.  
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1.2.1. Rationale for study 
 
The world does not appear to make sense: if it did, Dubai would be 
miserable, poor, and suffering from the oil curse syndrome or theory (Wight 
2011: 351). According to many conventional theories of development and the 
oil curse theory, Dubai would never be a candidate for success; given the 
fact that it is “…sparsely populated and does not enjoy economies of scale 
scope for manufacturing and other commercial activities” (Ibid: 351). The 
development strategy and model that have unfolded in recent years in Dubai 
reflect the geo-political landscape of the region; its demographic makeup, 
the development agenda, size and political tenacity of the emirate and most 
importantly, its history prior to the post Pax-Britannica period. 
 
In Dubai and other Arab states, the authoritarian power structure is centred 
around what has been labelled dimuqratiyyatal-Khubz (democracy of bread): 
the tacit social contract in which the regime provides social and economic 
welfare in return for political loyalty (Sadiki 1997 cited in Kumar 2006:5).  
The Islamic principality of Dubai never succumbed to the oil curse theory 
syndrome, but instead, the rulers of the emirate have in recent times 
transformed the previously underdeveloped city state into a prosperous 
sheikhdom and model of development that has been replicated across the 
region and into Eurasia. This also prompted my interest and rationale for 
undertaking the study.  
 
In addition to the points outlined above, the following are other specific 
rationales for this study and are based on the premise that Dubai’s 
development model, as described in development economics literature, is 
unique. The uniqueness of the given model is viewed with the following 
perspectives: 
 
(i) Dubai is considered a developing state, yet it does not possess those 
characteristics that seem to beset other developing states, such as: 
high rates of unemployment, deeply imbedded social problems, fiscal 
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deficit, IMF/ World Structural Adjustment Programs, brain drain 
etcetera. 
(ii) The social and economic institutions of the city state depend heavily 
on an army of expatriate labour to operate the state apparatus and 
simultaneously train and mentor its local citizens to eventually take 
over and run state owned entities and the bureaucracy.  
(iii) Dubai does not depend on Overseas Development Aid (ODA); indeed, 
in contrast to other developing countries it provides development 
assistance funds through its Dubai Cares Funding Agency to finance 
education in the MENA Region, East and West Africa.   
(iv) Unlike countries from Latin America, Africa and the Caribbean, 
Dubai is a part of a federal state with partial autonomy. Dubai is 
subject to the federal law of the UAE but retains the right to 
administer its own internal affairs.  
(v) The socio-economic development agenda is the vision of one man: the 
ruler of Dubai, Prime Minister and Vice–President of the United Arab 
Emirates, His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum. 
This vision is then hierarchically cascaded down to a close circle of 
trusted lieutenants and from there to a well organised and efficient 
expatriate dominated bureaucracy.  
(vi) Similar to the artificial carving up of sub-Saharan Africa, borders in 
the region were “drawn based on politics by the colonial powers rather 
than historical, cultural or ethnic backgrounds or social consensus 
which led to subsequent ethnic and religious civil conflicts” (Dahi and 
Demir 2008:7). This similarity has evoked a personal motivation to 
investigate which fundamental sets of the inter-related factors have 
contributed to Dubai’s success. 
In essence, a summation of the rationales for the study is an attempt to fill a 
gap in the way Dubai’s socio-economic development literature is presented, 
explained and analysed. In addition, there is a need to contextualise Dubai’s 
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development policies and strategies into a development paradigm within the 
development studies discourse.  
 
1.2.2. Problem statement  
 
The state of underdevelopment globally, whether spatial, social or economic 
is problematic, having definite political and socio-economic implications.  
The need to achieve holistic development in Dubai has been pursued in a 
multi-dimensional way, similar to the process and definition of development 
which is multi-faceted by nature in order to overcome its previous state of 
socio-economic underdevelopment. The societies of the Gulf countries, 
including Dubai, have a traditional, tribal political structure and are often 
referred to as rentier-state economies, relying pre-dominantly on a single 
source of income generated from the export of fossil fuels (Kumar 2006:02). 
Dubai is ruled by a dynastic monarchy and has been described by Jonathan 
Mann of CNN “as a tiny, synthetic city-state that has transformed itself and 
is now literally changing the landscape around it, making its own new world 
out of oil money and ambition”(Mann 2007). 
 
Hvidt (2007) expresses the concern that “...as the developmental process 
unfolds in Dubai it has only received cursory reports in the news media, 
news oriented magazines and business literature, therefore only fragmented 
information is available.” Such fragmented information includes literature 
that captures Dubai’s economic transformation on the basis of macro-
economic variables/indicators, which include GDP per capita, rate of 
unemployment, economic growth and spatial development across the 
Emirate. 
 
The development strategies and plans of the UAE and Dubai have been 
designed on the premise that “...the fundamental objective of development is 
the welfare of society and ensuring its continuity for the present and future 
human beings” (Al-Sadik 2008:209). Unfortunately, debate concerning 
Dubai’s socio-economic development has not encapsulated or reflected a 
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development theory or model. There is a tendency to analyse Dubai’s 
developmental path without addressing the correlation between politics, 
economics and development and how all three are interwoven. “Dubai’s 
developmental achievements are related to its governance structure. It 
encompasses an autocratic (soft) rule, strong developmental visions, a lean 
and efficient state apparatus, active market interference, reliance on the 
market mechanism and a pragmatic (not ideological) approach to 
development” (Hvidt 2007:4). The problem, however, is that literature on 
Dubai’s socio-economic development postulates a narrow mapping of the 
process and the trend is to present studies on the UAE and Dubai from a 
spatial and descriptive ontological perspective.   
 
The main research problem addressed in this study may be formulated as: 
An Analysis of Dubai’s Socio-Economic Performance and Development 
Strategies 1998-2008, given its history, socio-political structure and lack of 
human capital, its geo-political environment, and lack of democratic 
governance. These fundamental characteristics of modern Dubai have led to 
the research objectives outlined below. 
 
1.3. Research Objectives 
 
The research explores the approaches and strategies of socioeconomic 
development in Dubai over a ten year period. Specifically, the study 
attempts:  
(i) To analyse and evaluate Dubai’s Development Strategic Plans (DSPs) 
of 1996, 2010 and 2015. 
(ii)  To test the value of development theories, specifically those of the 
developmental state, the competition state and the rentier theory in 
explaining socio-economic development of Dubai. 
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(iii) To review and espouse role leadership or good governance in 
designing and implementing policies aimed at achieving targeted 
socio-economic development outcomes in Dubai over a ten year period 
(iv) To analyse social developments (including heath care, education,  
women empowerment, civil society) in the emirate of Dubai 
(v) To analyse the role which good governance played in Dubai’s 
development.  
 
1.3.1. Main research questions  
 
The aim of this section is to present the primary research question which 
seeks to investigate: What Dubai’s socio-economic development strategies 
and performance have been over the period 1998 to 2008? In order to 
provide answers to the above question, the following sub-questions are 
addressed: 
 
(i) What socio-economic development approaches did Dubai pursue to 
achieve its present level of growth and development? 
(ii)  Is there a strong correlation between the state’s involvement and 
development in Dubai?  
(iii) Can Dubai be considered a developmental state, a rentier state or a 
competition state? 
(iv) What role has leadership and style of governance played in enhancing 
the socio-economic development of Dubai?  
(v) Are there visible signs of integrated development planning in Dubai’s 
approach to urban and socio-economic transformation?  
(vi) How has Dubai harnessed expatriate labour for national development?  
(vii)  How did Dubai protect and empower its minority population in 
the process of national development?  
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1.4. Significance and Justification of the Study 
1.4.1. Significance of the study 
 
The Emirate of Dubai has been able to achieve socio-economic development 
in a region in which “...the empirical realities reflect the glaring deficiencies 
in human rights and a track record of uneven development”(Alvi 2005: 142). 
There is also a need to add to the body of academic literature written on the 
transformation of UAE within the development studies discourse, as 
opposed to single a sector specific analysis and business related 
commentaries.  
The significance of this thesis may be regarded within the following context:  
(i) The research will be of value to other development practitioners and 
individuals interested in international development. 
(ii)  It will re-contextualise and re-orient Dubai’s development literature, 
available from an academic point of view. 
(iii) The study seeks to fill a gap in the availability of scientific 
information on the development process and success of Dubai. 
(iv) The study will stimulate further research into the ascribed 
development model used by the leaders and policymakers of the 
UAE, and Dubai in particular, through which they have achieved an 
unprecedented level of socio-economic transformation and 
development in the last decade. 
(v) The study represents academic research in an area that is under- 
explored despite the remarkably successful, yet unorthodox 
approach to socio-economic achievement.  
(vi) The study utilises fragmented information on Dubai based on 
measurable outcomes such as GDP per capita, to define and 
contextualise the city’s development within development studies 
discourses. 
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1.5. Conceptualisation of the Developmental Process 
 
The sociology of development (Gereffi 1989:505) is regarded by Remenyi as a 
“process-directed outcome, encapsulating improved standards of living, 
greater capacity for self-reliance in economies that are technically more 
complex and more dependent on global integration than before” (2004: 22). 
Todaro (2000:16) puts it slightly differently, by outlining that “development 
must be conceived of as a multi-dimensional process involving major 
changes in social structures, popular attitude and national institutions, as 
well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and 
the eradication of poverty.”  
 
Every nation strives after development (Todaro 1992:98) and Dubai is no 
different. “The objective of development on a global scale is to reduce the gap 
in wealth between developed and developing countries and on a national 
scale the object is to reduce poverty and underdevelopment” (Fair 1982 cited 
in Chazireni 2003: 22). These objectives are encapsulated in the eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which are multi-dimensional in their 
focus and trajectories. 
 
Development Studies literature articulates and emphasises that 
development is more than total GDP, or GDP per capita of a country. 
Instead, it has been universally accepted that development includes the 
uncompromising involvement of the populace in the process. On the 
contrary, Jabbra observed that “citizens of the Arab world do not participate 
positively and actively in the developmental process of their societies” 
(Jabbra 1989:4). It is generally accepted that development should primarily 
be people centred as it concerns the population and within that context, 
Sáìgh (1978:12), made a most salient point, stating that “...decisions 
involved in the design of development strategies and policies and in the 
allocation and use of development resources must themselves also be 
accompanied by wide social and political participation by the population.” 
This point is further developed by Kadir (2011:4) who stated that “the 
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fundamental premise of the right to development is predicated on the 
freedom to participate in political life, the right to work and equality of 
opportunity, peace and security.”  
 
1.6. Theoretical Framework  
 
The developmental path of every society is charted or informed by one or a 
combination of development paradigm/s as empirical research and 
economic orthodoxy since the post-world war II would suggest.  In most 
cases there is no announcement of the development paradigm being 
followed; instead, social scientists ascribe a model of development after the 
fact.  
 
Dubai’s economic development achievements cannot be pigeonholed solely 
into any of the following paradigms: dependency, developmental state, 
competition state, neo-classic economic model, export led growth (ELG), 
modernization, Marxism, and welfare state. For this reason, the theoretical 
framework of this thesis is drawn from the rentier, developmental and 
competition state theories. The chosen theoretical concepts of competition 
and rentier states are derived from international political economy (Cerny 
2000), whilst the developmental states theory emanates from development 
studies and international sociology (Abe 2006:6), as the appropriate 
barometers by which to gauge and situate this study.  The rationale for the 
selection of those development paradigms is heavily influenced by Hvidt 
(2007: 5), who states that “Dubai’s development record is unique, especially 
within the socio-economic and political setting of the Middle East.” Thus, 
the theoretical models chosen seek to contextualise, document and analyse 
Dubai’s development within the development studies discourse.  
 
In addition, in order to adequately analyse the research objectives and 
questions, it is deemed appropriate to explore the development theories 
drawn from the academic disciplines of political economy and development 
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studies. The development paradigms proposed for this thesis are not without 
weaknesses and thus have attracted criticism within academic and socio-
political communities.  
 
1.6.1. Rentier state theory 
 
Political economists such as Luciani and Beblawi in the1980s described the 
rentier state model as an analytical tool for understanding the lack of 
democracy driven by exogenous sources of rent such as oil wealth (Hudson 
2009:60). This influx of oil wealth may have a diabolical effect on a country’s 
development as seen in Nigeria, Libya and Angola. Terry Lynn Karl (1997), in 
his book “The Paradox of Plenty”, explains the oil curse theory and argues 
that “a government’s oil revenues harm the development of a state’s 
economy as well as its political system.” Thus, this study attempts to 
determine if Dubai is a fully fledged rentier-state or it simply demonstrates 
elements of the rentier state theory.  
 
Dubai exhibited the income structure of a rentier state until the mid-1980s 
and external rents currently still count for a substantial part of the 
Emirate’s revenues. However, Dubai has never demonstrated completely 
typical rentier state behaviour (Sailer, 2010: vii). The rentier state theory is 
not able to satisfactorily explain its economic policies before 1985 and it 
remains  unclear if the policies after 1985 may be interpreted as a crisis 
management measure in accordance with the rentier-state theory (Ibid: VII). 
On the contrary, Almezaini (2010:3) argues that “the UAE characterises a 
rentier state that continues to shape the current structure of government. In 
return for loyalty and for not demanding political reform, the state offers its 
citizens enormous material wealth. This rentierism continues to enhance the 
legitimacy of the authorities.”   
 
In summary: based on a review of the literature, expert opinion and 
observation, it may be deduced that the Dubai Strategic Plans of 1996, 
2010, and 2015 represent mere development policies geared towards 
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achieving measurable goals. Thus, the theoretical or conceptual framework 
for analysing the socio-economic development strategies of Dubai over the 
period of 1998-2008 is part of a broader framework for explaining a possible 
development model, as there is no single development model but instead a 
seeming hybridisation of models.  
 
1.6.2. Developmental state model 
 
Drawing on the work inter alia, of Johnson (1982), Deyo (1987) and Evans 
(1995), we understand a developmental state to exist when the state 
possesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about a positive 
transformation of society within a condensed period of time (Verena and 
Menocal 2007: 533). The concept of the developmental state gained currency 
in a polarised debate about the respective roles of state and market in 
economic development in the 1980’s, especially when the role of the state 
was considered pivotal to economic development, as it was in East Asian 
countries such as Japan and South Korea (Cao 2008: 166-167). It is 
important to note that, “the developmental state and its associated policies 
are not unique to Japan or East Asia. A similar type of model, albeit a more 
restrictive one, was also followed in Latin America during the period that 
lasted from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1960s and, in 
some cases, the 1970s” (Caldentey, 2008:27). Allen and Thomas (2004:359) 
argue that “the developmental state model of South East Asia represented 
prior to the crisis in 1996 a distinct brand of capitalism which differs in 
significant ways from its European and American counterparts.”  
 
Dubai is similar to the East Asian or the Newly Industrialised Countries 
(NICs) which “...have strong political and bureaucratic leadership that 
directs the economy towards achieving developmental goals” (Hirata 2002:1). 
However, unlike the NICs, Dubai’s developmental state has injected more 
social dimensions into the model, through for example, the provision of: free 
education, healthcare, government grants to encourage its citizens to marry, 
heavily subsidised electricity and water. This is made possible because it is 
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the “...government, and not the private sector, that takes the lead in the 
development of Dubai” (Hvdit 2009: 400). This point is supported by the 
Moody’s Report (2008) that asserted “Dubai’s development rests on a 
centrally coordinated approach, integrated across the Emirate’s core 
strategic sectors.”  
 
Dubai displays features of an authoritarian developmental state as 
described by Leftwich (1998:62-3 cited in Allen & Tomas 2004), possessing 
the following distinct features: a dedicated developmental elite; a complex 
and insulated economic bureaucracy; a weak and/or subordinated civil 
society and the relative autonomy of the state apparatus. Ha-Joon Chang 
sums up these features, in noting that “development strategy is a complex 
set of interrelated policies rather than a simple matter of trade policy, as is 
often implied by the mainstream literature” (2006: 4). The complexity in 
constructing development strategies is reflective of the thematic deficiencies 
that beset development theories, which will be addressed in chapter five. 
 
1.6.3. Competition state 
 
Drawing on the theoretical work of Cerny (2000) and data from a 
longitudinal empirical investigation over several years, the researcher 
contends that Dubai is transforming into a competition state (Abdullah & 
Nicholson 2009: 25). The main focus of the competition state is to promote 
economic activities at home and abroad, enabling the firms that operate 
within the state to be competitive in the global market (Ibid: 32). The 
competition state is based on the ideology of the neoliberal state, where the 
state promotes the process of openness, deregulation, and liberalisation 
(Ibid: 33).  
 
Dubai’s quest to build its development tracks through the use of cluster 
initiatives, such as the academic city, an ICT industry and the Emirates 
Group, characterises the tenets of a competition state as theorized by Cerny 
(2000). The state works to attract foreign states and firms to engage in long-
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term, mutually beneficial relations with domestic counterparts (Al-Qasimi, et 
Al. 1999:2). The Government of Dubai provides, “...legal regimes, regulatory 
frameworks and allocative systems, so that the system works for the 
domestic population and for outsiders coming in to invest” (Ibid: 2). The 
Dubai International Financial Centre, Jabel Ali Free Zones, Dubai Media 
City, modern infrastructure, strategic partnerships and International 
Academic City, are examples of the effective systems and legislative 
mechanisms that have been put in place to attract and protect foreign direct 
investors as well as domestic investors. 
 
1.7. Research Methodology  
 
The purpose of this research is to use the rentier, state, developmental state 
and competition state development paradigms to locate Dubai’s socio-
economic development strategies. Development Studies is cross-disciplinary 
in nature, thus lending itself to mixed research methods. After deciding on 
the research questions, research objectives, reviewing of research methods 
literature and taking into account the methodological limitations, the 
researcher elected to use both qualitative and quantitative research methods 
to conduct the proposed study. Socio-economic data sets will be collected 
from a cross-section or a combination of primary and secondary sources for 
this single study and will be integrated to achieve the research questions 
outlined Section1.2.1. The chosen research approach, methods, dataset 
sources, processes of collecting and analyzing datasets will be described and 
fully explained in chapter four.  
 
1.8. Time Period Covered by the Study  
 
The study period, between the years 1998 to 2008, was chosen for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, in late 1996, Dubai announced an ambitious strategic 
development plan called "Into the 21st Century" under which it included 
$12 billion worth of projects, to bolster the non-fossil fuel sectors of the 
economy. Since then, further planning has been encapsulated in Vision 
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2010 and the Dubai Strategic Plan (DSP) 2015; which seek to achieve social 
and economic development in an organised, integrated and holistic manner. 
It was deemed appropriate by the author to locate the study two years into 
Dubai’s first development plan.  
 
Secondly, it is the researcher’s intention is to examine Dubai’s achievements 
(social and economic) in that ten year period of intensive economic planning, 
as reflected in the emirate’s  macro-economic indicators, while it took 
Singapore and other developing countries almost 50 years to achieve a 
similar set of objectives. Thirdly, to consider the effects of the global 
economic recession, that started in 2008 and impacted negatively on the 
development trajectory of Dubai by derailing the city state’s development 
agenda.  Fourthly, to examine how, during the late 1990’s through to 2008, 
Dubai attempted to play “catch-up” with the rest of the emerging and 
developed economies. Finally, 1990s ushered in a new era in which the 
development community saw the emergence of the post-Washington 
consensus; and thus the re-emergence of the state as a major player in their 
economies.    
 
1.9. Scope and Delimitations of Study 
 
It is not the intention of the author to study all the sectors that comprise the 
Dubai economy. It is also not the intention of this study to examine the 
socio-economic development of all the United Arab Emirates, but, rather, to 
focus on Dubai specifically. The basis for this is that each Emirate of the 
confederation of the UAE operates in a unique and different environment 
with varied organisational culture, political leadership and institutional 
framework, ably supported by federal institutions. The proposed study will 
seek to explore fundamental institutional, social and macro-economic 
development policies that have contributed to the holistic transformation of 
Dubai, and place it within development paradigms.  
 
19 
 
1.10. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of ten chapters and an appendices section. The basic 
structures are as follows:  
 
Chapter One 
This chapter introduces the thesis and outlines the research questions and 
objectives of the research design. It additionally covers the rationale and 
background for the study; the problem statement; contextualisation of 
development studies as an academic discipline; the theoretical framework; 
the significance of the research and scope and delimitation. 
 
Chapter Two 
This chapter presents an overview of the political, geo-political, socio-
economic and historical background of the UAE and Dubai in particular. 
Chapter two also seeks to situate the socio-economic development of Dubai 
within the broader context of the UAE’s development, based on its pre and 
post European historical encounter up to the present period in its history.  
 
Chapter Three  
This chapter reviews relevant literature regarding Dubai’s socio-economic 
development transformation published by various authors, thinkers and 
scholars. The review will contextualise the study within development 
paradigms relevant to the research, based on the following sub-topics: 
spatial development, public participation, good governance and public 
policy.   
 
Chapter Four 
Chapter four addresses the research methodology of the thesis, aimed at 
effectively covering the research objectives. It will explain the research types 
of research and information. The data sources, data collection methods and 
statistical processing of data will be explained in this chapter. The strengths 
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and limitations of each method will be spelt out. Justification of the methods 
used and ethical considerations will also be discussed. 
 
Chapter Five 
This chapter addresses the theoretical aspect, providing an overview; 
analysis and critique of four mainstream development theories and in the 
process explain why they cannot be applied fully to an understanding or 
explanation of the socio-economic development trajectory of Dubai. The gap 
created by the theoretical critique of development theories will be addressed 
by making a case for the development paradigms of: rentier, competition and 
developmental states, as a hybrid development model which may be used to 
explain Dubai’s development.  
 
Chapter Six  
In chapter six, the theoretical framework of the thesis is discussed and 
situated within the proposition that Dubai’s socio-economic transformation 
was carried out using a combination of the rentier state, developmental and 
competition (RDC) states model. In addition, the state-society relationship 
was examined to provide support for the theoretical framework that guides 
the entire research project.    
 
Chapter Seven 
This chapter synthesises and analyses the DSPs of 1996, 2000 and 2015 to 
examine the socio-economic development of Dubai as it is carried out within 
the parameters of integrated development planning by the state and 
policymakers. This chapter also functions as a filter to compartmentalise 
and refine the underlying tenets or features of Dubai’s socio-economic 
development strategies investigated in this study. The chapter also covers 
discussions and schematically displays the process and complexity of 
developmental policy making. 
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Chapter 8 
This chapter delves into the emotive and thorny issue of the need for 
Emiratisation and the harnessing of expatriate labour to enhance the socio-
economic development of Dubai. The demographic composition of Dubai and 
its implications for national development are also addressed in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 9 
This chapter addresses the merits and demerits of Dubai's development 
model. Its social and economic achievements are explained in this chapter 
while it also addresses issues such as institutionalised racism; exploitation 
of expatriate labour; limited rights extended to the local and expatriate 
communities; lack of public participation in the political process and the 
right or not to citizenship as well as Dubai’s over-dependence on foreign 
labour and foreign debt. 
 
Chapter 10  
This chapter concludes the study by summarising the research findings and 
making suggestions for further research. A summative overview of the whole 
study, along with recommendations is provided, with the emphasis 
predominantly on issues that are of paramount importance to the future of 
the Dubai Model. 
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 Chapter Two 
Trucial States: A Socio-Political and Geo-Economic Historical 
Background 
The previous years were a testimony of the importance of the UAE Federation as a 
gateway toward a better life for our citizens and a means of achieving stability, 
advancement and prosperity in our country and realizing the dreams and aspirations 
of our people. 
 
Former President of the UAE Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Globally, nation states have not evolved in a vacuum, and indeed, they 
cannot, but instead have rather evolved out of a series of interrelated socio-
political and economic factors. It is against this background that Peck 
(1986:21) trenchantly and disconcertingly noted that “...the ancient history 
of what is now known as the ‘UAE’ and the Gulf as a whole remains largely 
conjectural and the absence of precise references in known historical 
documents and the remoteness of the area from earlier archaeological 
explorations preserved its secrets.” Strikingly, and in comparison to its early 
historical development Dhillion and Yousef (2009:1) write that “…in recent 
years, the Middle East has come to be defined by a series of dichotomies: 
democracy versus authoritarianism; Islam versus secularism; economically 
successful versus stagnation.” The former Trucial States, including Dubai, 
have evolved over the last 40 years as a glaring example of state led 
capitalistic development intertwined with a tribal neo-patrimonial form of 
socio-political system, supported by a modern bureaucratic structure.  
 
This chapter recounts the historical background of the United Arab 
Emirates including Dubai, and in part sets the stage to answer the main 
research topic of this thesis, as stated in chapter one.   The chapter is 
divided into eight major topics: Section 2.1 and Subsection 2.1.1 focus on 
the early inhabitants and political geography of the UAE including Dubai. 
Section 2.2 discusses the Ottoman influence in the Middle East. Section 2.3 
looks at the arrival of the Europeans in the southern Gulf of the Middle 
East. Section 2.4 deals with an Overview of Dubai’s Historical Background. 
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Section 2.5 discusses the formation of the UAE and its Political Systems and 
the Structure of the Federal and Emirate Level. Section 2.6 explores the 
UAE’s Federal Constitution and Institutions. Section 7 examines the Political 
Structure at the local/emirate level. Section 2.8 investigates the Socio-
Economic Development of the UAE and Dubai while Section 2.9 provides a 
conclusion of the chapter.        
 
2.2. Early Settlers of the UAE and Dubai (Bedouins)  
 
The seven Gulf Emirates (formerly known as the Trucial States) that 
compose today’s United Arab Emirates emerged as political tribal 
settlements resulting from the migration of Arabian tribes which settled in 
some locations where sources of livelihood were available (Loath 2007: 8). 
Heard-Bye (2001:101) supports this description in noting that, “the 
ancestors of the tribal population in the GCC and the UAE in particular 
have not always lived in the region. They took possession of the land during 
successive waves of population movements that brought Arab tribes from 
Yemen via Oman, as well as by way of central and northern Arabia.” It is the 
belief of some Middle Eastern historians that the Arab immigrants, upon 
arrival in southern Arabia, came into contact with the original people who 
inhabited the land and who were nomadic by nature.   
 
...Many of the current population living within the present-day borders of the 
United Arab Emiratis are descendents of Bedouin tribes, organized into a 
number of independent principalities (or emirates). Most have been ruled by 
a family from the 1800s until the present time (Nark 2010:6); a typical 
example is the ‘Al Nathan’ family that has been ruling Abu Dhabi 
uninterrupted from late 1700s (El Mallakh1970:136).  
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2.2.1. Political geography: 
 
The United Arab Emirates (territory: 83,600 km2) is situated on the eastern 
tip of the Arabian Peninsula and includes an archipelago of 200 islands  
which extends over approximately 5900 square kilometres (Simmons 
2005:358, UAE Yearbook 2000/1: 27). In demographic terms, Dubai is the 
second largest of the seven emirates in the United Arab Emirates. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the United Arab Emirates 
 
                            Source: http://www.memnav.com/w/maps/uae/ 
 
 
A careful examination of Figure 2.1 above shows that “...geographically, the 
UAE is surrounded by its two larger neighbours with Oman on the east 
Saudi Arabia on the south and west” (Foley 199:25). The UAE and “...Dubai 
in particular, is strategically placed and lies at the confluence of the ME, 
Asia, Western Africa and Central/Eastern Europe. It is in a bed of ancient 
civilizations, a birthplace of three major religions and a transit point for 
onward journeys” (Balakrishnan 2008: 63). It is important to note that the 
nation state of the United Arab Emirates and Dubai in particular were never 
ruled by a colonial power, due to fact that the UAE is a successor to the 
Trucial States. 
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2.3. Ottoman Influence 
 
Historical records revealed that, 
 ...the Ottoman Empire exerted considerable influence over the 
Arabian Peninsula, present day Iraq, and parts of Iran (formerly 
known as Persia) from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Ottoman influence 
in the Arabian Peninsula gradually dissipated under pressure from 
local tribes in the interior and as the Gulf and Peninsula coast came 
under British naval domination. Protectorate arrangements with local 
Arab rulers continued until the British withdrew in 1971 (EAAU, 
2000:3).  
More than one European power has been involved in the Gulf region during 
the last few centuries. With its strategic location on the route to India, “...the 
Gulf became inextricably linked with the commercial and political rivalries of 
western countries: Portugal first, then Holland and France, and finally 
Britain” (Zahlan 1989:4). The legacy of the British is evident in almost every 
tenet of national and local institutions.  
 
2.4. Arrival of the Europeans  
2.4.1. Portuguese era 
 
A review of historical records would reveal that Portugal helped to usher in 
what historians regarded as the Europe’s second commercial foreign 
expansionism agenda. Thus, it was not surprising when:  
 
“In the early sixteenth century, Portuguese traders presented the first 
European challenge for control of the region. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the Dutch and British competed in the area for 
access to the sea trade routes and to local traders. The “maritime 
warfare” of the local traders or “piracy” (according to the British) 
frustrated British attempts to achieve dominance in the region and by 
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the late 1700s, the French threatened British aspirations" (Simons 
2005:358).  
 
The Portuguese arrival in the Gulf in the sixteenth century had bloody 
consequences for the Arab residents of Julfar and East Coast ports of Dibba, 
Bidiya, Khor Fakkan and Kalba. However, while European powers competed 
for regional supremacy, a local power, the Qawasims, were gathering 
strength (Al Abed et al. 2008:11). At the beginning of the nineteenth century 
they had built up a fleet of over 60 large vessels and could put nearly 20,000 
sailors to sea, eventually provoking a British offensive to control the 
maritime trade routes between the Gulf and India (Ibid:11). 
 
Within the span of its modern history the Gulf witnessed first the 
Portuguese explorers, then the British, French and Dutch trading 
companies (Section 2.3.1 refers), all of whom sought to establish exclusive 
trading monopolies in its waters. To the Portuguese period of hegemony in 
the waters of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman  there succeeded an age 
when primacy in trade passed to the maritime nations of Northwestern 
Europe; above all, to England and the Netherlands (Rabi 2006:352). The 
establishment of the English and the Dutch East India companies in 1600 
and 1602 respectively, foreshadowed the Portuguese eclipse in the Gulf and 
marked the ascendency of the English and the Dutch there (Peck 1986:27). 
 
2.4.2. Era of Pax-Britannica  
 
In 1622, the English assisted the Persians in recovering Hormuz from the 
Portuguese and three years later combined with the Dutch to defeat 
Portugal’s attempt to regain its position there. It follows then that the origins 
of the British presence in the Gulf stood in sharp contrast to the old saying 
that “trade follows the flag.” Throughout the seventeenth century and much 
of the eighteenth century, the activities of the English East India Company 
in the Persian Gulf were primarily commercial (Peck 1986: 27-8; Rabi 2006 
:352). This signalled the genesis of what this study refers to as an “Anglo-
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Arab-Persian” relationship that is still inextricably intertwined and deeply 
embedded politically and economically in the southern Gulf of the Middle 
East.  
 
The Qawasim, mainly land and sea traders, dominated what are today the 
emirates of Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah. The Bani Yas, who were 
agricultural and pastoral, lived in what are today the emirates of Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the area 
became known as the Pirate Coast, as both European and Arab pirates 
attacked foreign ships. The British mounted expeditions against the pirates 
during this period, culminating in an 1818 campaign against the pirates 
headquarters of Ras al Khaymah and other harbours along the coast. This 
action ostensibly was taken to safeguard British maritime routes, 
particularly those of the British East India Company, but some historians 
have noted that the war was in fact motivated by the British desire to 
establish supremacy in the region against the claims of other European 
powers (Federal Research Division 2007:2; Al-Otabi 1989: iv; Griffiths 
2005:358). 
 
The Trucial States (now the UAE) were increasingly absorbed into the British 
orbit by a system of agreements which successive British governments, first 
in Delhi and then in London, deemed necessary in order to best pursue their 
particular objectives of the day (Heard-Bey 2001:117). This has led to the 
enactment of a multiplicity of agreements that firmly legitimises the highly 
skewed “Anglo-Arab-Persian” relationship. The term “Trucial States” was 
derived in the 1850s from a Perpetual Treaty of Maritime Truce between 
several Emirs and the British (Al-Ali 2008:9, Musris-Abd Allah 1978: 249); 
the term was dropped after the sheikhdoms were granted independence 
from the British in 1971.   
 
The 1820 General Treaty of Peace, Pax Britannica, records the agreement 
established with the British who signed a series of agreements with various 
rulers (sheikhs) designed to guarantee peace between Britain and the tribes 
and end the practice of piracy (Onley 2009; Griffiths 2005: 358). The 1820 
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treaty includes the first denunciation of the slave trade ever written into a 
formal treaty. However, this treaty did not, in practice, prevent regular 
warfare at sea among the tribes of the coast (Federal Research Division 
2007:2). The subsequent maritime truces of 1835 and 1853 (Treaty of 
Maritime Peace in Perpetuity) brought an end to the flourishing piracy along 
the eastern coast as noted by El Mallakh (1970: 136). Referring to these 
historical facts, Onley is of the opinion “that the Treaty of Maritime Peace in 
Perpetuity essentially marked the coming of Pax-Britannica to impose itself 
as “guardian of the Persian Gulf” (Onley 2009: I). Since the signing of the 
“Perpetual Maritime Truce treaty in 1835 (to limit piracy on the seas), there 
has been a close link between Britain and the sheikdoms of current-day 
Arab Gulf” (Nyarko 2010:6).  
 
This series of treaties put the Trucial States squarely within the clutches of 
the British and in part helped to established a relationship with Britain that 
would last up to independence in 1971 (Rabi 2006: 354). As one historian 
stated, the treaties between the Trucial States (Dubai included) were 
exclusive and far reaching in terms of the subordination of local sheikhs to 
the British political governance (Lootah, 2007: 8). These agreements were 
signed subsequent to the “defeat of the Qawasim tribal group, by the British 
who over time signed agreements with the sheikhs of the individual 
emirates, beginning in the 1820s. Later these agreements, augmented with 
treaties on preserving a maritime truce, resulted in the area becoming 
known as The Trucial States” (Al Abed 2008:12). Ironically, even though 
there were unequal power relations between the British and the locals in 
other words these sheikhdoms of the GCC, they were not colonies of Britain 
(Lootah, 2007: 8). In other words, the principalities or sheikdoms of the 
former “Trucial States” and the wider Gulf had become mere British 
protectorates.  
 
Emanating from the presence of the British in the Southern Gulf is the 
artificial erection of  “…border demarcation by the British in the nineteenth 
century; in which many of these borders  are currently, being contested; for 
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example no defined borders separate parts of the UAE and Oman; Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen; and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. However, progress in 
delineating these borders is being made” (EAAU 2000:3). In 1892, in what 
could be perceived as the most comprehensive and definitive “Exclusive 
Treaty,” Bahrain and the Trucial States agreed:  
 
Firstly, not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any 
power other than the British government. Secondly, not to allow any 
agent of another government to reside within their territories without 
the assent of the British government; and thirdly, not to sell, cede, 
mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of their territory, 
except to the British Government (Aitchison 1933:257 cited in Rabi 
2006: 354). 
 
Razvi has drawn attention to a significant point when he noted that “from 
1820 to 1971, when Britain pulled out of the Gulf area, it was the strongest 
power in the region, and as such kept the Trucial States in almost total 
isolation until the early 1950s. Its main interest, of course, had been to 
safeguard the route to India, and it was not concerned with local conditions” 
(1993:664). This is similar to the experiences of some Indian Ocean islands 
that were colonies of Britain.  
 
2.5. Overview of Dubai’s Historical Background 
 
Dubai is an emirate within the greater United Arab Emirates (UAE), located 
in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula (Ramos 2009:1). The origins of 
the name Dubai or Dibai or Dubbayy are uncertain. Some attribute it to a 
combination of the Farsi words of “two” and “brothers”, referring to Deira 
and Bur Dubai. Others say it was derived from the market named Daba or 
the spiny-tailed lizard, Dab once found in this part of the world (Saunders 
2003:34). The historical narrative is both colourful and riddled with gaps, 
based on who is enunciating the chronology of events that have marked the 
emirate’s socio-economic and geo-political evolution. Ramos remarked that:  
30 
 
...to understand Dubai’s modern history since its founding in 1833, one 
must go further back in time to explore the regional history that frames its 
foundation. European powers, beginning with the Venetians, and then 
subsequently, the Portuguese, the Dutch, and finally the British, were 
interested in the Gulf region as a means to secure trade routes to and from 
the Indian Subcontinent and points eastward (2009:1). 
 
In contrast to Abu Dhabi, politics in Dubai has been relatively 
straightforward. Although a fishing village had existed on the site of Dubai 
Town since the 18th century, it only became independent of Abu Dhabi's Al 
Bu Falah in 1833 when another Bani Yas section, the Al Bu Falasa, seceded 
from Abu Dhabi and took up residence in Dubai (Peterson 1988:3-5). 
According to Fatma Salem (2010: 06), “the historical records of Dubai, 
suggest that the history of Dubai dates back to 1833 when members of the 
Bani Yas tribe took up residence at the creek in Dubai, a natural seaport.”  
 
However, it would be more logical and prudent to say “the city of Dubai was 
resettled in 1833 by approximately 800 members of the Bani Yas tribe” 
(Melamid 2009: 345). It is against this background that local historian Al- 
Rashid (1997) points out that “...the present day Dubai began in 1833, when 
a branch of Bani Yas tribe left Abu Dhabi (Capital City) led by Obaid bin 
Said and Maktoum bin Buti.” The arrival of the Bani Yas tribe marked “the 
second phase of re-settlement to have taken place in Dubai since by the 
1820s the area around the Creek had become a well established fishing and 
pearling community” (Saunders 2003:34).   
 
Al- Rashid (1997:127) further noted “...Dubai, similar to other emirates has 
for more than one hundred years had successive rulers who have combined 
autocracy on one hand and patriarchal near democracy on the other hand; 
holding power under the principle of being first amongst equals and 
maintaining their positions by virtue of their accomplishments.”  Political 
commentator Jim Cranner (2009 December) in an interview with the BBC, 
concurs, in noting that “Dubai is a tribal autocracy which has been ruled by 
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the Maktoum family since 1883, without hitch or coup d’état; and during 
that time four USA presidents have been assassinated.” In essence, 
“...Dubai is a monarchy governed by autocratic regimes with all power 
leaning leading towards a single person” (Henderson 2007: 35; Matly & 
Dillion 2007:1). 
 
The branch of the Bani Yas confederation that split from the main group 
centred on Abu Dhabi and the Liwa oases and under the leadership of the 
Maktoum family led a bloodless coup with a group of 800 individuals, 
settling on the shore of the Khor Dubai in 1833 (Murray 2008:1; Lavergne, 
2006:6). Similar to other Arabian Gulf States (AGS) and “...any Bedouin 
society, this was a hierarchical and patrimonial, but nonetheless fluid and 
so to speak a ‘democratic’ group, where power of the tribesmen was shaky. 
Often shifting between the major families, and where each family head had 
all possibility to quit [sic] the group to join another one, in case of 
disagreement over the policy implemented by the ruler of the day” (Lavergne 
2006:6).  
 
Thereafter, 
 
...the Al-Maktoum dynasty was established in Dubai in 1836, with the 
associate monarchical intrigues of loyalty, lineage and succession. In spite of 
the overarching Trucial treaties, which focused principally on the sea peace, 
Dubai’s tenuous status between the Qawasim and the Bani Yas required a 
mix of political cunning and natural luck to keep each group at bay from 
overtaking the fledging Dubai. Similar to the larger political intrigues of the 
previous centuries among the Portuguese, Dutch and British, the three 
factions frequently shifted allegiances for their own benefit (Ramos 2009:10).  
 
2.6. Formation of the UAE and its Political Systems & Structure at the 
Federal and Emirate Level 
 
The British favoured greater cooperation among the Trucial States and in 
1952, the seven sheikhdoms – Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras al-
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Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain – formed the Trucial States 
Council, which provided a forum for the discussion of issues of mutual 
concern and coordination (Simons 2005: 359). However by “January 1968, 
the Labour Government under Harold Wilson declared it could no longer 
afford the £12 million a year it cost to keep its forces in the Gulf and would 
be withdrawing its military by the end of 1971” (Saffoury 1970:104 cited in 
Onley 2009: 29). With the impending British withdrawal from the Gulf, the 
seven Trucial States, and, for a while, Bahrain and Qatar began negotiations 
in 1968 toward an independent union (Peterson 1988:2). However, in 1971, 
the Gulf States of Bahrain and Qatar, then still under British protection, 
opted for full independence as opposed to becoming a member of a federal 
system of government.   
 
Following the British termination of their agreements with the Trucial States 
and their subsequent withdrawal from the Gulf, a federal state of, initially, 
six emirates, known as Dawlat al Imarat al Arabiyya al Mutta hida (State of 
the United Arab Emirates) or, more commonly as the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), was formally established on 2 December 1971. Ra’s al-Khayma joined 
in February 1972, with Sheikh Zayed, who had been instrumental in its 
formation, and who became the federation’s first President along with 
Sheikh Rashid as his Vice President (Al Abed 2008 et al. 2008:12; Peterson 
1988:2; UAE Yearbook 2000/1:71).  
 
2.6.1. Political systems: federal level 
 
Any attempt to understand the political structure of the United Arab 
Emirates and the position of its public participation values, requires a deep 
search into the roots of the political structure of the seven Emirates: 
specifically into the tribal political structure, the position of political 
participation within it, as well as a return to the historical realities of this 
political structure (Lootah, 2007:8). The potency and centrality of Lootah’s 
comment is concurred to by Heard-Bey (2001:101) in stating that “…coming 
from the tribally structured and highly organised culture of Yemen, where a 
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sophisticated edifice such as the Marib dam was built and maintained, the 
immigrants in the UAE retained their tribal structures and community-
building genealogies and legends.”  We are also reminded by Lootah (2007:8) 
that: 
…desert natural conditions that dictated a life of migration and movement 
generated, in turn, the tribal political system as a flexible and appropriate 
organization for the tribal process of continuous movement. Tribal political 
organization, though simple in nature, and although treated by some as a 
primitive form of organization, did not ascend to the level of state-formation, 
as mentioned earlier. However, it is considered the most appropriate form of 
organization for tribal life and its natural and social considerations.  
 
Historically, the ruling tribal elites have held a monopoly of power in all of 
these Gulf States, a position buttressed by the availability of effective and 
loyal armed forces and internal security apparatus to quash any domestic 
challenge. In many cases the internal security forces include a large 
proportion of foreign nationals and exclude certain tribal or, in the case of 
Bahrain, religious factions from their ranks (Ehteshami and Wright 
2007:914). The modern socio-political construct of the UAE has evolved into:  
 
…a federal presidential partial monarchy as the president is elected from      
among the absolute monarchs who rule each of the seven emirates. The 
country ruled by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al- Nahyan who 
succeeded his father Sheikh the late Sheikh Zayed, in November 2004 
(Grant et.al 2007:508).  
 
The UAE’s political system, which is a unique combination of the traditional 
and the modern, has been a political success. Thus, enabling the country to 
develop a modern administrative structure while, at the same time, ensuring 
that the best of the traditions of the past are maintained, adapted and 
preserved (UAE Yearbook 2000/1: 71).  
 
When, the rulers of the emirates met over four decades ago to agree on the 
forms of government for their new federal state. They deliberately chose not 
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to simply copy from others but, instead to work towards a society that would 
offer the best  form of modern administration; while simultaneously 
retaining the traditional forms of government that, with their inherent 
commitment to consensus, discussion and direct democracy, offered the best 
features of the past (UAE Yearbook 2007: 47).  
 
In essence, an alternative form of political governance emerged, in the 
structure of a power-sharing agreement brokered by the rulers of each 
emirate of the then newly formed UAE at a federal level. Political federalism 
was unfamiliar to, and an unprecedented mode of governance for, the former 
nomadic Bedouin tribes of the former Trucial States, when it was embarked 
upon in 1971. The political economy of the wider Arab world has not yet 
been able to embrace federalism as a form of governance.   
 
2.6.2. Public participation 
 
The socio-political systems that have emerged in the Arab world may be 
described as non-representative or non-participatory, and despotism is a 
distinguishing feature of the region. Peterson (2006:9) writes, “...take the six 
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they are ruled by 
monarchies with dirigiste governments; patriarchal rulers, and extensive 
ruling families occupy the upper echelons of these regimes.” The Arab Gulf 
States are among the least politically pluralistic regions and their leaders 
lack western style legitimacy, having political structures that are 
underpinned and sustained by the region’s geo-political, cultural and 
religious traditions. “...The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2010 Democracy 
index scored all the Arab states as ‘authoritarian regimes’, except for 
Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, which are classified as 
hybrids” (EIU 2011: 6).  
 
El Mallakh (1970:136) concurs, providing a typical example, by stating that 
“…Abu Dhabi's ruling family, the Al Nahyans, assumed authority in 1793; 
when Shakhbiut bin Sultan (1928-1966) spanned the years from poverty to 
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oil-based affluence until his replacement by his brother, Zayd bin Sultan.” 
The Al Nahyan family still governs Abu Dhabi and UAE in the capacity of the 
ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the United Arab Emirates. Similarly, the 
countries of Syria, Oman, Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, (prior to regime 
changes that took place in the later four countries during the Arab Spring of  
2011 have cumulatively had leaders who have governed these countries for 
over 150 years demonstrating a lack of broad-based power rotation and 
public participation; instead, revealing an entrenched dynastic succession of 
power. 
 
The federal state of the UAE operates by means of a gentlemanly power-
sharing arrangement between the seven ruling families. Abu Dhabi, by far 
the biggest emirate and the richest in oil, is dominant. It houses the federal 
capital, and its emir is the UAE’s head of state (www.economist.com: 2011). 
Schuster describes the machinations of the political process in the UAE in 
the following manner: 
 
… Both at the national and local level, political power in the UAE is held 
above all by unelected senior members of the local ruling families. Political 
rule in the UAE is hereditary and succession plans have traditionally been 
drawn-up in advance. In 2006, the UAE government took a first step towards 
opening the political system when it held elections to fill half of the seats on 
an advisory body known as the Federal National Council. The FNC and its 
representatives continue to be dominated by Emirati elites (2011:1). 
 
To summarise: the socio-political epistemology of the UAE and Dubai in 
particular, is deeply entrenched in patriarchal, dictatorial benevolence 
marked by political exclusion and dynastic transitions.  
 
2.7. UAE’s Federal Constitution and Political Institutions 
2.7.1. Constitution 
 
Between 1971 and 1996 the UAE had a provisional or interim constitution, 
which was renewed every five years. In 1996, the seven emirates agreed to 
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make the constitution permanent, and accepted Abu Dhabi city as their 
capital (EIU 2006:11; Ministry of Energy United Arab Emirates 2006: 17). 
 
The current constitution forms the basis of the political, judicial, social and 
economic organisation of the country (Rizvi, 1993:665). The UAE 
constitution states inter alia, the desire to form a sovereign and independent 
federal nation state.  “...Article 1 of the current Constitution defines the UAE 
as a ‘federal state’. Article 6 emphasizes that the people of the Federation are 
one people and they therefore enjoy, according to Article 8, one nationality” 
(Al Abed 2001: 139 in Al Abed & Hellyer 2001). The formation of the UAE 
represented a voluntary cession of powers by the rulers of the individual 
emirates to the new state. This decision was clearly spelt out in the 
provisional Constitution that was finally adopted in 1996 (Ibid: 139). 
 
Based on the provisions of the constitution, “...power has been divided 
between executive, legislative, and judicial branches with legislative and 
executive powers being separated into federal and emirate jurisdictions. In 
addition, each emirate has its own local government, consisting of its own 
ruler, municipalities and departments. Each emirate retains a good deal of 
political and financial autonomy” (Ministry of Energy UAE 2006: 17). 
 
The constitution also states in Article 116 that “the Emirates shall exercise 
all powers not assigned to the Federation by this Constitution.” This was 
reaffirmed in Article 122, which states that “the Emirates shall have 
jurisdiction in all matters not assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federation, in accordance with the provision of the preceding two Articles” 
(UAE Yearbook 2009: 24).  
 
Territorial sovereignty and integrity of each emirate including Dubai is 
secured and guaranteed under Article 3 of the constitution; which states 
“….each member of the federation of the United Arab Emirates shall duly 
exercise sovereignty over their own territories and territorial waters in all 
matters that are not within the jurisdiction of the Union” (Al Abed 2001: 139 
in Al Abed & Hellyer 2001). Article 2 of the UAE constitution stipulates that 
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Abu Dhabi shall be the capital of the federal state. The UAE is a 
confederation of individual sheikhdoms with constitutionally established 
federal institutions that will be discussed below. In summary, according to 
Simmons (2005:360), “….the constitution reflects a compromise between 
emirates in favour of a more centralized or integrated federation and those 
that preferred preserving the autonomy of the individual emirates.” 
 
2.7.2. Federal institutions 
 
Article 45 of the constitution makes provision for “a federal system of 
government that includes a Supreme Council, the Presidency, a Cabinet, or 
Council of Ministers, a parliamentary body, or the Federal National Council, 
and an independent judiciary - at the apex is the Federal Supreme Court” 
(UAE Yearbook 2007:39). The federal system includes five bodies which do 
not have a full separation of powers: the Federal Supreme Council, the 
President, the Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council, and the 
Federal Judiciary. 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Al Darmaki (2008: 232) 
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Figure 2.2: Constitutional configuration of the Federal Government 
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2.7.3. Supreme Council of the Federation 
 
The Supreme Council of the Federation (FSC) is the federation’s highest 
authority, and is composed of the rulers of the seven emirates or of those 
designated to represent them. The constitutional power vested in the 
Supreme Council of the Federation is duly enshrined in articles 46-50 of the 
constitution of the UAE.  
 
Under the above mentioned articles of the constitution, “the Supreme 
Council has exclusive executive, ratification, and legislative powers” (Al Abed 
2001:134 in Al Abed & Hellyer 2001, DPADM 2004: 6). The Supreme 
Council is vested with powers to “...ratify federal laws and decrees, plans 
general policy, approves the nomination of the Prime Minister and accepts 
his resignation. It also relieves him from his post upon the recommendation 
of the President” (UAE Yearbook 2001:73). In addition, the Supreme Council 
elects the President and his deputy for five-year terms; both may be re-
elected.  
 
2.7.4. Council of Ministers 
 
The “...Constitution describes the Council of Ministers as ‘The Executive 
authority of the Union,’ and states that it is responsible, under the control of 
the President and the Supreme Council, ‘for carrying out all the internal and 
external affairs entrusted to the Union’ (Article 60). The Council of Ministers 
is charged with the following functions: 
 
(i) Following up the implementation of the general policy of the 
Union, both internally and externally. 
 
(ii) Initiating draft federal laws and submitting them to the Federal 
National Council prior to submission to the President and the 
Supreme Council for ratification and promulgation” (Al Abed 
2001:137 in Al Abed & Hellyer 2001).  
39 
 
The UAE Yearbook (2001:74) states that “the Council of Ministers or 
‘Cabinet’, as ‘the executive authority’ for the federation, includes the usual 
complement of ministerial portfolios and is headed by a Prime Minister, 
chosen by the President in consultation with his colleagues on the Supreme 
Council.” In essence, the Council of Ministers is similar, and tantamount, to 
a cabinet in western style democracies. 
 
2.7.5. The Office of the President and Vice President: 
 
According to Al Abed (2001:139-140), “The President and Vice-President are 
elected by the Supreme Council for a term of five years, which may be 
renewed, under the terms of Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution. In the 
absence of the President, the Vice-President assumes his responsibilities.” 
“...The President is accorded a wide range of legislative and executive powers 
under the terms of the Constitution that can be divided into three 
categories: 
(i) Powers derived from his position as President, discharged by him 
alone. 
(ii) Powers exercised either through the Supreme Council or through 
the Council of Ministers. 
(iii)Powers exercised through the Council of Ministers” (Ibid: 140).   
 
2.7.6. Federal National Council 
 
The Federal National Council (FNC) was formed under the Provisional 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 as a permanent 
component of the country's governing structure (Gulf News, May 3, 2009). 
The FNC composes of 40 members with eight from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 
six from Sharjah and Ra’s al Khaimah, four from Ajman, Umm al-Qawain 
and Fujairah (UAE Yearbook 2007:30).   
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The FNC in its formal structure is a consultative body, with the legislative 
authority actually residing with the Supreme Council and Council of 
Ministers. The Constitution devotes no fewer than 26 articles to describing 
the structure, functions, and prerogatives of the council; its powers are only 
advisory and it has, therefore, little capacity to affect the political process. 
Although the Constitution grants the council the power to approve, amend, 
or reject draft laws (Article 89), it makes clear that the Supreme Council is 
able to ratify, and the President issue, a law regardless of the FNC’s action 
(Article 110) (Simmons 2005:361; Peck 2001: 153 in Al Abed & Hellyer 
2001). In summary, “...the deliberations of the FNC can produce thoughtful 
critiques of draft legislation and also raise issues of broad public concern 
through the questioning of ministers. Yet, in its essential nature, the FNC 
resembles more closely a traditional consultative diwan or majlis than a 
modern representative body” (Peck 2001:153). 
 
Since its inception, the Council has influenced the Federal Government to 
draft new laws. Original draft laws from the Cabinet were amended by the 
Council to suit the needs of the citizens which they represent. The history of 
the Council also shows that the majority of its recommendations and 
amendments have been adopted and included in laws promulgated by the 
government. An important element of the council is its specialised house 
committees, which examine draft laws and new rules (Gulf News, May 3 
2009). Throughout most of its history, the FNC followed a practice of 
nominating all 40 members between 1972 and 2006, when 20 members of 
the current FNC were elected  by an Electoral College in 2006, with the 
remainder nominated by the rulers of the respective emirates (UAE Yearbook 
2010:30).  
 
2.7.7. The judicial system 
 
The Constitution, first written in 1971 and reaffirmed several times since 
then, declares Shari’a to be the principal source for law in the United Arab 
Emirates (DPADM 2004:6). Generally it is applicable to all criminal and 
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family matters; however, in criminal cases the country’s penal code may 
become applicable if there insufficient evidence as required under Shari’a 
law. Similarly, as with other countries around the world, “...the federal 
judiciary’s independence is guaranteed under the Constitution, and 
comprises the Federal Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance. The 
Federal Supreme Court consists of five judges appointed by the Supreme 
Council of Rulers. The judges decide on the constitutionality of federal laws 
and arbitrate on intra-emirate disputes and disputes between the Federal 
Government and the emirates” (UAE Yearbook 2000/01: 78). The Court of 
First Instance contains three divisions: civil, criminal, and Shari’a. Marriage, 
divorce, inheritance, and more recently, drug offences and offences involving 
minors fall under Shari’a law jurisdiction. Dubai has a three-tier judicial 
system similar to the three federal levels (Consulate General of the United 
States, 2005 cited in Grant, et al. 2007: 510). 
 
The judicial system of the UAE is also “...influenced by the Common Law 
and Egyptian legal traditions. Custom and tradition are also considered in 
judicial decision-making. The major codifications of the law are the Civil 
Code, contained in Law No. 5 of 1985; the Federal Penal Code, contained in 
Law No. 3 of 1987; the Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
contained in Law No. 10 of 1992; the Code of Civil Procedure, contained in 
Law No. 11 of 1992; and the Code of Criminal Procedure, contained in Law 
No. 35 of 1992. The official language of the courts is Arabic” (DPADM 
2004:6). 
 
All Emirates have the right to maintain a separate court system, under the 
UAE Constitution. However, only Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah have done so. 
Dubai’s legal system is founded upon civil law principles (most heavily 
influenced by Egyptian law) and Islamic Shari’a law, the latter constituting 
the guiding principle and source of law. In Dubai and other civil law 
jurisdictions, legislation tends to be formulated into a number of major 
codes providing for general principles of law with a significant amount of 
subsidiary legislation (Tarbuck and Lester 2009:7). It is important to note 
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that the judicial systems of the Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah cannot make 
judgments that are in contravention of the Federal Constitution to which 
they are parties to. 
 
It is important to note that “there is no system of binding judicial precedent 
in the UAE, although decisions of the higher courts are of persuasive 
authority and lower courts would generally tend to follow relevant 
judgments issued by courts of higher authority” (Dubai Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry 2007:993). 
 
2.8. Political Structure at the Local/ Emirate Level  
 
Parallel to, and interlocking with the federal institutions, each emirate also 
maintains its own local government (UAE Yearbook 2009:28). The 
relationship between the federal and local governments continues to evolve.  
 
...As a result of the country’s rapid economic and social development since 
1971, including an increasing population and rising educational standards, 
local governments in each emirate now seek to assume, or to re-assume, 
functions that had previously been assigned to the Federal Government, 
although not a federal responsibility under the terms of the country’s 
constitution (UAE Yearbook 2009:31).  
 
Although the Constitution enumerates the legislative and executive powers 
of the federation, it also stipulates that all residual powers fall within the 
jurisdiction of the individual emirates, thus recognising their status in 
relation to the federal institutions. The separation of powers between the 
federation and its constituent emirates is thus of considerable importance 
(Al Abed 2001: 139 in Al Abed & Hellyer 2001). 
 
A closer look at the working of the federal and local governments, both 
separately and combined, underlines the UAE’s unique amalgamation of the 
traditional and modern political systems that have guaranteed national 
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stability and laid the foundation for development (UAE Yearbook 2010:26). 
In the interest of national unity and political cohesion, the Constitution of 
the federation underpins and accords a degree of political “independence to 
individual emirates in pursuing an economic strategy based on their 
respective comparative advantages” (IMF 2005: 8). 
 
Federal institutions are competently supported by local governments of the 
seven emirates. They vary in size, and have evolved over time with the 
growth of the country. However, their mechanisms differ from emirate to 
emirate, depending on factors such as population, area, and degree of 
development (UAE Yearbook 2010:31). The largest and most populous 
emirate, Abu Dhabi, has its own central governing organ, which is the 
Executive Council. Similarly, the Dubai Executive Council was established 
in 2003, with similar functions to that of Abu Dhabi’s Executive Council. 
Sharjah and Ajman have also Executive Councils. In addition to an 
Executive Council, Sharjah has established its own Consultative Council 
(Ibid: 31). 
 
A similar pattern of municipalities, departments and autonomous agencies 
may be found in each of the other emirates. In smaller or more remote 
settlements, the ruler of each emirate may choose a local representative, an 
emir or wali, to act as a conduit through which the concerns of inhabitants 
may be directed to government. In most cases, these are the leading local 
figures, whose authority emanates both from the consensus of their 
community and the confidence placed in them by the ruler (UAE Yearbook 
2010: 31). 
 
2.9. Socio-Economic Development of Dubai in the U.A.E  
2.9.1. Overview of Dubai’s socio-economic history  
 
Dubai’s historical, developmental journey is similar to that of other 
sheikhdoms or principalities, being interwoven with that of the UAE: and the 
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relationship that exists between the federal state and the emirate of Dubai is 
in essence a symbiotic relationship which was formalised under the 
provisions of the 1971 tentative constitution. “...The UAE’s general economic 
policies are based on the principles of achieving the citizen’s welfare through 
the optimum use of available economic and financial resources” (Omiaira 
2001:11). This collective, socio-economic development planning was 
necessitated by the formation of the federal state of the UAE in 1971: this is 
opposite of the principle of subjugation ethos that prevailed under the Pax-
Britannica era.   
 
Traditionally and prior to the discovery of oil, the inhabitants who lived in 
Dubai and other principalities were nomads and survived to some extent on 
agriculture and animal husbandry, while fishing and the pearl industry later 
became the dominant income sources; thus the economies of the former 
Trucial States were both socially and economically under-developed 
(Exportrådet 2007 cited in Fazal 2008:6; EAAU 2000:3). Ramos (2009:2) 
summarises by noting that “...Dubai has been marked by two distinct 
cultures namely: coastal settlements and Bedouin nomadic interior 
communities.”  
 
For many decades Dubai was a stopover for boats heading to and from 
Persia, India, China and East Africa. It was also the starting point of the 
great caravans to the West. Archaeological findings in the area confirm the 
historical importance of Dubai as a regional trading centre. Dubai has, in 
fact, since the early twentieth century been known as the “city of 
merchants” (Al-Sayegh 1998:87). Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the supply of Indian goods to the Trucial Coast depended mainly 
on the port of Lingah, on the Persian side of the Gulf, where British steam 
liners called regularly. Between 1873 and 1902 the bulk of Indian trade 
brought through the port of Lingah was redistributed by Dubai's merchants 
resulting in a settlement of Indian merchants at Lingah and other Persian 
towns, whose ports flourished (Al-Sayegh 1998: 89). However, when the 
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commercial strength of the Persian coastal towns began to drastically 
decline as a result of the Persian policy of encroaching on the Arab tribes 
and of the imposition of high taxes, this changed. Taxes reached 400 per 
cent on some goods and the trading post of Lingah slid from prosperity to 
relative obscurity in a very short period of time. Many Arab and even Persian 
merchants began to leave Lingah to settle in Dubai, bringing with them their 
trade and businesses, their shipping experience and craft skills (Ibid: 89). 
 
Over the course of the 20th century, Dubai’s trade-based economy received 
additional significant boosts as a result of the political complications and 
severe development obstacles of its closest neighbour, Sharjah. In the 
1930s, for example, the Al-Shamsi family of Sharjah, was led by Sheikh 
Hadif. Frustrated by the ruling Al-Qasimi family’s reluctance to allow the 
British to develop the Hamriyy beach area to facilitate the unloading of 
vessels, he chose to move his entire family to Dubai (Davidson, 2007:36). As 
the richest of the pearl fisheries in the Gulf lay between Qatar and Dubai, 
the port of the latter became a centre for provisions and pearl marketing; an 
economic factor which added to the socio-economic importance of Dubai 
during this period (Al-Sayegh 1998:89).  
 
2.9.2. Dubai: rapid socio-economic transformation 
 
The socio-economic landscape of Dubai changed when, “the pearl trade took 
a beating during the Wall Street crash of 1929, and later with the 
introduction of Japanese cultured pearls. These were sleepy places until the 
discovery of oil in the late 1950s and early 1960s” (Nyarko 2010: 6). Oil 
revenues simplified the capability of undertaking various projects in order to 
promote economic growth (Exportrådet 2007 cited in Fazal 2008:6). 
 
The discovery of oil in 1966 marked an important era and turning point in 
the history of Dubai ushering in a new era of business activities in the 
emirate’s history (Selem, 2010). Dubai’s ruler, “...Shaikh Rashid Bin Saeed 
Al-Maktoum used the proceeds from the oil for investment in institutions, 
46 
 
physical infrastructure, schools and hospitals with the vision of enhancing 
Dubai’s socio-economic development” (Salem, 2010). Pacione remarked that 
“over a period of half a century the city state of Dubai has progressed from 
pre-industrial to industrial to post-industrial status. Change is evident in 
the economic, social and cultural characteristics of the city and, most 
visibly, in the scale, pace and nature of urban development” (2005:255). The 
platform for Dubai’s extraordinary transformation was laid when “in 1958 
the grandfather of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Dubai's current ruler, 
borrowed £500,000 from oil-rich Kuwait to dredge the silted-up creek and 
allow larger ships to anchor” (Kerr and Khalaf, 2009). 
 
The city-state of Dubai has developed dramatically over the last three 
decades, becoming a major business and tourism centre and with a more 
dynamic and diversified economy. It is now the largest re-exporting centre in 
the Middle East and a regional hub for a wide range of businesses and 
industries (Abdella, 2009:1). 
 
...In many respects Dubai typifies the way in which Gulf cities have 
developed over the past two hundred years. Many have grown rapidly from 
small merchant communities to thriving commercial centres. In fact Dubai 
owes much of its prosperity and development to its merchants who played a 
key role in restructuring the economy and in the government decision 
making process. As the main contributors to the economy, they played a 
fundamental role in implementing economic and political reforms, and were 
the driving force behind Dubai's development in the pre-oil era (Al-Sayegh 
1998:87). 
 
Overall, Dubai’s approach to economic development has been remarkably 
similar to that used in many Asian countries, including Singapore. There is 
a pragmatic balance between the role of the state and the private sector. The 
state is very active in the economy as a large proportion of GDP is generated 
by state controlled enterprises (Orchard 2005:2). The first element to 
consider is that Dubai has, from its inception, been considered by its rulers 
as an economic tool before anything: hence the term “Dubai Enterprise”, 
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attached to it from the time of late Shaykh Rasheed (reigned 1959-1990), 
one of the firsts of a long line of Amirs of Dubai, who made its ambition 
come true. Dubai has been seen as a profit-making business, rather than as 
a cradle for a local or imported society, or before being considered a city 
(Lavergne, 2006:263).  
 
In summary, Ortega (2009:9) notes that “the current tribalist trajectory of 
Dubai’s economic policies closely resembles the historically pertinent ruler-
merchant bargain. The broader model is termed the ‘ruling bargain’ and 
describes the basic relationship that exists not just between rulers and 
merchants, but between rulers and all of their citizens.”  The economic 
development of modern Dubai has evolved and been shaped by a multiplicity 
of internal and external factors, amongst which was “the role Dubai played 
as an international commercial ‘entrepÔt’ since the late 1880s” 
(Elsheshtawy 2004:177).   
 
2.9.3. UAE’s (Dubai’s) social development overview 
 
Social development has been a primary, major focus of the UAE Government 
since the formation of the federation. All available resources have been 
harnessed to provide an advanced social infrastructure, especially in 
education, health and social welfare (UAE Yearbook 2001/2: 197). It has 
been noted by Khoury (1980 cited in Davidson 2005:159) that the: 
 
…UAE including Dubai has made social growth another of its major 
priorities; in particular education and healthcare have been regarded as a 
key socio-economic building block. A comprehensive welfare system has 
been seen as the necessary foundations for the creation of a healthy and 
happy society in which every individual can vigorously contribute to U.A.E’s 
future development. 
 
As late as 1950, Dubai was a city of huts and unpaved streets. In 1970, 
literacy rates hovered just above 20 percent. Only a fraction of the mothers 
48 
 
of today’s college students had graduated from high school, and that 
fraction was only slightly higher for their fathers (Walters 2006:78). The 
social malaise described by Walter was not dissimilar to the experiences of 
other societies in the wider Arab world.  
 
The 21st century social landscape of “…the UAE is by many standards a 
contented place. Its citizens, who account for less than a fifth of the 
country’s 8.2m residents, are among the world’s most pampered. The 
population enjoys generally a cradle-to-grave welfare; lavished by the oil-rich 
state and the advantage of what has long been the Gulf’s most open and 
tolerant way of life” (www.economist.com:2011). This is due in part primarily 
to Articles 14 and 17 of the constitution that decree free education and 
medical care as they are deemed fundamental to the social development of 
the federal state. “...UAE citizens who are entitled to monthly social benefits 
include widowed national and divorced women, the disabled and the 
handicapped, the aged, orphans, single daughters, married students, 
relatives of jailed dependants, estranged wives: the society’s most vulnerable 
and insolvents” (UAE Yearbook 2006:222).  
 
It is evident that the political governance ethos of the UAE emphasises the 
“social and human dimension of development and thus the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) has dedicated its efforts for several decades to providing its 
people with economic and social services and thus has raised their 
standards of living to some of the highest in the world” (UNDP & UAE 
Ministry of Planning 2007).  
 
2.10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the historical journey of the Trucial States in the 
Southern Gulf that developed into the United Arab Emirates, which included 
Dubai in particular, from the 15th century. The major aim of the chapter was 
to review the socio-economic and political history of a group of principalities 
that evolved into the dynamic nation state of the UAE. The chapter also 
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aimed to provide a background to the UAE’s socio-political epistemology that 
is deeply embedded and entrenched in a culture of historically tribalistic 
tendencies, colonial hegemonic rule and the unnatural confederation of 
individual sheikhdoms.  This chapter assists in informing and shaping the 
way the main research topic of the thesis is investigated and answered. In 
order to appreciate the socio-economic progress of the UAE and Dubai in 
particular within the last 10 years, it is imperative that a profile of the 
emirate’s historical transition from a traditional society to a modern nation-
state is reflected upon.   
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 Chapter Three:  
Re-Contextualizing Dubai’s Development Discourse: A   Literature 
Review 
 
“Development is the most important challenge facing the human race” 
World Bank, World Development Report 1991 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to review the body of literature on Dubai’s socio-economic 
development trajectory and contextualize it within development studies 
discourse.  Kingsbury states “the idea of development is central to the 
processes by which countries, particularly poorer countries, organize 
themselves” (2004:10). According to Newman (1996:57), cited in Cowen & 
Shenton (1996), “...the idea of development had been invented to deal with 
the problems of underdevelopment and social disorder in the 19th century 
Europe through trusteeships.”  
 
In investigating the issue of development or the lack thereof in Dubai, there 
is a volume of literature that discusses the socio-economic transformation of 
the city-state, from a business and spatial angle or perspective; however 
there is a paucity of writings within the development studies discourse and 
development paradigms. The available literature varies significantly in 
approach and emphasis as authors tend to specialize in individual business 
or macro-economic topics. There is little structured research and much of 
what is written tends to explain the boom period of the UAE and Dubai in 
particular. In essence, there has been little academic literature written on 
socio-economic development that contextualizes Dubai’s development 
trajectory within specific development paradigms. 
 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 3.2 covers the thorny 
issue of regional geo-politics, while Section 3.3 deals with the equally 
contested issue of the politics of development and seeks to provide an 
overview of the correlation between government and development. Section 
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3.4 and its sub-sections deal with some thematic issues that encapsulate 
Dubai’s trajectory and journey. Section 3.5 provides an insight into the oil-
curse theory and how Dubai was able to avoid it, whereas Section 3.6 
analyses some of the development theoretical deficit that beset development 
theories and Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2. Geo-politics of the Region  
 
The geo-politics of the region has been plagued with ongoing conflicts since 
the 18th century, starting with the decline and the eventual collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the subsequent creation of colonial regimes (Dahi and 
Demir 2008:7). Similar to the artificial carving up of sub-Saharan Africa, 
borders in the region were “…drawn based on politics by the former colonial 
powers rather than historical, cultural or ethnic backgrounds or social 
consensus that led to subsequent ethnic and religious civil conflicts” (Dahi 
and Demir 2008:7). Shah (2011) makes a profound and undeniable 
observation in noting that: 
 
... oil, is fundamentally what the modern Middle Eastern geopolitics 
have been about. Given the vast energy resources that form the 
backbone of western economies, influence and involvement in the 
Middle East has been of paramount importance for the former and 
current imperial and super powers, including France, Britain, USA 
and the former Soviet Union.  
 
Regional geo-politics, including the prolonged Indo-Pak impasse, instability 
of Afghanistan, civil disturbances in Iraq, an increasingly power hungry Iran 
and the failed state of Yemen, have all played a fundamental role in the 
shaping of Dubai’s development policy. Ramos (2008) explains that “…the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the conflicts between Iraq and Iran in the 
1980s have solidified Dubai’s geographic position in the Southern Gulf.” He 
further states “that regional conflicts in their own way provided a degree of 
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economic stability for Dubai and thus spurring increased regional trade 
through its port.”    
 
Figure 3.1: Political Geographical Map 
 
Source: World Atlas cited in Shah (2011).  
 
Dubai (UAE) is situated as shown above in figure 3, by the orange arrow in a 
sensitive geo-political region and is therefore exposed to the prevailing 
turbulence in the Middle East (Henderson 2007:35). Against this 
background Davidson (2008) observes that “…Dubai is between a rock and 
hard place, surrounded by extremely unstable neighbors and the elements 
within them which must be appeased.” The historical roots of the region’s 
unstable geopolitical situation predate “…the discovery of oil, as the region 
had been a hotbed for religious conflict and wars over other rich resources 
and land” (Shah 2011). 
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The declining Ottoman Empire paved the way for the rising European 
imperial and colonial powers who were interested in securing various 
territories and controlling access to Asia. In more recent times, interest in 
the region has been due to the energy resources there (Shah 2011). The two 
Gulf wars and other proxy wars have demonstrated that Shah is correct in 
his analysis.  
 
Dubai was supposed to be the antithesis of Palestine. It was designed to 
create a concrete Utopia that would encourage all young Arabs to forget 
about their political aspirations and dreams. Dubai carefully steered away 
from all the issues that alarmed and agitated Arab public opinion. Against 
this background Dubai and the other six emirates which comprise the 
United Arab Emirates made sure that they operated within the realm of US 
foreign policy priorities (AbuKhalil, 2009). In many respects Dubai 
represents that antithesis of Palestine; however, in the months following the 
advent of global financial crisis, the soft underbelly of the city was exposed, 
and it became a place that people ran from, as opposed to running towards 
it. 
 
The nature of regional geo-politics has fundamentally played a defining role 
in informing the nature of the city’s cohesive and integrated development 
policy instruments; which were designed and implemented by the Dubai 
Government to achieve targeted levels of economic growth and development.  
The unpredictable and untenable geopolitics of the Middle East 
paradoxically has been a blessing for the city state of Dubai. Chancellor 
(2005) notes that: 
 
... In many complex and surprising ways, Dubai actually earns its 
living from   fear. Its huge port complex at Jebel Ali, for example, has 
profited immeasurably from the trade generated by the US invasion of 
Iraq, while Terminal Two at the Dubai airport, always crowded with 
Halliburton employees, private mercenaries and American soldiers en 
route to Baghdad or Kabul, has been described as ‘the busiest 
commercial terminal in the world’ for America’s Middle East wars. 
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Post-9/11 developments have also shifted global investment patterns 
to Dubai’s benefit. Thus after al-Qaeda’s attacks on America, the 
Muslim oil states, traumatized by the angry Christians in Washington 
and lawsuits by WTC survivors, no longer considered the United 
States the safest harbour for their petrodollars. Panicky Saudis alone 
are estimated to have repatriated at least one-third of their trillion-
dollar overseas portfolio. Although nerves are now calmer, Dubai has 
benefited enormously from the continuing inclination of the oil 
sheikhs to invest within, rather than outside, the region. (Chancellor 
2005: Cited in Davis 2006).  
 
To summarize Chancellor’s central arguments, it is appropriate and 
politically correct to say that Dubai earns its’ living partially from the geo-
politics of regional anarchy.   
 
3.3. Politics of Development 
 
The primacy of politics in development, that is to say, the central and 
dominant variable determining not only the conception and shape of 
development, but developmental success or failure in societies, is their 
politics. Politics is not simply important, it is crucial for both understanding 
and promoting development. It is widely acknowledged that politics plays a 
central role in influencing economic development and that it is illusory to 
conceive of good governance as independent of the forms of politics and type 
of state which alone can generate, sustain and protect it (Leftwich 2000:4; 
Uphoff & Ilchman 1972:76; Leftwich 1994:363).  
 
Researchers are reminded by Sholkamy (2012:94) that “...for decades, 
development paradigms and programmes have adopted the values of human 
wellbeing and dignity which is both profoundly political projects, while at 
the same time pretending that development is an apolitical venture.” The 
reseacher fully agrees with Sholkamy’s analysis and would go further by 
stating unequivocally that colonial powers used local and western NGOs, 
along with international donor agencies, as proxy political institutions to 
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distribute development funds, and strengthen local civic institutions. The 
result of the process is an undermining of the sovereignty and capacity of 
the recipient state.  
 
The political nature of the process has led McMicheal, with whom I concur, to 
point out that:  
 
...Development as an ideal and practice has always included: a power 
equation, to improve the lot of humankind and to govern in the name 
of developing a nation-state, its institutions, its resources, technology 
material wealth, individual opportunity, and so forth. As such, 
development is a tool for those in power and their legitimacy, so 
growth and expanding opportunity (2010:15).  
 
Without negating the potency of McMicheal’s argument above, there have 
been “…numerous tectonic shifts that have shaken the foundations of 
development paradigms over the last half a century which have had far-
reaching implications for development policy formulation and 
implementation” (Levy 2011:60). Literature on Dubai’s socio-political history 
points to a correlation between the role of the state and development in the 
emirate and the UAE in general. The major shifts in the domination of 
development paradigms from Marxism to Neo-liberalism did not stymie the 
development agenda and pragmatic role of the Dubai Government.  
 
The politics of development in Dubai is summarized by Al-Tamimi (2007:3) 
and the Moody’s Report of 2008, which collectively noted that “the Emirate’s 
development rests on a centrally coordinated approach to state run and 
state led capitalism.” Dissimilar to other countries, the politics of 
development in Dubai is not directly influenced by Western international 
foreign policy and or a single party’s political hegemonic agenda, but instead 
from within the boundaries of the sheikdom. Unlike other developing 
countries, “the language of democracy that dominates development circles in 
the rhetoric of ‘civil society’ and ‘good governance’ dogma or structural 
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adjustment programmes” (White 1996: 142-144) do not apply to Dubai 
specifically and the UAE in general.  
 
3.4. Development Trajectory of the Arab World 
 
The Arab region is currently generating unprecedented wealth and creating 
new generations of wealthy citizens; and for the second time in half a 
century, rapid economic expansion is underway, fuelled by high oil prices 
and growth in related sectors (Ibrahim, 2008:1 in Ibrahim & Sherif 2008); as 
witnessed in Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, 
paradoxically, the unprecedented wealth is evinced by a “region that is 
facing significant multidimensional development challenges that profoundly 
affect social, economic and living conditions of the citizens” (UNDP, 2003; 
Mahjoub et al 2010:05). The Arab Human Development Report (2002: v) 
noted that “...some of the challenges comprise inter alia, high illiteracy 
rates, the deterioration of education, gender inequality, rampant poverty and 
mounting unemployment rates.”  
 
Politically, the Gulf States, and the Arab world by extension, “depict[s] 
images of a society that is inward looking, docile, undemocratic and 
repressive” (Kumar 2006: 3). However, in recent times the Arabian world has 
emerged from some of its socio-economic challenges and has experienced 
exponential growth and development, especially the six member Gulf States. 
This is in stark contrast to what Al- Ansrawi noted two decades earlier: 
“...that all Arab states regardless of the nature of their individual resource 
endowments, share the usual characteristics common to all developing 
countries” (1986:19). It should be noted that some of these characteristics or 
development gaps are still visible in many Arab states, thus serving as the 
springboard for the so-called Arab Spring which engulfed the region in 2011. 
In addition, regional political and development challenges are well 
documented in the annual publications of the Arab Human Development 
Reports and even though this thesis does not concur with various aspects of 
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the analyses articulated, there are merits to aspects of the report’s areas of 
focus.   
 
The UAE’s general economic policies are based on the principles of achieving 
the citizen’s welfare through the optimum use of available economic and 
financial resources (Omiaira 2001: 11). This ethos of the UAE government is 
not mere rhetoric, but has been translated into increasing federal budgetary 
allocations that are aimed at creating a quasi-welfare state. The political 
elites of the UAE “…believe strongly in the social and human dimension of 
development and thus the United Arab Emirates Government has dedicated 
its efforts for several decades to providing its people with economic and 
social services (social welfare, healthcare and education), and thus has 
raised their standards of living to some of the highest in the world” (Al 
Qasimi 2007: 1).  
 
The UAE state is faced with some major challenges, irrespective of the 
progress since the formation of the union in 1971. In a joint UAE/UNDP 
Millennium Development Goals United Arab Emirates Report of 2007, the 
Minister of Finance of the UAE Skeikha Lubna bint Khalil Al Qasimi 
highlighted that “there are some major challenges that are still facing the 
state in the development field” Some of these are outlined below: 
  
...to work on diversifying sources of income and expanding the 
production base, so as not to depend primarily on crude oil 
production and export; to further activate the role of the private sector 
as an important and effective partner in the development process; in 
addition to transferring and owning of technology, and developing 
national human resources to perform their full role in the 
development process (Al Qasimi 2007:4).  
 
Since the report’s publication in 2007, immense progress has been made in 
the areas of technology transfer, diversification of the economy into a 
number of sectors (including tourism, solar energy, healthcare and light 
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industries) and the nationalization (Emiratization) of the labour force. 
However, like many other proponents of the ‘Dubai Inc Model’, Sheikha Al 
Qasimi failed to recognize the countless number of unsung heroes and 
heroines from over 120 countries who have contributed their human capital 
to the process of national development in Dubai and the UAE generally. 
Hundreds of thousands of construction and hotel workers for instance have 
been the recipients of some of the most horrendous sub-human treatment 
conceivable that can be meted out to any human being (see chapter nine). 
The section below will expound on the nature of the literature that describes 
Dubai’s transformation. 
 
3.4.1. Literature that describes Dubai  
 
Little (2007) in her thesis entitled Understanding the Economic Development 
of Dubai states that “the literature regarding Dubai can be divided into two 
general categories, literature that describes Dubai and literature that 
explains Dubai.” On that basis Hvidt (2007) articulates the concern that “as 
the developmental process unfolds in Dubai it has only received cursory 
reports in the news media, news oriented magazines and business 
literature, therefore only fragmented information is available.” But there 
have been recent exceptions where a number of social science-based but 
historically oriented academic publications have emerged e.g. (Al-Sayegh 
1998; Al-Abed and Hellyer 2001; Davidson 2005; Davidson 2007 cited in 
Hvidt 2007; Ali 2009).  
 
Subsequent to the expressed observation documented in Little’s thesis 
(2007), a body of literature has emerged analyzing the rise of Dubai on many 
individual topics, such as tourism, construction, economic growth, GDP per 
capita, rate of unemployment, women’s empowerment, real estate and 
construction and spatial development. This, in essence, is capturing 
fragmented macro-economic variables/indicators, emanating from the 
transformation of the emirate. By way of examples: Henderson (2006 & 
2007) explains Dubai from a purely tourism development and historical 
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evolution perspective. The verbosity of debates concerning Dubai’s socio-
economic development has not been encapsulated or reflected within a 
development theory or model and tends to fall outside the parameters of 
development studies discourse. Visibly lacking from the discourse is the 
fundamental role of key political institutions in facilitating and fostering the 
successful transformation of a traditional, primarily production based 
economy into a 21st century service driven economy that is fully integrated 
into the global economy.  
 
It has been the observation of the author that the political economy and 
sociology of Dubai’s development have been documented and analyzed from 
the perspective of the efforts of the Government of Dubai. Similarly, it is the 
view of many observers and analysts that the literature describing Dubai is 
selective and unbalanced and thus permeates misconceptions on the 
perspectives of socio-economic development in Dubai and by extension the 
six member states of the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC).    
 
3.4.2. Dubai economic diversification strategies 
  
Shediac & Abouchakra et al. (2008), Sekwati (2008) and Doner, Ritichie and 
Slater (2005) note that a:  
 
…strong, growing, sustainable economy is the goal of every nation in the 
world. Having a diverse economy—that is, one based on a wide range of 
profitable sectors, not just a few—has long been thought to play a key role 
in a sustainable economy. Resource dependent economies are prone to 
systemic vulnerability from external shocks due to commodity price 
fluctuations and thus diversification is of fundamental importance given the 
experience resulting from the recent global economic downturn.  
 
Academic literature on economic diversification and oil price fluctuations 
would appear to dictate that the UAE, including Dubai, should embark on a 
process of reducing its’ over dependence on hydrocarbons. The leadership of 
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this oil-rich state is fully cognizant, it would seem, of the oil-curse theory, 
the finite nature of oil production and the resultant economic consequence 
of being totally dependent on petro-dollars.    
Andrew Leistensnider in a seminal piece on the economic diversification 
efforts of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) notes that: 
 
…From a microeconomic perspective, firms diversify their products 
into, investments, and ventures into different sectors in order to 
preserve stability. Each sector is a gamble, but the others serve as a 
type of insurance policy that guarantees an avoidance of a complete 
calamity. For the Middle East including Dubai this can be equated to 
not basing an entire economy on oil reserves, but instead diversify 
into different non-oil related economic activities (Leistensnider 
2008:99).  
 
 This study concurs with Leistensnider, on the basis that an in-depth 
analysis of the UAE’s and Dubai’s economy in particular will reveal that the 
Government of Dubai has diversified its economy away from its dwindling 
reserves of hydrocarbons and subsistence farming into tourism, banking 
and finance, retail, aviation and is now a hub for re-exports. In fact, Dubai 
is the world’s second largest hub for re-export; coupled with the fact that 
Dubai’s economic diversification has been premised on an orgy of 
development projects which has helped weaned Dubai off hydro-carbon 
revenue.  
  
Dubai is the federation’s second largest emirate and its leading player in 
terms of both economic strength and its political influence. It has emerged 
in recent years as a financial and commercial centre of global repute. 
Although its oil production has fallen and is now very small compared with 
its neighbour Abu Dhabi, Dubai has replaced that source of wealth with a 
booming service-based economy that depends heavily on tourism, 
construction, telecommunications, media, real estate and financial services 
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(EIU 2006:6). The city-state of “...Dubai is the epitome of the UAE’s 
economic diversification, primarily leveraging its strategic geographical 
location and a highly liberalizing government with proactive market-oriented 
economic policies for diversification away from oil dependence” (Pradham 
2009: 11)…; this transformation is remarkable given that the pre-oil (al-
Sayegh 2001:26), political economy of Dubai was dominated by the pearling 
industry.   
 
Dubai has defied conventional theoretical constructs which posit that “if a 
country is seeking rapid development, and to escape the grips of poverty, oil 
is certainly not a blessing. Oil dependent states have performed 1.7% worse 
in terms of economic growth than non-oil states in recent years,” according 
to Christian Aid (www.christian-aid.org.uk cited in Schubert 2006:5). Using 
the 1996 Dubai Strategic Plan (DSP); as a platform from which to establish 
the parameters of the city’s social and economic development in which five 
key sectors were targeted. Helmond & Bas (2007:2) states that “…Dubai’s 
new economic development activities were clustered around key sectors that 
were initiated by the Dubai Government.” The machination of economic 
clustering will be elaborated upon fully in chapter seven that deals with the 
‘Dubai Inc Model’.  
 
Fazal opines in her thesis that:  
 
…The Dubai economy is at present not dependent on oil. However, the 
independence is not a coincidence but a planned strategy. The government 
realized early that its access to oil is temporary and therefore it gradually 
moved the focus towards other sectors where comparative advantage could 
be found. The change of direction from a major reliance on the oil-sector to 
diversification is believed to compensate for the relatively lower oil revenues 
in the future (Fazal 2008:7).  
 
The researcher would like to posit the view that the diversification of Dubai’s 
economic base is not necessarily intended to reduce its concentration, in 
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terms of the hydrocarbon contribution to the emirate’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) and by extension its diversification quotients. Instead it was 
designed to off-set its depleting oil reserves and to develop a new political 
economy in the city.  
 
Economic diversification of Dubai hinges on the policy prescriptions of 
Dubai’s Strategic Plans (1996, 2010, and 2015) that would be spearheaded 
by a raft of well administered government related enterprises (GREs). The 
IMF (2011: 19) agrees in reiterating that “...GREs have contributed 
significantly to economic diversification, but the global financial crisis has 
highlighted the risks they pose.” GREs of Dubai span sectors such as 
tourism, real estate, aviation, free zones, and banking and finance. 
Empirical evidence has pointed to the direct correlation between economic 
diversification and national development. Literature on development would 
point to the transformation of the former Newly Industrialized Economies 
(NICs) and Dubai, to be based on the design and effective implementation of 
policies that act as catalysts for economic development.   
 
3.4.3. Gender and development  
 
The status of women and the process of socio-economic development are 
correlated, but the nature of the association has been the subject of 
considerable debate (Moghadam 1992:2), especially in the conservative 
societies of the Middle East. “Gender analysis, once confined to the margins 
of development theory, has over the last ten years penetrated both the 
thinking and the operations of international development institutions” 
(Miller & Razavi, 1998:4 in Reeves & Baden 2000:6); thus development 
strategies need to be informed by an analysis of gender relations and 
intended to support women (Reeves & Baden 2000:6). However, in the 
patriarchal society of Dubai, the notion of gender in development may be 
rejected as a form of “cultural imperialism” (Moore 2001), and religious 
heresy. 
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There is tacit or overt support for Reeve and Baden by Dr Mansori of the 
Hamdam-E-University in Dubai, who made an uncharacteristic comment: 
“….No society can totally develop and flourish without the full participation 
of women. Women in the Gulf region need more empowerment and 
involvement” (Mansori 2011 Interview).  
 
Furthermore, 
 
The UAE leadership is committed to empowering women and utilizing their 
skills in our growing economy. This commitment is enshrined in the 
Constitution through guarantees for gender equality and social justice, as 
well as gradually evolving legislations that are striving to maintain the 
balance of modernization with our cultural heritage and Islamic beliefs. 
Women’s rights in the UAE are not only enshrined in the UAE constitution, 
but the UAE is also a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which 
is an international benchmark for high standards of non-discrimination 
(Gargash 2009).  
 
In the UAE and Dubai in particular: “…women have the rights of work, 
social security, ownership and business management. They also enjoy 
education, health and social care, equal salaries to men, as well as 
maternity leave, which is guaranteed by the civil service law” 
(http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/fatima-lauds-women-s-role-in-uae-s-
development-march-1.520333). In spite of the constitutional guarantees 
empowering women, this fundamental pillar of development has escaped the 
notice and thinking of political scientists, social commentators and geo-
economists who write on the Middle East. This is a profound weakness in 
the literature being written on Dubai and the United Arab Emirates in 
general. Gender development is a deeply enshrined objective of the 
development process and it seeks to improve the socio-economic status of all 
citizens, including women. This thesis key criticism of the discourse 
surrounding the involvement of Emirati women in the development process 
has to do with the focus placed on the seeming exclusion of local women as 
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opposed to how they have been deployed productively within the national 
economy.    
 
Development practitioners and policy-makers across the region have 
glaringly ignored the gender component in development; and thus 
development policies and strategies in the Arab world should seek to 
emulate how Dubai focuses its attention on liberating the productive 
capacity, and simultaneously encapsulating the rights, of women within the 
legal framework of its individual society. In essence the rights and 
empowerment of women must be protected under the remit of the 
constitution or individual pieces of legislation/s. 
 
3.4.4. Dubai as a late developer 
 
The process of development occurs across countries at different times, with 
some countries developing relatively early and others developing much later. 
Countries differ, however, in the timing of their development. Some 
countries, the early-bloomers, reach their steady states before other 
countries, the late-bloomers, begin to develop (Atkeson & Kehoe 2000:1). 
Late developers traditionally manage the tasks of catching up economically 
via increased state management of the economy to direct resources from 
consumption to investment, and by developing institutions to foster growth 
that elsewhere proceeds organically (Adshead & Robinson 2009:1). Dubai 
has been able successfully to execute an admixture of policies such as those 
articulated by Adshead and Robinson. 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, Dubai was on the periphery of the global 
economic system. Its politics was at best tribal, patriarchal and 
authoritarian, coupled with a relatively thriving economy that was 
supported by trading, pearling and other primary products. Unlike Western 
countries, Dubai started off the 20th century as a ‘late developer’; only upon 
the discovery of oil in 1966 did a process of semi-industrialization around 
the political economy of oil begin. Similarly, the emirate did not experience 
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the process of primitive accumulation as was the case of Europe. A study of 
late developers’ literature and the socio-economic history of Dubai confirm 
that the city state is indeed a late developer. Unfortunately, the political 
economic, socio-cultural and technological goals and achievements of Dubai 
remain on the periphery of late developer discourse in academic circles.  
 
According to Jacobsen (1994:8), “laden with the advantages of 
backwardness, new nations followed the ‘attribute checklist’ necessary to 
hasten industrialization, which typically included: a bureaucracy working in 
Weberian efficiency, a transport and communication infrastructure, a 
foreign exchange surplus, a light consumer-goods industrial base, land 
reform undertaken to enhance agricultural productivity and to fill factories  
as the nation urbanizes.” Jacobsen was describing Dubai in the immediate 
post-Britannica era; by extension, it is no wonder Chaudhry (1993) and 
Waldner (1999)  cited in Adshead & Robinson (2009:2) commented that 
“...late development and state building frequently go hand in hand because 
state building is either needed as a precondition for economic growth or 
accompanies it and is undertaken to support it.” This researcher fully 
concurs with Chaudry and Waldner as these pre-conditions negated the 
threat of post-colonial dependence on the United Kingdom by the former 
trucial state of Dubai after 1971.  
 
The literature on late development suggests that late developers can manage 
the tasks associated with “catching up” through good husbandry of the 
state’s resources for economic growth (Adshead & Robinson 2009: 18). 
Dubai, similar to Ireland and the former Asian tigers, has a dirigiste 
government that uses rent-seeking from oil production to hasten its entry 
into the international political economy. The social and economic 
development of Dubai cannot be explained by merely using macro-economic 
variables; instead, one has to understand its trajectory of historical 
development, the state and its relationship with the society and the local 
economy and how that process determines the socio-economic and political 
framework of the city state. 
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3.4.5. Social contract 
 
The socio-political make-up of the Federal State of the UAE is unusual and 
unparalleled in the Arab world. The constitution of the UAE, coupled with 
unfavourable social and economic conditions in the other emirates, 
juxtapose Dubai and Abu Dhabi, to govern the federation by virtue of their 
constitutional power that allows them to veto decisions that are not in their 
interests. In addition, the geo-economic position of Abu Dhabi allows the 
emirate to act as a rentier-state within the Federation by allocating financial 
patronage to less wealthy emirates in return for maintaining the status quo. 
In essence Abu Dhabi is imposing the conditions of a form of social contract 
on the less prosperous emirates within the federation. 
  
Academic literature tends to concentrate on the fact that in the Arab world 
there is a tacit or otherwise social contract between monarchs or emirs and 
their citizens. The UNDP (2011:11-12) explains that “...the dominant form of 
the social contract in the region and Dubai in particular is one where the 
population resigns itself to lack of political freedom in exchange for provision 
of certain services and exemption from or low taxation.” Figure 3.2 below 
provides a diagrammatic display of how the tacit social contract manifests 
itself in the Federal State of the UAE that includes the principality or 
sheikdom of Dubai. The neo-patrimonial arrangement or, as some would 
argue, the cultural norms dictate that the elders dispense patronage to the 
less fortunate within the society in order to engender a socially cohesive 
society.  
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Figure 3.2: Social Contract: Actors in process 
 
Compilation by author (2011) 
 
Christopher M. Davidson in his book Dubai the vulnerability of success, 
argues that “Dubai’s economic development has largely depended on a 
political stability achieved through what has constituted an ‘unwritten 
ruling bargain’ between rulers and nationals. The defining component of this 
bargain has entailed the distribution of Dubai’s wealth—derived initially 
from oil, but more recently from other rent-generating activities—among the 
national population” (Davidson 2008). This is one of the few pieces of 
scholarship that address the thorny issue of the social contract even though 
the Federal constitution as stated in chapter two of the thesis contains 
provisions for the state to provide welfare for the most vulnerable within the 
society. This in essence, buys loyalty and reinforces political 
authoritarianism. It can be argued or extrapolated that the typical form of 
social contract in vogue in many Arab States has allowed these states to 
continue a non-developmental path, with the exception of the oil rich GCC 
states. 
 
3.4.6. Spatial development  
 
The World Development Report (2009) focuses in part on the spatial 
transformations that must happen in order for countries to develop. 
Development, seen through the report’s eyes, “involves a necessary (and 
welcome) spatial unevenness in economic activity coupled with progressive 
spatial evenness in human welfare” (Rigg & Bebbington, et al. 2009: 128). In 
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response to its underdevelopment as a city state the Government of Dubai 
has incorporated a combination of urban development models. Dubai based 
geographers, commented that “….spatial development in the city tends to 
mirror (i) sector model developed by Hoyt (1939) and (ii) Harris and Ullman 
(1945) multi-nuclei model” (Interviews 12-14, 2012). It has been further 
elaborated that Dubai’s urban morphology is based on “...creating a ‘city 
within a city’ concept” (Interview 12, 2012).  
 
A major criticism of the Spatial Development approach was leveled by Karim 
Elgendy in an insightful article entitled “Dubai Experiments with 
Sustainable Development” who commented:  
 
… throughout the last three decades, the city of Dubai has not been known 
for its emphasis on sustainability as guiding principles for its development. 
The city’s growth trajectory relied – and has been economically fuelled by a 
transformational model which imported inappropriate and inefficient 
building forms and planted them in its extreme climate. In many ways, it is 
fair to argue that the Dubai model of development has been, in essence, the 
antithesis of sustainable development over the last three decades. In other 
words, Dubai has come to represent the climax of an obsolete development 
model in which humans attempted to subjugate their environment rather 
than coexist with it (Elgendy 2010:1-3).  
 
Even though this study tends to concur with most of the comments 
expressed by Elgendy, however the author disagrees with his last sentence.  
 
In a most provocative and critical article entitled “Fear and Money in Dubai,” 
Katodrytis, similar to other authors, is content to describe the geo-
economics and spatial development of Dubai in the following manner: 
 
…Dubai is a prototype of the new post-global city, which creates appetites 
rather than solves problems… If Rome was the Eternal City and New York’s 
Manhattan the apotheosis of twentieth-century congested urbanism, then 
Dubai may be considered the emerging prototype for the 21st century; 
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prosthetic and nomadic oases presented as isolated cities that extend out 
over the land and sea (Katodrytis 2005 cited in Davis 2006:53). 
 
Katodrytis failed to situate Dubai’s spatial or territorial development within 
urban development discourse, coupled with his lack of recognition regarding 
the importance of urban infrastructure in shaping national development. 
This dimension of development plays an important role in the development 
process as noted by the FOA (2005) cited in Bellù (2011: 5).  
 
Pacione (2005) is less cynical and takes a more informed approach with 
regards to the ultra-transformation of Dubai’s socio-spatial structure and 
urban landscape. He noted that “in the early 1990s, the government 
commissioned the Dubai Urban Area Strategic Plan 1993–2012 to guide the 
economic and physical development of the city and that property 
development forms a cornerstone of Dubai’s development strategy.” I concur 
with Pacione on the basis that the spatial development of Dubai is a 
deliberate development strategy aimed at overcoming spatial poverty gaps 
inherited from the colonial presence in the former Trucial States. The 
geography of development theory/concept aptly describes Dubai’s “urban 
physiognomy and morphology” (Ramos 2009:8), and fits in most 
appropriately with the mantra used in Dubai which is ‘build it and they will 
come.’ This has cumulated in a public policy geared towards development of 
the city’s infrastructure with a view to creating sustainable economic growth 
and development. Critics of the city are quick to point out that there are 
glaring deficiencies in Dubai’s urban development and that these will lead to 
inequalities and environmental problems as well as spatial development 
gaps. 
 
The significance of new infrastructure (roads, bridges, schools and water 
supplies) is underscored by Davidson (2008:136) who noted that “without 
new infrastructure the UAE and in Dubai in particular would not be able to 
sustain its plan for industrialization and other economic development 
activities.” In support of Davidson’s point, it is important to note that 
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Dubai’s urbanization and sub-urbanization process is acting as a catalyst 
for economic, social and institutional changes at all levels of the society. 
Davidson, either through ignorance or oversight, failed to address a 
fundamental facet of Dubai’s diversification efforts, which encompass reform 
in its soft infrastructure including creating a modern legal framework, co-
opting modernizing features into its political structure and the development 
of a lean and responsive state bureaucracy powered by an e-government 
web platform. 
 
3.4.7. Role of the state in Dubai’s development  
 
The French poet, Paul Valery, was reported to have used the following words 
“if the state is strong, it will crush us, if it is weak, we will perish” (Bradhan 
1996 cited in Tanzi 1997:4). Thus, “…the ideal role must be one between the 
two extremes” (Tanzi 1997:4). States have arisen in all shapes and sizes, 
depending on a mix of factors including culture, natural endowments, 
opportunities for trade, and distribution of power (WDR 1997:19). I would 
like to support the World Development Report view in drawing on the 
example of the Dubai state which demonstrates “a unique amalgamation of 
the traditional and modern political systems that have guaranteed and laid 
the foundation for development” (UAE 2010:26).  
 
The state is currently the subject of much discussion, because more and 
more analysts, who not so long ago saw the state as the problem, are 
recognizing that it must be part of the solution. This is an important shift 
away from thinking about the state as recently as the 1990s, when 
simplistic recipes such as “…the key to development is the market, not the 
state” and ‘more market means less state’ held considerable sway” (Munck 
2010:9). This view of the state is informed by the prevailing neo-liberal 
orthodoxy, and is contrary to established conventional wisdom and 
experience regarding new and traditional roles of the state in the process of 
nation building, and of using the national resources and the capacity of the 
state to achieve a given set of inter-related development outcomes.  
71 
 
Harik (2006:365) notes that “development economists, for their part, view 
state participation in the economy as the burden of backwardness. Like neo-
liberals, they assume that the market exists, with all its legal, regulatory, 
and administrative characteristics”. Kasi (2009:2) provides a partial analysis 
in noting that “developmental efforts in the last decade have not been as 
successful as expected in a majority of the developing nations. Except in a 
few newly industrialized countries, in all the other developing nations 
poverty has been on the rise, economic growth has slowed down, 
employment faltered and inflation is on an upward swing.” 
 
The neo-liberal orthodoxy, or ‘Washington Census’, poses a serious 
dichotomy as to the role of the state in relation to economic planning and 
involvement in the economy. This debate and contestation regarding the 
actual importance and role of the state is quite paradoxical in light of what 
the World Development Report (1997:1) notes:  
 
… Around the globe, the state is in the spotlight. Far-reaching developments 
in the global economy have us revisiting basic questions about government: 
what its role should be, what it can and cannot do, and how best to do it. 
The last fifty years have shown clearly both benefits and the limitations of 
state action especially in the promotion of development. Governments have 
helped to deliver substantial improvements in education and health and 
reductions in social inequality. 
 
Historical evidence indicates that all countries which have successfully 
transformed from agrarian to modern advanced economies – both the old 
industrial powers of Western Europe and North America, and the newly 
industrialized economies of East Asia – have benefited from governments 
that played a pro-active role in assisting individual firms in overcoming the 
inevitable co-ordination and externality problems. In fact, the governments 
in high-income countries today continue to do so (Lin and Monga 2011:265). 
Much of Dubai’s development rests on a centrally coordinated approach, 
integrated across the Emirate’s core strategic sectors. The central 
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government and the ruling family have played an active role through 
government- or ruling family-owned corporations in providing free property 
(which is initially owned by the government or the ruling family), which is 
then monetized through mass-development (Moody 2008:3). Apart from 
Moody’s (2008) and Tamanini’s (2007) partial analyses of the role of the 
Government of Dubai in economic development there is seemingly a lack of 
theoretical analysis on the role of the state which undergirds the socio-
economic development of Dubai.   
 
The role of the UAE’s (Dubai’s) pax-Britannica state is largely different from 
that of other developing countries in the sense that its machinations are not 
influenced by Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions; while, in contrast to the neo-liberal doctrine of less state 
involvement in the economy, the Government of Dubai is highly involved in 
the transformative, entrepreneurial and redistributive process in the form of 
a tacit or overt social contract. 
 
3.5. Oil Curse Theory 
 
Most literature on development in mineral-rich countries points to the 
resource curse notion (Edighiji 2010:11). The easy money from natural 
resources, the curse theory went, helped finance civil wars and also 
weakened civil institutions by enabling repressive governments to buy off 
opponents and stay in power despite policies that stifled the rest of the 
economy (Tierney 2009). Economics literature argues that in countries with 
abundant natural resources (especially oil), exports of primary goods have 
negative effects on economic growth (see Sachs and Warner 1995; Gylfason 
2001; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2003; Stijns 2005 and Harb 2009 cited 
in Al Awad 2010: 5). This is due in part to what noted writer on the subject 
Terry Lynn Karl says: “Petro States... rely on an unsustainable development 
trajectory fueled by an exhaustible resource and the very rents produced by 
this source form an implacable barrier to change” (Karl 1999:31).  
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One of the surprising features of modern economic growth is that economies 
abundant in natural resources have tended to grow slower than economies 
without substantial resources of this type. The oddity of resource-poor 
economies outperforming resource-rich economies has been a recurring 
motif of economic history. In the seventeenth century, resource-poor 
Netherlands eclipsed Spain, despite the overflow of gold and silver from the 
Spanish colonies in the New World (Sachs & Warner 1997:1). This has led 
Ross to comment: “political scientists believe that oil has some very odd 
properties. Many studies show that when incomes rise, governments tend to 
become more democratic. Yet some scholars imply there is an exception to 
this rule: if rising incomes can be traced to a country’s oil wealth, they 
suggest, this democratizing effect will shrink or disappear” (Ross 2001: 325).  
A review of Terry Lynn Karl (1997) book, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms 
and Petro-states Cooper (1998) noted that:   
 
…Drawing on the collateral experience of Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, 
and, for contrast, Norway, puts forward the thesis that prolonged mineral 
booms, where proceeds accrue to the government, not only lead to a loss of 
financial discipline and deterioration in competitiveness of agriculture and 
industry, but also shape the character of poorly developed states. They 
encourage a culture of rent-seeking rather than productive activity and of 
avoiding both domestic taxation and the political systems of accountability 
associated with it. The paradoxical legacy of oil wealth is therefore much 
greater fragility in governmental and civic institutions than in states less well 
endowed with mineral resources.  
 
Dubai surprisingly, and contrary to academic literature and theory, has 
been able to avoid or defy the oil curse notwithstanding the fact that the 
Dubai Government is not open, or accountable to its citizens, or transparent 
with regard to the distribution and utilization of scarce public resources. 
Dubai and other Gulf States have managed to “create highly profitable and 
well managed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), confounding expectations of 
both general SOE inefficiency and the particularly poor quality of rentier 
public sectors” (Hertog 2010:261).  
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Ross in a seminal piece of work entitled Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, has 
observed that “claims about the rentier state can be sorted into two 
categories; those that suggest oil wealth makes states less democratic and 
those that suggest oil wealth causes governments to do a poorer job of 
promoting economic development. Often the two are conflated” (Ross 
2001:330). I concur with Ross that both arguments are often conflated; 
however it is my contention that not all mineral (oil) wealth countries fall 
into Ross’s second category. Dubai and the UAE in general expose the 
structural and theoretical weakness in these arguments. The Government of 
Dubai has successfully used state resources and its institutions to promote 
economic growth and development, as well as promote the interests of the 
vulnerable groups in the society through the use of constitutional 
provisions, and pragmatism along with an efficient and lean public sector. 
 
The oil curse theory has been severely criticized by specialists such as Ross 
who posits that:  
 
….qualitative studies of the oil-impedes-democracy hypothesis also have 
important limitations. The vast majority have been country-level case studies 
of oil-rich states in the Mideast. Although many have been empirically rich 
and analytically nuanced, the Mideast is nevertheless a difficult place to test 
this claim, since virtually all oil-rich Mideast governments have been highly 
authoritarian since gaining independence. The absence of variation on the 
dependent variable—as well as on Islam, an important control variable—has 
made testing difficult (Ross 2001: 331).  
 
In addition to Ross’s criticism on the oil curse theory the section below will 
provide a brief overview of paradigmatic shortcomings in development 
theory. 
 
3.6. Development Theory Shortcomings: 
 
The difficulty encountered in defining development as a process is not 
dissimilar to the achievement of its goal centred outcome. John Rapley 
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(1996) in his book Understanding Development Theory and Practice in the 
Third World remarked that “development has come a long way in the past six 
decades.” Irrespective of the change, Hague (1991:1), Martin (1998:41) 
Kingsbury (2004:1) and Kihika (2009:784) are of the belief that “the present 
development discourse is contentious, imperialistic, prejudiced, theoretically 
bankrupt, and is an unyielding basis for geo-political social inequity and 
injustice.”     
 
Munck and O’Heary (1999), Sidibeh (2005) Gordon and Sylvester (2004) 
have challenged and interrogated the very concept of development, and have 
argued that conventional theories and models of development are not 
relevant to the development needs of Africa and other parts of the developing 
world to which they are exported for use, opining that the myth of 
development constitutes part of the imaginary social fabric of Western 
societies.  
 
This researcher concurs with the argument posited above and further argue, 
that after more than four decades of development interventions by Western 
countries and their proxy organizations (NGOs, Donor Agencies,) through 
development aid, institutional capacity building and Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), analysis of empirical results in many developing 
countries would reveal generally that in many cases significant percentages 
of populations  are a lot poorer than prior to Western development 
interventions. On that premise Jones (1997:111) notes that “….despite the 
development and implementation of modern development efforts since the 
end of the Second World War, poverty and deprivation remain the norm for 
much of the world's population. In some regions, conditions have even 
worsened for populations. Development efforts have not achieved the 
positive results expected.” Schuftan (1998:1) sums this up in his inimitable 
way: 
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“On a facetious note, western development is merely the post-colonial form of 
economic exploitation now carried out at the request and with the support of 
the exploited.” 
 
The monolithic imitative approach to development, accompanied by 
structural theoretical gaps that characterize development paradigms, 
coupled with the failure of the present raft of models, have given birth to 
post-development activists. “...Recent post-development critiques of 
modernization and development are the latest variant in a long history of 
critiques of development, ranging from, for example, populist ideas of self-
reliance in the writings of Julius Nyerere, Michael Lipton, Ernst, Friedrich 
Schumacher to the structuralist perspectives” (Curry 2003: 407). Renowned 
scholar Sachs (1992:1) also articulated that “the idea of development stands 
like a ruin, in the intellectual landscape and it is time dismantle this mental 
structure.” It is important to note that “...Sachs and Estava are two of the 
leading members of the post-development school who declared development 
to be dead” Thomas (2000:5 in Allen and Thomas 2000). This list of the 
disillusioned development practitioner and sympathizers will become longer 
in the post Millennium Development Goals era. 
 
 David Lewis’s article “Anthropology and development: the uneasy 
relationship”, reiterated sentiments of the frosty relationship between 
anthropology and development that began when Bronislaw Malinowski 
advocated a role for anthropologists as policy advisers to African colonial 
administrators (Grillo 2002 cited in Lewis 2005:1). Anthropology as a 
discipline generally has displayed great ambivalence regarding development. 
In recent years, it has become almost axiomatic among anthropologists that 
development is a problematic and often invasive concept. However, in the 
late 1990s, two broad schools of thought emerged: those who favour an 
active engagement with development institutions on behalf of the poor, with 
the aim of transforming development practice from within; and those who 
prescribe a radical critique of, and a distancing from, the development 
establishment (Escobar 1997: 498). 
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 The monumental shift of anthropology into the development domain speaks 
of a crisis of confidence that can be construed to mean what Martin (1998) 
and Pieterse (2010) called the “deconstruction of development”, meaning 
mainstream development and its counter paradigms. Pieterse (1998) in his 
article “My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-Development, 
Reflexive Development” articulates, the emergence of a new paradigm that is 
more people centred and represents a break from conventional development 
paradigms. Philosophically it is my opinion that the anthropology of 
development could represent the shifting theoretical framework in 
development discourse.  
 
Drawing on a body of literature that critiques the process of development, I 
would like to suggest that the fundamental theoretical deficit which besets 
development at a pragmatic level is the myopic Eurocentricism that 
undergirds development thinking and which leads into the assumption that 
development is “automatic, unilinear, and is immune from intervening 
factors such as cultural revivalism” (Moghadam, 1992:1).  In defence of the 
existing development paradigms So (1990:12) moots the view that: 
 
“...Theories are not static entities. They attack other theories and they 
defend their own arguments. After engaging in heated theoretical debates 
they transform themselves into better research tools than they were before. 
The field of development is a perfect example of the dynamics of change in 
theoretical perspectives.” 
 
The typology of development theories that is discussed in chapter five of the 
thesis is representative of the dynamics within the development field. With 
this in mind, Pieterse (2010:11) remarked that “shifts in the nineteenth to 
late twentieth centuries’ have altered development thinking and policy 
epistemologies.” This observation has led me to paraphrase Karl Marx’s 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, “...philosophers have tended to only interpret 
the world in various ways.”(www.columbia.edu/cu/tat/core/marx.htm) 
Implicitly this comment by Marx could be interpreted as foreshadowing 
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development theorists, who seem to interpret the perceived reality of 
underdevelopment through the lens of an idealist and neo-imperialist.   
 
Furthermore, owing to their theoretical failure, and contrary to what is 
believed, that after rigorous academic debate development theories would be 
morphed into better theories as opined by So (1990). Empirical evidence 
reveals for example that, the dependency and modernization schools have 
failed to predict or foresee the following: 
 
The dependency theory never foresaw the socio-economic transformation of 
the oil rich countries of the Arab World, similarly it failed to detect that the 
countries on the periphery of the global economic system would become late 
developers, such as Ireland, UAE Asian Tigers, Brazil, and India. Secondly, 
loathe it or love it ‘economic globalization’ has brought with it incremental 
benefits to the developing world and drawing on the insatiable desire to  
develop, policy makers in southern countries have used the tenets of the 
flying geese paradigm for national development. According to (Kasahara 
2004:2) “the paradigm postulates that, under appropriate conditions, North-
South economic linkages, i.e., the relations between the developed and the 
developing economies, could be beneficial to all, and that the East Asian 
development integration is a case in point”. 
 
Gordon and Sylvester (2004:3) aptly and most perceptively summarize the 
point above by commenting that “development has evolved into an 
essentially incontestable paradigm with such a powerful hold on our 
collective imaginations that it is almost impossible to think around it”.  
 
The proponents of the dependency schools never envisaged such a re-
shaping of the socio-economic global landscape. In addition to the above, 
Tucker (1999:12) cited in Munck & O’Hearn (1999) notes that the 
dependency theory failed to recognize the cultural dimension of domination. 
This was a crucial omission as cultural analysis is central to any 
understanding of the relations of power and to any strategy of resistance or 
dependency reversal.  
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Modernization theory predicts that countries with a rapid economic 
development will experience a move towards democratic institutions, such 
as political representation (Lipset 1959 cited in Aartun 2002:1). On the 
contrary the unprecedented socio-economic transformation has not led to a 
crescendo of calls and pushes for democratic reforms and or the wholesale 
introduction of democratic institutions or the formation of political parties or 
civic movements with political agendas in Oman, Dubai and the UAE by 
extension. This consequently demonstrates the subjective nature of 
development theories. The critics may argue that these are isolated cases; 
nonetheless the fact remains that there is no universal applicability of 
Western style development theory: as Hanlon & Marcelo (2010:1) remind us, 
“every country has a specific history which shapes its development path.” In 
spite of the criticism it is imperative that the point be made that 
“development is important because it produces an economy, and more 
broadly a society and culture, that determines how people live  in terms of 
income, services, life chances, education and so on” (Peet, 2009: 6).  
 
3.7. Conclusion  
 
Successful and progressive societies are defined by their ability to improve 
the quality of life for every successive generation. However, “development 
strategy is a complex set of interrelated policies rather than a simple matter 
of trade policy, as often implied by mainstream literature” (Chang, 2006:4). 
Dubai’s socio-economic model has been discussed and written about in 
many fora locally, regionally and internationally. However, many of the 
analyses are conducted within specific macro-economic variables without 
contextualizing the city-state’s socio-economic progress within development 
paradigms.  
 
In addition to the points mentioned above, there has been a school of 
thought, which espouses the view that the modern development process is 
driven by selfish motives and the interests of Western societies. Similarly, 
development theories have come under strong criticisms by policy-makers, 
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scholars and development practitioners from both sides of the political North 
and South divide. These critics have deemed the development models 
promulgated and propagated as Euro-centric and a form of neo-imperialism 
masked as development paradigms imposed by donor agencies, the United 
Nations organs and governments of developed countries. The empirical 
results of the dominant neo-liberal development paradigm have 
demonstrated how theoretically flawed the model is in achieving the desired 
results across the developing world. In spite of the theoretical deficits of 
Western development models, So (1990:11) tempers the criticism as noted in 
section 3.6 above.  Notwithstanding what has been said, Hanlon & Marcelo 
(2010:1) appropriately noted that “every country has a specific history which 
shapes its development path” and policy makers can draw on the wide array 
of development paradigms and development research methodologies to 
shape the national development strategies of each nation state, including 
Dubai.  
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 Chapter Four:  
Research Methodology 
All of the greatest scientists in the history of mankind, such as Galileo, Newton, Einstein,  
Adam Smith, and Charles Darwin, were master theoreticians, and they are remembered for 
the theories they postulated that transformed the course of science. 
by 
Anol Bhattacherjee (2012) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the research methodology which has been applied by 
the researcher to answer the research questions that formed the basis of 
this study. It further demonstrates the systematic process that was followed 
to reach the conclusion as well as indicating that acceptable research 
methodologies were observed and applied.  
 
The primary aim of this study was to develop an understanding of the 
mechanisms of the city-state of Dubai’s socio-economic development 
strategies over the ten year period 1998 to 2008. To achieve this aim, this 
study employed a theoretical framework based on a hybrid construct of 
Rentier, Developmental and Competition State models. The study, and by 
extension, the research methodology and process were shaped by the set of 
research questions that are listed below. 
 
The chapter also elaborated on the importance of research design, the 
methods of data collection and analysis, highlighting the need for 
triangulation of qualitative research instruments and in a limited way 
utilising quantitative tools as and when these became appropriate. This was 
done in such a manner as to allow the limited quantitative data to be used 
to suррort qualitative data.  The chapter emрloys a combination of the 
constructivist and рragmatist research paradigms.   
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4.2. Research Questions 
 
In particular, this chapter intends to answer the following questions:  
What have been Dubai’s socio-economic development strategies and 
performance over the period 1998 to 2008? In order to provide answers, the 
following sub-questions need to be addressed: 
 
RQ1. What socio-economic development approaches did Dubai pursue 
to achieve its present level of growth and development? 
RQ2. Is there a strong correlation between the state’s involvement and 
development in Dubai?  
 
RQ3 Can Dubai be considered a rentier, developmental state or a 
competition state? 
RQ4. How has Dubai harnessed expatriate labour for national 
development?  
RQ5. How did Dubai protect and empower its minority population in 
the process of national development?  
 
4.2.1. Preliminary study 
 
This thesis had its origins in Dubai, a year or two after my arrival there on 
the 30th of September 2004. The preliminary investigation was prompted by 
a number of socio-economic factors, including that which came to be 
regarded as the most unprecedented economic transformation, urbanisation 
development and wealth creation in the Arab world; all of which was made 
possible not only by transnational capitalists and oil money used to buy 
countless numbers of voiceless workers who were skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled. 
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This preliminary research into the social and economic development of the 
Emirate of Dubai involved numerous informal interviews with security 
guards, academics, CEOs, engineers/project managers, taxi drivers and 
workers in the retail sectors and construction workers. The researcher also 
monitored the business magazines, newspapers, and government 
announcements as well as local and international electronic media. The 
overall aim was to proceed to a deeper understanding of the development 
process that was unfolding in front of me and also to determine the 
development dogma/s or paradigm/s that could be used to understand 
Dubai’s development agenda.   
 
The findings from the preliminary study suggested that there is a need for 
further and more holistic study; with an emphasis on locating Dubai’s 
development trajectory within a development paradigm, given that most of 
what was written on Dubai tended to focus narrowly on individual sector 
performance such as trade, tourism, transport, real estate and IT services. 
Development as a discourse and process was loosely used and 
inappropriately contextualized into macro-economic variables. Examples of 
such work would be found in the writings of the flowing authors: Sampler 
and Eigner (2006) and (2008), “Sand to Silicon Going Global: Rapid Growth 
Lessons from Dubai”, Saunders (2003), “Dubai The Arabian Dream” and the 
“Oxford Business Group Report” (2005), to name three.  
 
4.3. Research Design 
 
Kothai (2006:31) explains that the research design is the conceptual 
structure within which research is conducted. It involves decisions 
regarding, what, where, when, how much and by what means an enquiry or 
a research study constitute a research design. Based on this description, my 
thesis “….is the end result of a series of decisions made by the researcher 
concerning how the study will be conducted” (Burns and Grove 1997: 222). 
Polit and Hungler (1995:160) argue that “….research designs vary with 
regard to how much structure the researcher imposes on the research 
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situation and on how much flexibility is allowed once the study is under 
way.” Essentially, a research design is “a plan, structure and strategy of 
investigation so conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions or 
problems” (Kerlinger 1986: 279, cited in Ali 2008:108), in other words “It is 
a complete scheme or programme of the research” (Ibid:108).  
 
The qualitative research employed a two phase research design. In the first 
phase a set of research questions was crafted, leading to a preliminary study 
of, an extensive review of secondary sources of literature on Arab 
development performance and Dubai in particular. The material for the 
preliminary literature review on Dubai’s rapid socio-economic 
transformation was drawn from local newspapers, Middle Eastern Studies 
journals, internet searches and other local printed material. 
 
4.3.1. Descriptive study 
 
Singh and Nath (2007:229), “….a descriptive study describes and interprets 
what is. It is concerned with conditions or relationships that exist, opinions 
that are held, processes that are going on, effects that are evident, or trends 
that are developing.” Kothari (2006:33) elucidates that this approach “is 
used when the purpose of research is the accurate description of a situation 
or an association between variables.” This contextualization of the definition 
appropriately places itself within the theoretical framework and research 
questions and objectives of the thesis. In essence, this study is primarily of a 
descriptive nature and forms part of the research design. 
 
4.4. Research Paradigms 
 
One of the critical decisions to make in designing a study is the paradigm (or 
paradigms) within which to situate one’s work. The use of the term 
“paradigm”,  derived from the work of the historian of science, Thomas 
Kuhn, refers to a set of very general philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of the world (ontology) and how we can understand it (epistemology), 
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assumptions that tend to be shared by researchers working in a specific 
field or tradition (Maxwell 2005:36).  
Johnson and Christensen (2012:31) narrow the definition of research 
paradigm to mean “a perspective about research held by a community of 
researchers’ assumptions, concepts, values, and practices.” Examples of 
paradigms are philosophical positions such as positivism, post-positivism, 
constructivism, realism and pragmatism (Ibid: 36; Creswell & Clark 
2011:42). These definitions encapsulate what thinkers on the issue have 
regarded as “a way of reviewing reality, especially in an intellectual 
discipline,” such as development studies discourse.  
 
Table 4.1: Elements of World View and Implications for Practice 
World View 
Element 
Research Paradigms and Assumptions 
Positivism Post-
positivism 
Constructivism Pragmatism 
Ontology: 
What is the 
reality? 
There is real 
reality 
Singular reality 
(e.g.) 
researchers 
reject or fail to 
reject 
hypotheses 
Multiple realities 
(e.g.) researchers 
provide quotes 
to illustrate 
different 
perspectives 
Singular and 
multiple 
realities (e.g.) 
researchers test 
hypotheses and 
provide multiple 
perspectives 
      Epistemology: 
What is the 
relationship 
between the 
researchers & 
that being 
researched? 
 
Knowledge can 
be obtained by 
objective 
methods 
Distance & 
impartiality 
(e.g.) 
researchers 
objectively 
collect data 
Closeness (e.g.) 
researchers visit 
participants at 
their sites to 
collect data 
Practicality (e.g.) 
researchers 
collect data by 
“what works” to 
address 
question 
Methodology: 
What is the 
process of 
research? 
   -Surveys 
          - Experiments 
- Quantitative 
approach 
Deductive (e.g.) 
researchers test 
an a priori 
theory 
Inductive (e.g.) 
researchers start 
with 
participants’ 
views and 
develop theories 
and 
generalizations 
Combining (e.g.) 
researchers 
collect both 
qualitative and 
quantitative 
data, mixing 
them 
Compiled Source/s: Adapted from Cohen and Crabtree (2006); Guba (1989) (cited in 
Tha 2010) and Creswell and Clark (2011) pg.42 
 
In order to develop an ontological and epistemological position from the 
spectrum of research paradigms summarized above, this study compares 
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the philosophical underpinnings and their practical implications for data 
collection and knowledge generation, which is the primary objective of any 
piece of research of this nature.  
 
Given the nature of this study, no single paradigm could satisfactorily deal 
with all the required methodological requirements. Therefore, the author 
found it prudent to blend the constructivist and pragmatist paradigms. The 
comparison of the theoretical underpinnings of the paradigms listed in Table 
4 above led to the conclusion that constructivism and pragmatism support 
my research agenda, which is to generate new knowledge encapsulated 
within the rentier, developmental and competition state paradigms.  
 
4.5. Data Collection: Sources, Methods and Procedures 
 
This section of the chapter discusses the morphology of the data collecting 
instruments and the opportunities and constraints encountered during the 
data gathering process in Dubai. The informational matrix or building bricks 
for this thesis was drawn from primary and secondary sources.  
 
4.5.1. Primary data sources 
 
Primary data included a number of reliable sources such as interviews, 
documentation analysis and direct observation. for empiricism purposes 
were used to answer the research title, and the substratum of research 
questions and objectives.  
 
4.5.2. Secondary data sources 
 
Secondary data is data that has been collected for some other purpose but is 
able to be used to answer research questions (Saunders et al. 2000:90). In 
order to answer the research questions and to achieve the study objectives 
as outlined in chapter one of thesis, secondary data was accordingly used.  
 
87 
 
The study obtained such data from a number of sources and this was used 
to enrich the quality of the data obtained from primary sources. In addition, 
other academic analyses and written material relevant to the area of 
research being undertaken were drawn on.  Secondary data sources 
included the: 
 
 Publications by the Dubai School of Government 
 IMF/UAE Country Reports 
 World Bank Reports 
 World Development Reports 
 United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Reports  
 OECD/MENA Reports 
 Development paradigm literature 
 Review of newspaper articles 
 Dubai Chamber of Commerce publications 
 Internal Reports from Dubai Municipality, Department of Economic 
Development, as well as Ministries of Education and Social Affairs,  
 United Arab Emirates Yearbooks 
 Dubai Statistical Centre Annual Reports 
 Emirates Centre of Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) Reports 
 International Organizations Reports on the U.A.E (Dubai) 
 Academic journals/ working papers and theses  
 UAE Labour Law of 1980. 
 
The abovementioned sources provided me with rich and comprehensive 
content for analysis and also assisted me in being able to identify theoretical 
deficiencies and to locate the gaps in existing literature that this research 
seeks to fill. They also added a new insight into on how to view development 
and discuss it, irrespective of the political sensitivity and undertones in a 
society that steers clear of socio-political issues. 
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4.6. Data collection instruments 
 
The primary data collection techniques used in this study included: semi-
structured interviews, informal interviews, documentation analysis and 
direct observation. Given the descriptive and explanatory nature of the 
research, these instruments proved to be of enormous value in terms of the 
volume and quality of the information gathered. 
 
4.6.1. Interviewing 
 
In-depth interviews are a common means of collecting qualitative data. 
According to Mushi, Maleka and Bhalalusesa (2002:15), “interviews 
essentially allow you to enter into the other person’s world, to understand 
the person’s inner perspectives.” This argument is supported by Gorman 
and Clayton (1997:124) in their assertion that “interviewing can enable a 
researcher to explore ‘causation’, that is, to enquire into why individuals or 
organizations behave in the way they do; something most quantitative 
research cannot really answer.” Coolican (1999:82) echoes this sentiment in 
stating that an “interview study is one in which the overall design is to use 
interviews to gather information as opposed to the formality and possible 
artificiality of an experiment.” The positivists’ view of interviews is that they 
are used for getting facts from respondents (Coolican 2009:145); for this 
purpose the study employed various interview methods as another 
important data collection instrumentation tool. The interview continuum 
depiction is illustrated and explained below in Section 4.5.2 
 
4.6.2. Interviewing continuum 
 
Interviewing, as a method of data collection, “is categorised into four large 
chunks: informal, unstructured, semi-structured and structured” (Bernard 
2000:190) as depicted below in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1:Interview Continuum 
 
Source: Adapted from Bernard pg.190 
 
4.6.3. Informal interviews  
 
Informal interviews are characterized by a total lack of structure or control. 
The researcher merely tries to remember conversations heard during the 
time in the field (Bernard 2000:190). In Dubai, this method of data 
collection was primary. This was important in a deeply distrustful society 
where individuals of all walks of life become very cagey about revealing 
information. As a consequence political commentators, journalists, civil 
servants, academics, government and privately owned NGOs regularly act in 
a manner tantamount to self-preservation, taking an uncritical and pro-
establishment posture towards the Dubai Government and its litany of quasi 
entities and corporations.  
 
4.6.4. Semi-structured interviews 
 
This study uses semi-structured interviews as one of the data gathering 
methods, involving a combination of techniques including one-to-one and 
emailed interviews. The topic lends itself to the use of semi-structured 
interviews due to the multiplicity of issues to be covered. This coupled with 
the fact that the process allows in-depth information to be unearthed, is a 
fundamental factor if the research questions and objectives are to be 
adequately answered. The justification and advantage of this approach is 
articulated by Schensul et al. (1999:149), who noted that “…interviews 
combine the flexibility of the unstructured, open-ended interviews with the 
directionality and agenda of the survey instrument to produce focused 
qualitative, textual data.” 
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Another justification for using in-depth, semi-structured interviewing to 
answer the research questions and objectives noted above is due to the fact 
that regarding most of my interviewees, The researcher “...would not be able 
to get more than one opportunity to interview these individuals” (Bernard 
2000:197). In addition, the semi-structured interview is deemed ideal to 
capture the nature of the socio-economic transformation data that is being 
investigated, as in the case of Dubai between 1998 and 2008: “…from 
managers, bureaucrats, to elite members of the community” (Ibid: 191), as 
well as other actors and stakeholders in the economy.  
 
According to Robson (2002:270 cited in Ncube 2010), “semi-structured 
interviews are described as containing predetermined questions which can 
be modified, re-worded, explained to the interviewee, or omitted when 
deemed appropriate. Semi-structured interviews are often contrasted with 
structured interviews that pose predetermined, but fixed-worded questions 
and with unstructured interviews that raise no pre-set questions.” 
Methodologically, qualitative research, such as in the case of this thesis, is 
“strengthened by semi-structured interviews that establish a firm qualitative 
foundation for the construction of an ethnographically informed survey, by 
devising a conceptual taxonomy of domains, factors, variables and variable 
attributes that may be transformed into the items on a survey instrument” 
(Schemsul et al. 1999:152).  
 
Semi-structured interviews presuppose flexibility on the part of the 
interviewer in terms of the order in which the topics are considered and, 
perhaps more significantly, allow the interviewee to develop ideas and speak 
more widely on the issues raised by the researcher. The questions are open-
ended and there is more emphasis on the interviewee elaborating points of 
interest (Densombe 2007:176).  
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4.6.4.1. Guidelines and administration of semi-structured interviews 
 
Written guidelines were developed based on thematic issues identified from 
the broad range of research objectives and questions. The guided interview 
questions (Appendix one) assisted in increasing the comprehensiveness of 
data gathered and provided a more systematic approach to data collection.   
 
As outlined in the purposive sampling frame, respondents were drawn from 
different sectors of the society with specific interview questions for each 
stakeholder category. The interviews were administered by the researcher, 
on two levels: The first level comprised one-on-one interviews with 
labourers, security guards, a medical engineer, a statistician, an economist 
and a journalist in addition to countless informal interviews with a wide 
cross-section of individuals in the city of Dubai.  
 
The second was carried out by emailing interview questions to selected 
respondents. The reason for this was to allow them to think carefully about 
the questions and to provide an in depth response on sensitive issues 
without feeling intimidated by the presence of other interviewees and or the 
interviewer/researcher.  
 
4.6.4.2. Interview steps  
 
The interviewing process involves a number steps, outlined in tabular 
format below:  
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Table 4.2: Steps Taken in Conducting Interviews 
Process Steps Remarks 
Step 1        Make a request via email, telephone, one to one conversation 
Step 2        Set up appointment and email questions 
Step 3        Send interview questions 
Step 4        Transcribe interview results 
Step 5        Analyse transcripts 
Step 6        Cross checking information provided by interviewees 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
  
The semi-structured interviews steps outlined graphically above were 
constructed both to reveal answers to the research questions and to attain 
the objectives of the thesis.  
 
4.6.5. Observation  
 
The thesis also utilized observation as a data collection method. 
“Observation offers the social researcher a distinct way of collecting data. It 
does not rely on what people say they do, or what they say they think. It is 
more direct than that. Instead, it draws on the direct evidence of the eye to 
witness events first hand” (Denscombe 2007: 206). As a data collection tool, 
“observation is highly recommended because: 
 
(i) It provides an ontological perspective which sees interactions, actions 
behaviours, and the way people interpret these” (Mason 2003:85). 
 
(ii) Secondly, direct observation lends itself to “develop an epistemological 
position which suggests that knowledge or evidence of the social work 
can be generated by observing or participating in natural or real life 
settings. Or put differently, you may have a position which suggests 
that meaningful knowledge cannot be generated without observation, 
because not all knowledge for example is articulable, recountable, or 
constructable in an interview” (Mason 2003:85). 
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Observation as a research method offers a number of clear advantages over 
interviews and questionnaires (Foster 2006:59 cited in Sapford & Jupp 
2006:59). Specific advantages that justify the use of direct observation as a 
research tool to investigate Dubai’s socio-economic strategies and 
performances include the following:   
 
(i) Information about the physical environment and about human 
behaviour may be recorded directly by the researcher without having 
to rely on the retrospective or anticipatory accounts of others (Foster 
2006:59 cited in Sapsford & Jupp 2006). 
 
(ii) Another justification has to do with the fact that it permits the 
researcher to develop a fuller understanding of the situation and 
content  
 
(iii) Direct observation affords the researcher the opportunity to collect 
data in a natural, unpressured and flexible environment.  
 
With regard to the advantages of using direct observation as a means of data 
collection, such observation of selected sites was guided by the observation 
matrix provided in Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3: Observational Matrix 
What to Observe Where to Observe? Method of Observation 
Cluster of free-zones Multiple sites across the 
city 
 
Direct Observation 
Infrastructural 
development 
Roads & Rail Networks, 
Bridges and other physical 
infrastructure in the city 
 
Direct Observation 
Institutional 
infrastructure 
 
Ministry of Social Welfare 
and Ministry of Finance, 
Government Health 
Facilities and Private 
Educational Institutions 
 
Direct Observation 
Construction sites and 
camps 
 Direct Observation  
Community development 13 Newly Built Residential 
Communities 
Direct Observation  
Source: Adopted from Taabazuing (2012) 
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The observational matrix outlined in Table 4.2 pre-dates the official duration 
of the start of this research study. For practical purposes, I had undertaken 
to analyse the rapid socio-economic transformation of Dubai since my 
arrival in the city state in 2004. Results and findings carried out prior to 
registration at UNISA were integrated into this study. 
 
4.6.6. Documentation analysis 
 
While it is a regular occurrence for social researchers conducting surveys to 
focus almost exclusively on surveying people as authoritative sources of 
data. However, in practice the strategy of the survey may be applied to 
documents as well. A social researcher may carry out empirical research 
based on documents which incorporate as wide, and as inclusive, data as 
possible.  Newspapers, company reports, and government reports are a few 
of the possible sources that might be surveyed.  As Gorman and Clayton 
(1997:159) note, “…it is not possible to understand the present situation 
without an appreciation of the past.” Likewise Yin (1994) emphasizes the 
value of documents, since they are able to provide more insights by cross 
validating and augmenting evidence obtained from other sources. 
 
Against this background, documentary analysis was used to map the 
process of change in Dubai between 1998 and 2008. The study reviewed key 
documents including statistical reports from various Federal and Local 
Government Ministries and the Dubai Strategic Plans of 1996, 2010 and 
2015.  
 
Qualitative documentation analysis is one of the most popular types of 
social science research methods (Wesley 2010:1). Documents are a valuable 
source of data for analysing institutions and the policy process because they 
constitute a record of “the development and implementation of decisions and 
activities that are central to [institutional] functions” (Hakim, 2000:46). 
Mason (2005:103) regards analysis of documentary sources as a major 
method of social research, and one which many qualitative researchers see 
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as meaningful and appropriate in the context of their research. This thesis 
made use of published and unpublished documents. The use of documents, 
also known as documentary analysis, served as a source for both secondary 
and primary data. 
 
4.7. Qualitative triangulation  
 
In the social sciences, the concept of “triangulation” indicates that 
researchers use different perspectives (mixing of data or methods) on an 
issue under study or in answering research questions (as referred to in 
Section 4. 3). These perspectives are able to be substantiated utilizing 
different data sources, several methods and/or several theoretical 
approaches so that diverse viewpoints cast light upon a particular topic 
(Flick 2009:445; Olsen 2004:3; Denscombe 2007: 144).   
 
The primary aim of qualitative researchers in using “….triangulation as a 
research strategy … is to check and establish the validity of their studies by 
analyzing a research question from multiple perspectives” (Guion et al. 
2002:1; Flick 2009:426). Flick (2009:426) argues that “triangulation fulfills 
the purpose of the integration of several methodological approaches and 
different sorts of data in a systematic research design for understanding 
what is being studied in a more systematic way.” Michael Рatton 
aррroрriately noted that "triangulation strengthens a study by combining 
methods" (2002:247). 
 
The nature of the present research has required “….the use of different data 
collection sources to corroborate each other” (Mason 1996:25 cited in 
Silverman 2008:121). Thus, methodological triangulation (Guion et al. 
2011:1), was deemed to be appropriate, as opposed to using, for example, 
data triangulation, in that this researcher has made use of limited 
quantitative data tables in chapter nine to analyse the social and economic 
dimensions of Dubai’s development. In addition to the quantitative tables, 
items such as documentation analysis, direct observation, informal and 
96 
 
semi-structured interviews all form part of the methodological triangulation 
process during the research. 
 
4.7.1. Methods of triangulation 
 
Denzin, in the 1970s, identified and distinguished between four types of 
triangulation (Flick 2009:444): data, investigator, theory and methodological 
triangulation.  
 
4.7.1.1. Data triangulation 
 
Data triangulation involves using a range of data from different sources of 
information in order to increase the validity of a study. The affirmative use 
of different data sources may be drawn from material such as books, photos, 
films and sound or the same material from different places, times and 
spaces (Guion et al. 2011:2; Gerrish & Lacey 2010:334; Wijnhoven 2009: 
82). By extension, these sources are likely to be stakeholders in a 
programme, participants, other researchers, programme staff, other 
community members, and so on (Guion et al. 2011:14). From a wide cross-
section of data sources, research outcomes may easily be corroborated to 
determine the weaknesses, reliability and validity of the raw data. 
 
4.7.1.2. Investigator triangulation  
 
This brings other investigators into the research. This may, for example, be 
done by working in a team and independently examining a part of the data 
and checking the prior interpretation; or by letting an auditor regularly 
check the process (Wijnhoven 2009:83). Essentially investigator 
triangulation "occurs where more than one person investigates a 
phenomenon to reduce personal bias of the data” (Gerrish & Lacey 2010: 
334). 
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4.7.1.3. Theory triangulation  
 
Theory triangulation involves the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a 
single set of data. Unlike investigator triangulation, this method typically 
entails using professionals outside of a particular field of study (Guion et al. 
2011).  
 
4.7.1.4. Methodological triangulation 
 
This exists when methods either from within the same paradigm or across 
paradigms are used to study the phenomena (Gerrish & Lacey 2010: 334). 
 
4.8. Data Presentation and Analysis 
 
Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources, processed, 
analysed and presented. Once all the interviews (person to person and 
email) were conducted, they were transcribed verbatim and subjected to 
thematic perusal classification analysis; based on the themes and concepts 
outlined in chapter three.  
 
4.8.1. Data presentation techniques 
 
The presentation of research plays an important role in the communication 
of research data gathered. The lack of an accurate and clear presentation of 
research findings will lead to questions being asked regarding the legitimacy 
and accuracy of the data. Such findings are normally presented using a 
number of statistical methods, including: pie charts, bar graphs and tables. 
For the purposes of this research tables were used as the method of 
presenting socio-economic variables and indicators. Every decision that is 
made concerning any aspect of this research can be justified. Thus, the 
reason for using tables as a means of presenting data sets collected is due to 
the fact that tables can be easily read and understood by everyone.  
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4.8.2. Data analysis (techniques) 
 
Data analysis is the process of developing answers through the reduction, 
display/examination and interpretation of data (http://www.statcan.gc.ca). 
Once the data have been collected by the researcher, using a triangulation 
of qualitative research methods, the research process proceeds into the data 
analysis phase. Caudle (2004:417 in Wholey 2004) describes this as “the 
making sense of relevant qualitative data gathered from sources such as 
interviews, on-site observations and documents.” 
 
All 30 informal and semi-structured interviews conducted were transcribed 
verbatim and subjected to thematic analysis. The transcripts were 
repeatedly viewed, and the responses supplied by respondents were treated 
within the parameters of the central themes and concepts outlined in 
chapter three. The analysis of interview data was supported by observational 
field notes which were compiled throughout the data collection period. 
Combining observational notes, documentational study and secondary data, 
the data analysis process was able to use a cluster of triangulation 
techniques with a view to establishing the consistencies, reliability and 
validity of the issues raised in the data collection period. In addition, 
analysis of Dubai’s socio-economic development strategies and the said 
performance between 1998 and 2008 involved looking for recurring issues, 
themes and macro-micro economic figures. Results obtained from the 
qualitative analyses were used to compare with those in the theoretical 
literature that formed the hybrid theoretical framework model proposed in 
the chapter six. 
 
4.9. Sampling Designs 
 
It is a general feature of social enquiry to design and select samples for a 
study. This is applicable whether the research is qualitative or quantitative 
in form (Burgess 1984a, 1984 cited in Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The first 
step in sampling is to define the population of interest clearly and accurately 
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(Sapsfold & Jupp 2006:27). Having decided on the appropriate segments of 
the population of interest to me regarding the research objectives and 
research questions, I had to decide on the type of sampling that would allow 
me to capture in-depth information, in a cost-effective and timely manner.  
 
4.9.1. Purposive sampling 
 
In conducting this research, the researcher employed a sampling technique 
known as “purposive sampling”; given that the “….research samples have 
been chosen in a deliberate manner, purposive sampling is also known as 
purposeful or judgment sampling” (Yin 2011: 88; Patton 2001:230). Using 
this approach, the sample is “hand-picked” for the research. The term is 
applied to those situations where the researcher already knows something 
about the specific people or events and deliberately selects particular ones 
that are likely to produce the most valuable data (Descombe 2007:17). 
 
The use of this technique is justified, in that the information needed to fully 
answer the research questions had to be extracted from strategically 
selected segments of the population. Thus groups and sub-groups of the 
socio-economic stakeholders and actors, who would be able to provide the 
required data, were identified.  
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The sample constituents include the following:  
 
Table 4.4: Composition of the Study Sample 
       Source of 
Information: 
Targeted Persons and Institutions     Sampling 
    Size 
  Sampling  
method 
     Interviews  Domestic Helpers 
 Economist at the Dubai 
Economic Council  
 Business Owners 
 Academics   
 Legal Consultant practising in 
Dubai 
 Emarati Citizens    
 Insurance Consultant  
 Medical Engineer 
 Construction Project Manager                      
 Technical/General Workers 
 Security Guards 
 Statistician 
2 
 
1 
1 
4 
 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
    Purposive 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
    
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
  Purposive 
  Purposive 
  Purposive 
    
      Informal 
Interviews 
 Taxi Driver 
 Cleaner and Office  Assistants  
 Human Resources Manager 
3 
2 
1 
  Random 
   Purposive 
   Purposive 
    
Observation  Dubai Internet City 
 Knowledge Village 
 Dubai International Academic 
City 
 Dubai Media City  
 Labour Camp 
 Infrastructure development 
 Socio-cultural relationships 
 Not  
Not 
Applicable 
 
 
 
 
4.9.2. Sample size 
 
Through purposive sampling techniques, I was able to conduct 50 informal 
and semi-structured interviews with a wide cross-section of stakeholders 
within the development process in Dubai.   
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4.10. Ethical Considerations 
 
The research involved interviewing stakeholders and obtaining expert 
opinions; and for this reason care was taken to ensure that the identity of 
those who had provided information was deemed to be confidential, in other 
words, was protected and their privacy respected. Similarly, confidentiality 
of data collected was ensured to protect those who provided it. 
I ensured that I conformed to ethical values and the protection of the privacy 
of individuals who participated in the study. 
 
4.11. Limitations 
 
There were a number of methodological challenges encountered during the 
data gathering process. The following were some of these:  
 It was difficult to manage expectations as some workers in the 
construction industry thought that by telling their stories, instant 
change would occur in social and economic conditions  
 There are over 200 nationalities in Dubai. Thus language became a 
problem; at times, the essence of the information being extracted 
during interviewing process, was lost during translation from Hindi, 
Urdu or Nepali to English.  
 Some interviewees were afraid of the ramifications if they were seen to 
be complaining either about government structures or their private 
sector jobs.  
 A significant challenge was to unearth information in government 
offices, due in part to the high staff turnover and inadequate or 
insufficient archival material to conduct documentation analyses.  
 Distrust between the Emirati and expatriate communities, resulting in 
some respondents not turning up for interviews.  
 Documentation analyses provide contradictory accounts on an 
historical event, such as when oil was discovered in Dubai and when 
the ruling family began their reign over Dubai.  
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 The study was also limited by the size of the sample, given that the 
research sought to target specific groups of individuals to interview. 
 
4.12. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided contextual understanding of the socio-economic 
transformation of Dubai as the research unit of analysis. It also set the 
scene for the research strategy as well as the findings in chapters seven, 
eight, nine and the conclusion and recommendations in the tenth chapter.  
Using purposive sampling, semi-structured and informal interviews were 
conducted with a number of individuals, cutting across professional and 
non-professional designations and groupings of respondents. The research 
was carried out using a two stage data gathering process. In the initial 
stage, a preliminary study was undertaken, being followed by a combination 
of instrumentation tools including: observation, document analysis and 
interviews. The data gathered were analysed and presented qualitatively or 
narratively, drawing on the RDC hybrid theoretical framework that shaped 
the basis of the research, combined with limited use of quantitative data, 
presented using tables. 
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 Chapter Five  
Competing Development Theories: A Snapshot of their Central  
Propositions & Shortcomings 
 
In development man is the central actor in the process 
By Bernardo T.G. Chidzero, 
Enrique Iglesias, 
and Michel Rocard 
1992 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The modern development era which came into being at the end of World War 
II has focussed almost exclusively on addressing the underdevelopment that 
exists in so-called developing countries. As a process and practice, 
development has been used as an ameliorating tool to undo centuries of 
colonial hegemonic rule and exploitation.  
 
Development represents a transformation of society, a movement from 
traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing 
with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more 
“modern” ways (Stiglitz 1998:3). As a transformative force, development is 
accompanied by a plethora of paradigms, which may partly be explained by 
Matunhu (2011:72) who is of the opinion that “….poverty reduction policies 
and strategies have tended to be influenced by the theories of development.” 
This chapter thus seeks to provide a cursory glance at four influential 
development paradigms as they appear during the chronological evolution of 
development thinking. In addition, this provides a theoretical foundation 
that allows for situating Dubai’s socio-economic development within specific 
development paradigms in chapter six.  
 
The chapter is divided into the following sections: 5.1 examines the various 
meanings of development and also looks at development as a concept; 
Section 5.2 investigates the genealogy of development; Section 5.3 deals with 
the core values of development and finally, Section 5.4 addresses the 
contradistinction between growth and development.  
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5.2. Development: Definition and Concept 
 
In common parlance the term “development” figures prominently and is used 
both frequently and rather casually; with popular usage including the 
following: development studies, problems of development, developing 
countries, less developed countries, development cooperation, 
underdevelopment, development aid, development strategies, development 
policy and so forth. Hence, what is meant by this term? (Szirmai 2005:6).  
 
There are few words that offer as many definitional difficulties as 
development and it remains a highly contested term. While dictionary 
definitions focus on the idea of ‘a stage of growth or advancement’, 
development remains a complex and ambiguous term which carries with it 
several layers of meaning. As a verb, ‘development’ refers to activities 
required to bring about change or progress, and is often linked strongly to 
economic growth. As an adjective, ‘development’ implies a standard against 
which different rates of progress may be compared, and it therefore takes on 
a subjective, judgmental element in which societies or communities are 
sometimes compared, and then positioned at different ‘stages’ of an 
evolutionary development schema (Lewis 2005).  
 
The term therefore seems to defy precise definition although not for a want 
of definitions on offer (Cowen & Shenton 2005:3); Political scientist Fred 
Riggs (1984) reviewed the relevant political economic literature, and (twenty 
years ago) found at least 72 definitions of the term. He notes that “the term 
‘development’ has largely replaced such earlier terms as  ‘progress’ and       
‘evolution,’ terms that are associated by connotation” (Riggs, 1984, p. 125 
cited in Pretes 1997:1421). Psychologically “development is a concept that is 
so ingrained in Western thought that it is taken for granted and assumed to 
act almost as a law of nature; that is, development is viewed as simply the 
progression of human life” (Pretes, 1997: 1421). 
 
The prolific academic writer and scholar, Torado, provides a working 
definition in stating that “development must be conceived of as a multi-
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dimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular 
attitude and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic 
growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of poverty.” He goes 
on to say,  
 
….Development in essence must represent the whole gamut of change by 
which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires 
of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a 
condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a situation or 
condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually better (Todaro 
2000:16). 
 
Similarly, Remenyi, Kingsbury et al. (2004) expressed the opinion that 
“development is a process directed at outcomes encapsulating improved 
standards of living and greater capacity for self- reliance in economies that 
are technically more complex and more dependent on global integration 
than before.” This explanation is partially supported by Haines (2000) who 
noted that “development is often, but not exclusively regarded as a synonym 
for progress.” Escobar (2001:501) in his inimitable vigorous style argued 
that “development has been taken to be a true descriptor of reality, a neutral 
language that can be utilized harmlessly and put to different ends according 
to the political and epistemological orientation of those waging it. Whether in 
the political science, or sociology, economics, or political economy, 
development has been debated without questioning its ontological status.”  
 
In almost two decades,  
….there has been an efflorescence of literature which contests the very 
meaning of development. Applying the lessons of post-structuralism, this 
nascent school – which has come to be known as post-development thought 
– proposes that development is itself an arbitrary concept rooted in a meta-
narrative which, in turn, reflects the interests of its practitioners. It is 
proposed that the goal of improving living standards leans on arbitrary and 
unjustified claims as to the desirability of the goal. This, in turn, is rooted in 
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something of a tautology: people seek development because it is desirable, 
and we know it is desirable because people seek it (Rapley 2004:350). 
 
Development has always been an ambiguous notion: on the one hand it is 
virtually synonymous with “progress”, while on the other, referring to 
intentional efforts to “ameliorate the disordered faults of progress” (Cowen 
and Shenton 1996:7 cited in Thomas, 2000:774).  
 
Glanville (2005:1), Oyugi (2000:4), Todaro and Smith (2006: 15 cited in 
Taabazuing) (2010) all posit that “development is not an easy concept to 
define, and to develop necessarily involves normative or value judgments 
being made.” Riggs notes that in the social sciences, at least, “the word 
typically suggests the evolution of human social systems from simpler to 
more complex, mature, or higher forms” (Riggs 1984:126 cited in Pretes 
1997:1421-1422). In essence, based on the raft of definitions in vogue, it 
may be argued that development seeks to optimise societal and individuals’ 
quality of life in an equitable manner. 
 
In view of the multiplicity of definitions provided above, the fundamental 
question that arises is whether or not development is able to be imposed 
from outside; or is it an internal initiative? In response to such a question, 
Louise Frechette former Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations was 
quoted by Harvard International Review (2003) as saying, “I think 
development is an internal process. The policy prescriptions that are 
promoted by bilateral donors or the United Nations may have a different 
impact or be received differently in different places; as a result their success 
depends very much on local conditions.” Hein de Haas noted that 
“...development is not only a complex multi-dimensional concept, but can 
also be assessed at different levels of analysis and has different meanings 
within different normative, cultural and historical contexts. It may therefore, 
be an illusion that there can be a single universal definition of development” 
(2009:8). 
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5.2.1. Meaning of development over time 
 
The table below attempts to portray what “development”, as a concept and 
as an academic discipline, means to different people at different periods. 
 
Table 5.1: Evolution of the Meaning of Development 
       Period         Perspectives Meaning of Development 
1800s Classical political economy Remedy for progress, catching up 
1870˃ Latecomers Industrialization, catching up 
1850˃ Colonial economics Resource management, trusteeship 
1940˃ Development economics Economic growth, industrialization 
1950˃ Modernization theory Growth, political and social modernization 
1960˃ Development theory Accumulation-national auto-centric 
1970˃ Alternative development Human Flourishing 
1980˃ Human development Capacitation, enlargement of people’s choices 
1980˃ Neo-liberalism Economic growth-structural reform,    
deregulation, liberalization  
1990˃ Post-development Authoritarian engineering disaster 
             
2000 
Millennium Development Goals Structural reforms 
Source:  Pieterse (2010: page 7) 
 
From the plethora of meanings that have emerged to describe a process 
aimed at solving the state of underdevelopment to which so many people 
have been subjected, it is not difficult to see why Escobar (2001: 498-499) is 
seemingly bewildered when he notes that “the question of development 
remains unresolved in any modern, social or epistemological order.”  
 
In summary, it is clear that there many different definitions of development, 
and that in essence, development means different things to different people. 
However, one common thread running through all the definitions outlined 
above, has been aptly captured by Fox and Van Rooyen (2004:188) when 
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they state that “development is regarded as people oriented, future oriented 
and entails hope; it implies a desired state compared to the current state of 
affairs.” What is fundamentally important is the fact that the development 
process must be an initiative with an internal dimension to ensure its 
sustainability and ownership by local stakeholders.  
 
5.2.2. Objectives of development 
 
Lyons and Hamlin (2001:7) put forward the view that “objectives are 
statements that serve as a guide for action; in other words they are 
something to shoot for.” Generally speaking, objectives are clearly set out in 
a logical and measurable manner, in order for the intended purpose/s to be 
achieved.  
 
Specifically, Charley, Jenkins and Smith (2001:4) and Todaro in Glanville 
(1993:2) noted that objectives of development include the following:  
 
...Firstly to increase the availability, and to widen the distribution of basic 
life-sustaining goods, such as food, shelter, health, and protection to all 
members of society. Secondly: to raise the level of living standards, including 
higher incomes, provision of more jobs, better education and more attention 
to cultural and humanistic values. These all serve not only to enhance 
material well-being but also to generate greater individual and national 
esteem. Thirdly, to expand the range of economic and social choice to 
individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence, not 
only in relation to other people and nation-states but also to the forces of 
ignorance and human misery.   
 
The final objective, which is drawn from the body of reviewed development 
literature, may be described as: an objective of development is to address or 
ameliorate the social and economic imbalance that exists between so-called 
developing countries of the south and developed countries of the north. It is 
worth pointing out that the list of objectives listed is not exhaustive, but 
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instead represents a small fraction of an increasing list of conceived and 
proposed objectives.  
 
5.3. The Genealogy of Development 
 
Modern development as a political project emanated in part from the 
appalling state of squalor, poverty and underdevelopment in the neutrally 
labelled “countries of the south”, or, more disparagingly, “the less developed 
countries”.    
 
The quest for development implies the contemplation and realization of a 
good life and a good society was always a central concern in all great 
civilizations of the world, including the Aztec, the Chinese, the Egyptian, the 
European and the Indian. However modern development, including the 
concept, theory, model and strategy, are pre-dominantly European. The 
origin of the European tradition of development can be traced back to the 
idea of progress that evolved in the Greek period (Haque 1999:39).   
 
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, “the historical roots, evolution, 
systemization and belief in modern development and/or growth has their’  
genesis and came to prominence at the end of the Second World War” 
(Chachage 1987:13; McKay 2004: 47; Lewis 2005:2 and Escobar 1998), 
when the term development was used by United States President Truman in 
1949 as part of the rationale for post-War reconstruction in 
“underdeveloped” areas of the world, based on provision of international 
financial assistance and modern technology transfer (Lewis 2005: 2).  
 
It is thus explicable why:   
 
academic interest in theories of development did not emerge on a significant 
scale until after World War II, and in particular after the European 
economies were rebuilt and West Germany integrated into the western 
alliance system and of course the rapid decolonization of the British, French, 
and Dutch empires was also important. Now the world has many ‘new 
110 
 
nations’, a term almost a synonym for less developed countries, and with the 
form if not content of statehood, they become legitimate objects of 
development programmes by metropolitan and non-metropolitan countries 
alike (Caporaso 1980:610). 
 
In support of this point of view, Hewitt (2004:289), writing in Allen and 
Thomas (2004), remarked that “…the world and by extension, the doctrine of 
development, did not suddenly begin anew in 1945, it merely continued 
along the twists and turns of history. As part of this, the idea of development 
evolved. There was a sea change in the institutions and discourses of 
development in the post 1945 period.” In summary: it is essential to note 
that development, as a practice and or intellectual discourse, experiences 
on-going shifts in definitions, conceptualization, theoretical underpinnings 
and pragmatic implementation. There can be no other academic discipline 
that experiences such erratic and tectonic shifts, however it can be argued 
that the very nature and core values of development lend themselves to 
erratic theoretical shifts and intellectual contentions.  
 
5.4. Core Values of Development 
 
The Human Development Report (2004:15) has mooted that “human beings 
are born with certain potential capabilities. The purpose of development is to 
create an environment in which all people can expand their capabilities, and 
opportunities can be enlarged for both present and future generations.” It 
appears that the authors of this Report drew on the work or thoughts of 
Todaro (2000:17) who had earlier made the following observations: that 
there are “three fundamental core values of development: Sustenance: the 
ability to meet basic needs; Self-Esteem: to be a person; Freedom from 
servitude: to be able to choose.”  
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5.4.1. Criteria for measuring development  
 
Development is primarily about economic development and as such, is 
measurable, according to Pieterse (2010:25). This view is slightly earlier 
advocated by Peet and Hartwick (2009:23) who explained that “development 
is fundamentally economic and is conventionally measured as economic 
growth, with the level of development seen in terms of the size of the 
economy.” Waugh (2002:630) is of the fervent view that “there are three 
criteria that can be used to measure development which are (i) Economic 
Wealth, (ii) Social, Cultural and Welfare Criteria and (iii) Other Criteria for 
Development.” 
 
Recent literature on gender and development corroborates Waugh's 
observation: 
 
….that a corner stone of new development thinking is the full integration of 
women into the mainstream of development and concern for progress in all 
aspects of their lives: health, education, employment, nutrition, legal and 
political rights. In traditional development thinking, investment in social 
development was seen as a luxury, a fruit of economic success. But it is now 
known that the basis of economic progress is a healthy, socially stable and 
slow growing population (2002:633).      
 
5.4.2. Dimensions of development 
 
Development Studies, and by extension, development, “is no longer a 
singular exercise, but has evolved to encompass sub-specialties, including: 
medicine, public health, biology, environmental sciences, engineering and 
anthropology as well as the more traditional history, political science, 
economics and public policy” (Maxfield 2002). Thus, measuring this 
multidimensional exercise represents a herculean task for policy-makers, 
international aid agencies and academic scholars.  
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Nonetheless, Bellù (2011) believes that “even if the development of a socio-
economic system can be viewed as a holistic exercise, (i.e. as an all-
encompassing endeavour) but for practical purposes, in particular for policy 
making and development management, the focus of the agents aiming at 
development is almost always on selected parts of the system or on specific 
features.” A summary of the parts (non-exhaustive) of a socio-economic 
system regarded as dimensions of development is briefly explained below. 
 
5.4.2.1. Human development 
 
Amartya Sen’s ideas cited in Fukuda-Parr (2003:301) and his propositions 
were instrumental in the emergence of Human Development being 
championed by the UNDP as a different approach to development. The term 
human development here denotes both the process of widening people's 
choices and the level of their achieved wellbeing (HDR 1990:10). The Human 
Development Report (HDR) of 1991 states that the main objective of human 
development is to enlarge the range of peoples’ choices to make development 
more democratic and participatory (HDR 1991 cited in Rist 2002:8). A 
similar and complementary trend of thought is echoed in the HDR of 2007, 
which noted that “human development is about the realization of human 
potential. It is about what people can do and become—their capabilities—
and about the freedom they have to exercise real choices in their lives” (HDR 
2007).  
 
As a development paradigm, “human development finds its theoretical 
underpinnings in Sen’s Capabilities Approach which holds “a person’s 
capability to have various functioning vectors and to enjoy the 
corresponding well-being achievements to be the best indicator of welfare” 
(Sen 1985 cited in Ranis 2004:3-4). This came about, as in the late 1980s 
there emerged an increased awareness that the customary economic 
measures of development were far too limited (Willis 2005:7), the concept of 
human development being much broader than the conventional theories of 
economic development (HDR 1995: 11-12). The concept of Human 
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Development has been described by Todaro (2000:72) as “the latest and 
most ambitious attempt to analyze the comparative status of socio-economic 
development in both developing and developed nations systematically and 
comprehensively.”  
 
5.4.2.2. Sustainable development 
 
Dynamic development is sustainable when it is forward looking and 
responsible. Therefore it must be assessed not only by such indicators as 
poverty, natural resources, forest coverage, and ocean temperatures but also 
by the institutional environment that helps this information emerge, gives it 
weight, and ensures that it is acted on (World Development Report 2003). 
The concept of sustainable development is narrowly framed by the National 
Environmental Management Act (1998), of South Africa, defined as the 
integration of social, economic and environmental factors into planning, 
implementation and decision so as to ensure that development serves 
present and future generations (Fox & Van Rooyen 2004:102). Sustainable 
development as a development strategy is summarised to encapsulate or 
encompass the point mooted below in the words of Schuurman (2004:22), 
who noted that “sustainable development is a strategy that seeks to satisfy 
the needs of the present generation without interfering with the needs of 
future generations.” 
 
5.4.2.3. Spatial development  
 
The current practice and sociology of development, tends to focus on the 
social, economic and demographic aspects of the process while a critically 
important aspect of development that is ignored is spatial in nature. Spatial 
development links geography to development through the economic 
development of space. This is a fundamental dimension of the development 
process; as if one were to visit any city in the world it would become obvious 
that there is spatial inequality and uneven development.  
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“The various theories of economic geography provide causal explanations 
that spatial inequality is the net result of the balance of forces of 
concentration and dispersion; which may be socially destabilizing if the 
regional divergence in economic welfare and political interests contributes to 
general social instability” (Kim, 2008: 1 & 3). It is against this background 
that there is global concern by political leaders, policy-makers and 
practitioners about the impact that spatial inequalities may have on 
achieving the desired developmental results. 
 
5.4.2.4. Economic development  
 
The process of economic development, pursued over a sufficiently long 
period of time, has the significant consequence of a marked lifting of the 
average standard of living. Modern economic development is more than 
simply an increase in income or output, whether considered per capita or in 
absolute terms (White 2009:5). Economists and policymakers contend that 
“economic development occurs when all segments of the society benefit from 
the fruits of economic growth through economic efficiency and equity” 
(Kooros & Badeaux 2007:121). Jain, Kaur, Gupta and Sandhu (2007:40) 
make the point that “the determinants of economic development can be 
divided into two parts; namely economic and non-economic determinants.” 
In essence, economic development does not solely mean macro-economic 
stability and improving fiscal balances, but incorporates the principles of 
real economic and social development (Chang 2010; White 2009). 
 
5.4.2.5. Development as freedom 
 
The eclectic, pragmatic world of development is about more than creating an 
economy: the multi-dimensional nature of the process makes it ostensibly 
about people. On that basis Sen (1999: xii) vigorously articulated that 
“development consists of the removal of various types of ‘un-freedoms’ that 
leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their 
reasoned agency.” The removal of substantial ‘un-freedoms’, he argued is 
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“constitutive of development’ and thus the expansion of freedom should be 
viewed both as the primary end and as the principal means of development” 
(Ibid: xii). 
 
5.4.2.6. Political participation 
 
Development should be and is primarily people centric, the focus of its 
attention being about transforming lives of people; within that context, 
Sáìgh (1978:12) expressed his opinion that “decisions involved in the design 
of development strategies and policies and in the allocation and use of 
development resources must themselves also be accompanied by wide social 
and political participation by the population.” This point has been further 
developed by Kadir (2011:4), who stated that “the fundamental premise of 
the right to development is predicated on the freedom to participate in 
political life, the right to work and equality of opportunity, peace and 
security.” This facet of development in the Arab Gulf States (AGS) is non-
existent as the political space is characterized by a soft autocratic 
monarchical mode of governance.  
 
5.5. Contradistinction between Growth and Development 
 
The most pressing and fundamental aim of national economic planners is to 
achieve economic growth, which, in theory at least, should lead to 
development. However, literature on the subject has demonstrated the 
complexity and non-linearity of development as a process and as a 
measurable outcome; thus the theory is at variance with the reality.  
 
Development became synonymous with rapid economic growth;  
while increased saving and investment was the engine of that growth 
(Todaro 1992: 98). The terms “development” and “growth” are often used 
interchangeably (Senqupta, 2011:4), due in part to “development originally 
and conventionally being based on a straight-line progression from a 
traditional to modern mass-consumption society and measured as economic 
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growth, with “level of development” interpreted in terms of the size of a 
nation’s economy” (Peet et al. 2009: 6; Harris 2000:18). Nevertheless, 
according to Tendulkar (2011: 291 in Lim & Monga 2011) “economists still 
continue to be intrigued by the mystery of economic growth.” 
 
Sen (1983: 748) further points that “growth is not the same thing as 
development and the difference between the two has been brought out by a 
number of recent contributions to development economics. But it can 
scarcely be denied that economic growth is one aspect of the process of 
development.” The socio-economic variables or indicators which provide the 
theoretical underpinnings and interlinkages between growth and 
development clearly espouse the academic argument that there cannot be 
development without economic growth; however, there can be growth 
without development. Keeton (1984: 276) amplifies the above argument by 
noting that “development refers to and is defined in terms of the 
maintenance of economic growth accompanied by qualitative changes in the 
structure of production and employment, generally referred to as structural 
change”,  and not just the narrow economic parameter and framework of 
“Keynesian economics, with its emphasis on broad economic aggregates in 
the 1950s when widespread attention was first paid to the problems of 
development and underdevelopment” (Keeton 1984: 276). In essence, 
development should be viewed “as the result of synergies between enhanced 
human capital and new knowledge, involving complementary investments in 
physical and social capital” (Lim 2011:301 in Lin & Monga 2011). This study  
would argue that, there is a thematic deficiency in using economic growth to 
denote development as the former tends to concentrate on national output 
as a yardstick to indicate the social and economic progress of a population. 
Hussain (2012), in an article entitled “Dimensions of Development” supports 
the thematic deficiency that the author has observed in his statement that:  
 
…the narrow conception of development was understandable since the 
concern of Third World countries emerging from a colonial past was to 
achieve rapid growth in national income as a means of pulling out of poverty.  
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In this study, the author’s main emphasis is on socio-economic development 
and the attendant strategies; thus economic growth and development are 
not used interchangeably; neither does “growth” denote “development”. 
Emanating from the concept is a cluster of seemingly contradictory theories 
that are discussed below. 
 
5.6. Typology of Development Theories 
 
Over the last fifty to sixty years, a typology of development theories with 
varying degrees of propositions and meta-analyses has emerged, each theory 
representing a different polarity on the global political hegemonic agenda. 
Against such polarized thoughts, Peet and Hartwick (1986:21) noted that 
“….it seems strange that there can be entirely different theories of 
development. Why can’t dedicated intellectuals just make up their minds, 
agree on the best theory, and then tell the world what policies to pursue? It 
is because development theories reflect the political positions of their 
proponents, the places where they developed their philosophical 
perspective.” The answer to such a question lies partially in this statement 
by Schuurman (2004:10) who argued that “development theories have been 
used by nation-states as a meaningful context for political praxis.” It 
therefore seems logical that Berberoglu (1992:7) has argued that “during the 
era of the 1950s and 1960s, when the USA global expansionism and 
domination of the world economy had reached new heights, ‘development 
theory’ came under the grip of Cold War ideologists such as W.W. Rostow, 
who set the parameters and shaped the direction of development theory in 
line with U.S. Foreign Policy objectives.”  
 
The typology of development theories over the last sixty years emerged out of 
organised confusion and tension within the discipline and there is no one 
single meaning of development that all stakeholders can coalesce around. 
For example, Seers (1979) asserts “…the purpose of development is to 
reduce poverty, inequality, and unemployment.” Sen (1999); notes that 
“…development involves reducing deprivation or broadening choice. 
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Deprivation represents a multidimensional view of poverty that includes 
hunger, illiteracy, illness and poor health, powerlessness, voiceless-ness, 
insecurity, humiliation and a lack of access to basic infrastructure” 
(Narayan et al. 2000, pp. 4-5 cited in Nafziger 2005: 1-2). Such shifting, 
thematic thinking in the core values of development as a process, lends 
itself to paradigmatic nightmares. 
 
5.6.1. Competing theories of development 
 
There are a number of competing approaches which entail different visions 
of what is a desirable “developed state”, different views of history, how social 
change occurs and the process of development in relation to the global 
capitalist system and different prescriptions for how to achieve development 
and who the agents of it should be (Thomas 2000: 23 in Allen and Thomas 
2000). Todaro (1992) postulates that “literature on development has been 
dominated by three major strands of thought: firstly the ‘stages of economic 
growth’ theories of the 1950s and early 1960s; secondly, the ‘international 
dependence’ theories of the late 1960s and the 1970s and thirdly the ‘free-
market’ theories of the 1980s and 1990s.”  
 
Hettne (2001:28) summarizes, and has categorized, the strands of 
development mooted above by placing “...development theories in silos of 
mainstream and counterpoint.” The evolution of a multiplicity of 
development paradigms owes its genesis to diverging political agendas based 
on the political ideological political spectrum of those who seek to develop 
the underdeveloped. For example, for the duration of the cold war period, 
the field has a spectrum of development and political models: socialism, 
collectivism and the Washington Consensus.   
 
An attempt is made below to explain four development paradigms from a 
number of theories and constructs that have been “put forth by theorists 
and professionals working with international donor agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the past 50 or so years 
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since the advent of development economics as a field of study” (Todaro and 
Smith 2008).  
 
Paradigms consist of particular ontological assumptions and particular 
epistemological principles, embodying a set of theoretical principles as well. 
Most importantly, they provide a definition of the appropriate domain of 
inquiry to which these principles are to be applied (Robinson 1998: 565).  It 
is with this in mind that Basu (2005) and Torado (1992: 98-99) make a 
significant point:  
 
….the focus and emphasis of development theories are on external and 
internal institutional constraints, economic, social, political or cultural 
factors and in some measure, gross inequalities in land ownership, highly 
unequal and imbalanced international trade relationships, policies geared 
toward the eradication of poverty. To some degree these approaches overlap. 
Generally modernization theory and dependency theory are antipodal 
theoretical approaches.  
 
5.6.2. Modernization theory 
 
Drawing on “…the works of philosopher and historian of science, Stephen 
Toulmin, who, in a number of his works argued that ‘modernity’ consisted  
of a set of interrelated propositions and beliefs, all dating from the late 
seventeenth century” (Toulmin 1990 & 2001 cited in  Richards 2003:58), as 
a development paradigm, “…modernization theory refers to a group of 
theories which emerged after 1945 following the industrial revolution in 
Europe and North America which pointed to the success of Western science 
and political organization” (Norgaard 1994; Crafts 2003 cited in Taabazuing 
2010: 62). The modernization theory in the late 1950's and early 1960's 
stemmed from America's new position of international hegemony and its 
concern with solving the problems of the poor countries (Yeh 1989:2). It is 
the underlying view of Huntington that the “…Grand Process of 
Modernization represents, a bridge across the Great Dichotomy between 
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modern and traditional societies” (Huntington 1971:288). The Payson Centre 
for International Development Report (2012) expresses the view that  
 
“… in order to develop, underdeveloped societies must be “modernized” to 
take on the features of economically developed countries. This is because 
modern societies are able to absorb change and assure their own growth 
while traditional societies cannot.” 
 
Essentially, on the basis of the argument made above, the modernization 
school of thought: “….broadly construes that the idea of modernization 
signifies the manifold changes which accompany technological advance in 
every aspect of life, including the economic, legal, political, artistic, familial, 
religious, and scientific spheres of human behaviour” (Sklar 1995: 19).  
 
5.6.3. The central propositions of the modernization theory 
 
Like other development paradigms, the modernisation theory is underpinned 
by a number of fundamental propositions that are outlined below.  
 
(i) Roberts and Hitte (2002:9) posit that to “understand the gap 
between wealthier and poorer nations, modernization theorists 
explored the process of development and offered a composite 
portrait of what it means to be ‘modern.’ In modernization 
theory’s dualistic schema, societies go from being one type of 
society (traditional or undeveloped) to another type of society 
(modern or developed).”  
 
(ii) For late modernizers (such as Dubai) the prescription was to: 
borrow, import, imitate, and rationalize. To get investment 
flowing, to break a nation out of a cycle of poverty and a lack of 
investment, nations should allow large firms from wealthy 
countries free access to their national markets, labour and 
resources (Roberts & Hitte 2002:10). 
121 
 
(iii) Modernization theory uses the micro-sociological level 
(individuals and aggregates of individuals, their values, 
attitudes, and beliefs). Such theory looks at the nation’s society; 
this theory regards human behaviour as being relative, based on 
culture (Valenzuela & Valenzuela 1978).  
 
(iv) The focus of the modernization school is on the Third World, 
especially on how to promote development there while implicitly 
holding up the First World as a model. According to the 
modernization school, there is something wrong within the 
Third World nations that makes them economically backward 
(Yeh 1989: 3-4).  
 
(v) The inherently emancipative nature of the values of self-
expression makes democracy increasingly likely to emerge; thus 
modernization brings about cultural changes that lead to the 
emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions (Inglehart 
& Welzel 2005:6). So (1990:35) earlier noted that “modernity 
involves changes in virtually all aspects of social behaviour 
including, industrialization, urbanization, mobilization, 
differentiation, secularization, participation and centralization.”  
 
(vi) Modernization is a transformative process. In order for a society 
to move into modernity, its traditional structures and values 
must be totally replaced by a set of modern values (So 1990:35).  
Huntington (1976) points out that “the modernization school 
considers modernization and tradition to be essentially 
asymmetrical concepts. Although the traits of modernity are 
clearly laid down, those of tradition are not. For the sake of 
convenience, everything that is not modern is labelled 
traditional. Consequently, traditions have a small role to play 
and have to be replaced in the process of modernization”( 
Huntington cited in So 1990:35). 
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(vii) In large measure, the model was heir to theories of social 
evolution formulated by prominent sociological thinkers during 
the preceding century. Following in the footsteps of neo-
Darwinian concepts of natural selection, human societies were 
seen as quasi-organic structures seeking to increase their 
survival chances through the enhancement of internal 
complexity and external-environmental adaptability (Dallmayr 
1993: 5). 
 
5.6.4. A critique of modernization theory  
 
Five main criticisms of the theoretical underpinnings of the modernization 
theory development paradigm are addressed in this section:  
 
Firstly, in the words of O'Donnell (1973), one encounters “dependency 
theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and 
Faletto Enzo, who took issue with modernization theory's relatively 
unproblematic picture not of social change but of economic development. 
They argued that non-Western societies were actually doomed by their 
position in the international economy to a state of underdevelopment and 
dependence”. 
 
Secondly, according to Berman (2009) citing Huntington (1968),  
 
… following the theory's initial rapid acceptance, by the late 1960s a 
backlash began to emerge. Critics argued that it was too linear, too 
teleological, and too optimistic. One major challenge came from Samuel 
Huntington. In his seminal book Political Order in Changing Societies, 
Huntington took issue with the theory's relatively unproblematic picture of 
social change. He argued that modernization theorists were right in seeing 
economic development as unleashing profound social changes but wrong in 
assuming those changes would necessarily be benign or progressive. 
Societies in the throes of dramatic social transformation, he noted, tend to 
be unstable and even violent. Positive outcomes are likely to emerge only 
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where healthy political institutions capable of channeling and responding to 
such changes exist ….and building such institutions is an extremely difficult 
and time-consuming task. 
 
Thirdly, Roberts & Hitte (2002:10) hold the view that:  
 
… after two decades of dominance in development circles, modernization 
theory came under attack from several angles. First, it was seen to be a-
historical; modernization theory failed to make distinctions between 
countries, regions, structural conditions, or specific historical experiences. 
For example, modernization theorists did not address the fact these poorer 
regions exhibited not one situation of poverty or one type of society, but 
multiple pre-modernities. 
 
A fourth and fundamental criticism of the modernization theory may be 
accorded to McKay (2004:53) who noted that “….the basic assumption and 
optimistic tone of the modernization theory flew in the face of the actual 
situation in the underdeveloped world. Inequalities were not being narrowed 
as conventional economic theory predicted, rather the world was becoming 
increasingly divided between the powerful core regions and the impoverished 
periphery.”    
 
Fifthly, in his stringent view, Berberoglu (1992:7) argues that “mainstream 
modernization theory became known as the ideological arm of the US 
expansionism throughout the world for the supposed purpose of diffusing 
development and democracy to the third world.” 
 
5.6.4.1. Modernization theory – convergence and divergence departure 
in Dubai 
 
Dubai has benefited from or demonstrates features espoused by the 
modernization theory. The following specific features are demonstrated: 
 
124 
 
5.6.4.2. Areas of convergence  
 
If social and economic development is used as a milestone to measure 
modernity as an outcome of modernization, then Dubai and the UAE would 
be said to have fared “quite well”. Dubai is fully integrated and wired into 
the hegemonic position of western globalization. The city state has 
successfully transformed the political economy of subsistence agriculture 
and fishing into a prosperous and glitzy cosmopolitan city state.  
 
Secondly, the Arab world, and Dubai in particular, are fast becoming fully 
integrated into modernity as described by modernization theory scholars. 
Chuchmuch (2006:4) commented “that Arab society has been subjected to 
enormous pressure from the outside world.  Social change is evident 
everywhere because the effects of economic modernization have been felt in 
all areas of life.  Even for Bedouins and residents of remote villages, the 
traditional way of life is disappearing.” The ideological debate refuting the 
applicability of the political and economic modernization of developing 
countries (DCs) as being similar to the path taken by industrialized 
countries is not a part of the body politic and economic dialogue in Dubai.  
 
Thirdly, the discovery of oil in the UAE and specifically in Dubai, and the 
subsequent change in the city’s demographic profile, has resulted in the 
“disintegration of the traditional Kultan (Religious Content Based) 
educational system and a new educational system emerged in the mid 20th 
century” (Ansari 1998:44). In its place, western style education systems 
arrived with the missionaries and increasingly with the influx of guest 
workers whose children are not allowed to attend government owned and 
operated schools unless they are Arabs. In essence, Dubai has embraced 
modernization through its educational system.   
 
Fourthly, political pluralism, as theorized by proponents of the 
modernization theory, would be the end product of economic development. 
However, in the micro-state of Dubai and UAE by extension, that process 
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only began in 2006 with landmark elections that were held at national level, 
to elect half of the FNC’s 40 member chamber. It is important to note that 
voters were handpicked to participate in the electoral process.  
 
5.6.4.3. Points of divergence  
 
As an Islamic society Dubai refuses to replace traditional and Islamic Sharia 
Law with Greco-Roman or French Law. This is a fundamental departure 
from other features of the modernization theory that Dubai embraces. 
Chuchmuch (2006:15) explains that “the divinely revealed laws that define 
Sharia are God’s blueprint for living one’s life and organizing society.” 
 
Lipset and other modernization theorists were of the view that social and   
economic development in a country would usher in political changes, which 
would lead to democracy in a region such as the Middle East where states 
are governed by patriarchal dictatorial regimes. Notwithstanding the above 
view, Peterson (2006: 34) noted “….there is a lack of political activism in the 
UAE (including Dubai) as most citizens are reluctant to antagonize powerful 
ruling families or jettison a system of relying on tribal and family 
connections for favour and connections.” Overall it may be said that   
political metamorphism has not taken place in Dubai which economic 
development, it was proposed, would lead to western style political 
pluralism.  
 
The discovery of oil in the Arab Gulf States (AGS) and their subsequent 
endorsement of the globalization process over the last five decades by,  in 
particular, the emirate of Dubai, through pro-active leadership has implicitly 
embraced the process of modernization through “…economic diversification 
and education reform” (Macpherson, Kachelhoffer & El Nemr 2007: 2-6).  
 
Subsequent to the formation of the UAE in 1971, “…during the late 1970s, a 
deep transformation affecting the relation between state and society was 
taking place. This transformation culminated in the constitution of modern 
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statehood and the development of the administrative apparatus of the 
monarchies. The development of modern state structure also brought with it 
elaborate bureaucracies, policing strategies and mechanisms of control by 
which the modern states in the Persian Gulf monarchies (Dubai included) 
could manage their own population” (Ilias 2012:34). This transition also 
marked a journey from the tribal political imagination to a regime ruled by 
techniques of government. Nonetheless, a complete departure from the tribal 
values was impossible. An apparent contradiction between the techniques of 
modern government and tribal values in contemporary society persisted at 
all stages of development (Ibid: 34).  
 
In contradiction of one of the tenets the modernization theory, Dubai has 
seen a widening in inequalities as the city became more economically 
developed and prosperous. There is an increasingly expanding gap in socio-
economic conditions between the rent extracting and receiving citizens and 
the guest workers, especially the unskilled and semi-skilled workers from 
Asia and East Africa, Yemen, Oman, Egypt and the Sudan.  
 
5.6.5. Dependency theory  
 
Similar to development as a concept, the modernization theory was beset by 
a series of theoretical gaps and shortcomings. Thus, “in reaction to the 
shortcomings of modernization theory, the dependency theory of 
underdevelopment was formulated by a number of Latin-American 
economists and social scientists in the 1960s. This theory was informed by 
Marxist social thought on capitalism and its exploitative tendencies” 
(Taabazuing 2010: 62-63). It is the considered view of Blomstrom and 
Hettne (1984 cited in So 1990:91) that “the dependency school represents 
‘the voices from the periphery’ that challenged the intellectual hegemony of 
the American modernization school.”  
 
As an economic school of thought Ferraro (1996:1) notes; 
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… the dependency theory developed in the late 1950s under the guidance of 
the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Raul Prebisch. He and his colleagues were troubled by the fact that 
economic growth in the advanced industrialized countries did not 
necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries. Indeed, their studies 
suggested that economic activity in the richer countries often led to serious 
economic problems in the poorer countries. Such a possibility was not 
predicted by neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth 
was beneficial to all (Pareto optimal) even if the benefits were not always 
equally shared.  
 
Präsidenten & Projekte (2004: 2-3) noted that the dependency school of 
thought hinges on the belief that “underdevelopment at the periphery occurs 
because of exploitation by the capitalist centre. The dependence school also 
believes that dependency is an external condition, that the centre nations 
get all the benefits from unequal exchange, and that the peripheral 
countries should sever their ties with the core countries.” 
 
5.6.5.1. The central propositions of dependency theory 
 
Firstly, Ferraro (1996:4) posits that; 
  
…there is a number of propositions, all of which are contestable, which form 
the core of the dependency theory. Underdevelopment is a condition 
fundamentally different from un-development. The latter term simply refers 
to a condition in which resources are not being used. For example, the 
European colonists viewed the North American continent as an undeveloped 
area: the land was not actively cultivated on a scale consistent with its 
potential. Underdevelopment refers to a situation in which resources are 
being actively used, but used in a way which benefits dominant states and 
not the poorer states in which the resources are found. 
 
Secondly, Haines (2000) provides us with a distinction between what he 
refers to as the “strong” and “softer” versions of dependency theory. The 
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strong version is associated with the work of Gunder Frank and of scholars 
such as Samir Amin. It portrays economic dependency as inevitably 
generating the development of underdevelopment, thus making development 
well-nigh impossible as long as it continues. The weaker version of 
dependency theory is normally associated with Cardoso (1972), Cardoso and 
Faletto (1979), Peer and Evans (1979). It does not assume dependency 
necessarily leads to the development of underdevelopment; however under 
certain circumstances one may find what Cardoso calls “associated 
dependent development or dependent development.”  
 
Thirdly, “the theoretical thrust of the dependency perspectives was that 
capitalist penetration leads to and reproduces a combined and unequal 
development of its constitutive parts. The policy implication is that 
indigenous economic and social development in third world social 
formations must be fundamentally predicated upon the removal of industrial 
capitalist penetration and dominance” (Taylor 1979). 
 
Fourthly, “dependency theory correctly predicted the growing global 
hegemony of multinational corporations and international capitalist 
institutions. Indeed, at no time during the last half-century have peripheral 
countries, such as those of Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia, been so 
thoroughly dependent as they are today on external capital in-flows and on 
the economic guidance of international finance organizations (Portes & 
Kincaid 1989 cited in Portes 1999: 231; & Castells & Lasema 1989).  
 
Fifthly, “dependency theory presented the world as consisting of two poles: 
wealthy countries are the ‘centre’ of the global capitalist system, and poor 
countries are its satellite or periphery. Peripheral countries have low wages, 
enforced by regimes that undermine independent labour unions and social 
movements” (Roberts & Hitte 2002:11).  
 
Finally, “the dependency orthodox paradigm is a body of social science 
theories: central to its theoretical underpinnings is that poor states are 
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impoverished and rich states are enriched, by the way in which these poor 
states are integrated into the world system. Prebisch's solution was similarly 
straightforward: poorer countries should embark on programmes of import 
substitution so that they need not purchase the manufactured products 
from the richer countries. The poorer countries would still sell their primary 
products on the world market, but their foreign exchange reserves would not 
be used to purchase their manufactures from abroad” (Ferraro 1996:1). 
 
5.6.5.2. Criticism of dependency school of thought 
 
The dependency theory has attracted criticisms from a variety of ideological 
positions and scholars (Chilcote 1974:7). A non-exhaustive list of some of 
the criticisms levelled at the dependency school is provided below.  
 
In 1979 Smith in his essay entitled remarked that “a major historio-graphic 
failure of the dependency theory in general substantially overestimates the 
power of the international system-or imperialism-in southern affairs today” 
(Smith 1979:248-249).   
 
The dependency theory has been criticized from a variety of other 
perspectives. A number of Marxist scholars have taken issue with the 
methods and assumptions used, suggesting that they are a 
misrepresentation of the true Marxist position. Several writers have argued 
that the dependency theorists have missed the true essence of capitalism 
and have instead portrayed it as a simple zero-sum game (McKay 2004:58 in 
Remenyi, Kingsbury, and Damien et al. 2004).   
 
Todaro (2000:94) reiterates the views of critics of the dependency theories in 
stating that a fundamental weakness of the Dependencia School emanates 
from “the lack of sufficient formal or informal explanation of how countries 
initiate and sustain development.” In addition, “Prebisch's solution was 
similarly straightforward: poorer countries should embark on programs of 
import substitution so that they need not purchase the manufactured 
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products from the richer countries. The poorer countries would still sell 
their primary products on the world market, but their foreign exchange 
reserves would not be used to purchase their manufactures from abroad” 
(Ferraro 1996:2). 
 
Dependency theory tends to over generalize about contemporary Lesser 
Developed Countries (LDCs) (Haines 2000:5) and as a general rule tends to 
ignore the progress LDCs have made by interacting with Western countries. 
The East Asian tigers provide us with ample examples of departures from 
the theoretical constructs of the dependency theory.   
 
A critical flaw in the said theory as noted by Smith (1979:249) “is simply 
that dependency theory in general substantially overestimates the power of 
the international system-or imperialism-in southern affairs today. This is 
not to deny that northern power is real in the South, nor to dispute that its 
effect may be to reinforce the established order of rank and privilege there, 
nor to suggest that imperialism is a term altogether lacking in meaning 
today. But it is to assert that dependency theory has systematically 
underestimated the real influence of the South over its own affairs.”  
 
5.6.5.3. Dubai point of convergence and divergence departure  
 
Development policies and strategies are influenced in one way or another by 
development paradigms. In this section of the chapter an attempt will be 
made to provide some analysis of the way in which Dubai has demonstrated 
some of the features espoused by the dependency theorists.  Below are some 
of the specific features demonstrated in the ‘Dubai Model’.  
 
5.6.5.4. Points of convergence 
 
Well articulated within the annals of the oil dependency literature and 
discourse, is the view that “oil over time has created new international 
interdependencies” (Crystal 1995:7). Similar to other countries on the 
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periphery of the Eurocentric or western hegemonic economic global 
construct, Dubai displays co-dependence on western and southern 
countries as regards the following: 
 
 Foreign export markets for the limited amount of goods and services it 
produces 
 Western trained managerial class (see chapters 8 and 9); as the city is 
grossly overpopulated by these expatriates and is unable to sustain 
the size of its economy commercially and productively. 
 Debt financing  for its developmental projects 
 Foreign direct and portfolio investments 
 Over-dependence primarily on western markets with respect to 
investing funds from the Government of Dubai’s sovereign wealth fund 
(SWF) 
 The tourism sector plays an integral role in the economic development 
of the city –in fact The Economist (2008, May 15th,) and Rai (2012 April 
30th) estimated that travel and tourism accounted for over 30% of 
Dubai’s GDP. In essence the Dubai economy is a dependent one, not 
on any primary product (commodity) but instead on a tertiary 
product. This was not foreseen by the architects of the dependency 
theory.  
 
5.6.5.5. Points of Divergence   
 
Dubai shares many features of the dependency theory; such points of 
divergence will be explored below:  
 
It is the observation of the author that during this era of international 
economic globalization Dubai has been able to take advantage of the 
benefits of globalization in the form of access to the international capital 
markets. This is a fundamental departure from the constructs that 
undergird the dependency school of thought. The population of the UAE and 
Dubai in particular does not lend itself to being a supplier of cheap labour 
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and to be exploited by western Transnational Corporations (TNCs); but 
instead Dubai as a city is known for its exploitation of expatriate labour, 
especially from the labour supplying countries of India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and Nepal etc.  
 
Dubai, starting from a position of underdevelopment, had the advantage of 
catching-up through a process of borrowing and adapting existing new 
technologies from developed countries and Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) operating within the city and or on a global scale. This particular 
point of departure supports the point made by Smith (1979:249) above that 
the “dependency theorists have systematically underestimated the real 
influence of the South over its own affairs.” Dubai is no exception to this 
meta-analysis of the structural weakness of the dependency theory.  
 
The local population of Dubai operates as rent-seekers from transnational 
corporations, individuals and domestic businesses incorporated by 
expatriates. Under the provisions of the company and labour laws, 
enterprises and individuals have to be sponsored by local Emiratis in order 
to be considered legitimate residents of the UAE.  Sponsorship comes at an 
hefty economic cost that has to be paid to an Emirati citizen/s for agreeing 
to sponsor residential and or commercial activities in Dubai.  
 
As a late developer, Dubai’s development path bypassed the process of rapid 
industrialization and instead focused on building a service oriented economy 
complemented by other sectors and economic activities such as re-
exporting. Dubai in essence is one of the world’s largest re-exporting 
entrépots and is not a typical LDC economy that is characterized by primary   
production.  
 
5.6.6. Basic needs approach  
 
By the beginning of the 1970s, there was a growing concern that 
underdeveloped countries could not hope to compete effectively with 
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northern countries, even with sizeable injections of aid. With growing global 
poverty, inequality and unemployment and increasing doubt as to the 
efficacy of the policy application of politically grand theories such as the full-
blown modernization and dependency approaches, there was growing 
international consensus for social scientists and policy-makers to 
restructure and improve the nature of the development process (Harcourt 
1997:6 cited in Haines 2000: 7).  
 
The basic needs development strategy gained currency and grew out of the 
work of the ILO World Employment Program (WEP) of the 1970s, bringing 
employment, people and human needs, back to the centre of development 
strategy (Haines 2000:7; Emmerij 2010:1). The objective of a basic needs 
approach to development is to provide opportunities for the full physical, 
mental, and social development of the individual. This approach focuses on 
mobilising particular resources for particular groups, identified as deficient 
in these resources and concentrates on the nature of what is provided, 
rather than on income (Streeten 1979:136). 
 
5.6.6.1. The central propositions of the basic needs approach 
 
Basic needs include two elements: first, certain minimum requirements of a 
family for private consumption: adequate food, shelter, and clothing, as well 
as certain household equipment and furniture. Second, essential services 
provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, 
sanitation, public transport as well as health, education and cultural 
facilities (Hoadley 1981: 150). 
 
The basic needs approach, then, is the acceptance of the goal of providing 
all persons with a certain minimum standard of these as a central priority of 
development; its strategy is the deliberate adoption of a set of policies 
designed to provide them, or help people provide these for themselves 
(Hoadley 1981: 150). A basic-needs-oriented policy implies the participation 
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of the people in making the decisions which affect them through 
organizations of their own choice (Overseas Development Institute, 1978:3).  
This approach encompasses "nonmaterial" needs. They include the need for 
self-determination, self-reliance, political freedom and security, participation 
in decision making, national and cultural identity, and a sense of purpose in 
life and work (Streeten 1979:136). The basic needs approach, as described 
by Haines (2007:14) “is an idea beyond macro theory that involves targeting 
of the poor, the setting of quantifiable indices of poverty and the promotion 
of grass roots development projects.” 
 
5.6.6.2. Criticism of the basic needs theory 
 
In that it is similar to other mainstream or alternative development theories, 
the basic needs theory approach to addressing underdevelopment suffers 
from numerous criticisms of which a few will be outlined below.  
 
The first as argued by Ghai (1978:16) comprises the “allegations that the 
approach lacks scientific rigour; it is anti-growth and consumption-oriented; 
it is a recipe for perpetuating economic backwardness, neglecting industry 
and favouring antiquated technology; and it is against the New International 
Economic Order.” 
 
A second criticism of the basic needs theory, also by Ghai (1978:16), argues 
that it “….assumes away class and group conflicts and gives the impression 
that poverty elimination is all too easy. The article also considers other 
factors which may have contributed to the rising chorus of criticism directed 
against this approach.”  
 
A third criticism by opponents of the basic needs approach to development 
has argued that “by emphasizing activities which are essentially 
consumption oriented, the basic needs approach implies a reduction in the 
rate of growth” (Hicks 1979:985). 
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A fourth and stinging criticism that questioned the legitimacy and 
theoretical soundness of the basic needs approach was echoed by Crosswell 
(1978: 2) who noted 35 years ago that “the basic human needs (BHN) 
approach was little more than a slogan that expresses a worthy intention 
but offers no concrete policy guidance. Accordingly, it may be of some use in 
generating political support but not in formulating development plans.” 
 
5.6.7. Neo-liberal paradigm 
 
The neo-liberal paradigm is a relatively recent off-shoot of the broader and 
other intellectual tradition of economic liberalism (Kabeer and Humphery 
2007:78). Conceptually the term neo-liberalism has attracted a wide 
spectrum of definitions from many scholars across the left-right ideological 
divide, one such definition comes from a: (….) “group of Marxists who have 
drawn on Marxist political economy to frame neo-liberalism as the dominant 
capitalist ideology of the present” (Hardin 2012:9). Fundamentally, “...neo-
liberalism is a political discourse, a body of economic theory and a policy 
stance that facilitate the governing of individuals from a distance” (Kotz 
2000:1; Laner 2000: 6). 
 
Broadly, speaking neo-liberalism is construed to embody the thoughts of 
echoed by Hindess who states; 
 
….the term ''neo-liberalism'' denotes new forms of political-economic 
governance premised on the extension of market relationships. In critical 
social science literatures, the term has usurped labels referring to specific 
political projects (Thatcherism, Regeanomics, Rogemomics), and is more 
widely used than its  counterparts including, for example, economic 
rationalism, monetarism, neo-conservatism, managerialism and 
contractualism (Hindess 1997 cited in Larner 2000:5). 
 
Essentially, neo-liberalism is debated to have emerged as a policy response 
in the 1970s to “….the exigencies of the global economy, and contemporary 
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transformations in governance (Larner 2000:5). By the “…beginning of the 
1980s, neo-liberalism’s ideas and practices profoundly challenged and 
destabilized post-1945 political projects, policy arrangements and practices 
of governing. Both in Latin America, where the Washington Consensus 
reshaped economies and political institutions and in the member countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
there was a move away from the perspectives on social policy developed in 
the three decades after 1945” (Jenson 2010:59).  
 
5.6.7.1. Central propositions of neo-liberalism 
 
The first proposition is that “….neo-liberals view the state’s participation in 
the economy as the burden of backwardness; they assume that the market 
exists, with all its legal, regulatory, and administrative characteristics” 
(Harik 2006:365). Neo-liberalism or neo-liberal orthodoxy thinking, 
promulgated by the Bretton Woods Institutions (namely the World Bank and 
the IMF), also came to be regarded as the “Washington Census,” and poses a 
serious dichotomy as to what the natural role of the state should be in 
relation to economic planning and involvement in the economy. 
 
The global stage of neo-liberalism developed during the period from the late 
1970s to the early 1990s, which witnessed major worldwide rise of,  
neoliberal ideas and the democratic electoral processes associated with 
capitalism in the context of the development process and development 
strategies (Henales & Edwards 2002:122; Önis & Şenses 2005:263).  It is 
the considered view of Henales & Edwards (2002:122) that: 
 
….Neo-liberal democratic capitalism … expanded dramatically during the 
1990s and came to be adopted even by social democratic and socialist 
movements and parties that had previously proposed reforms based on the 
continued centrality of state functions. This expansion finally engulfed 
socialist and social democratic governments in Europe such as those in 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, France, and Italy. In Latin America, neo-liberal 
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orthodoxy overwhelmed even those political currents with large mass appeal 
that historically represented independent national development such as the 
Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico and Peronism 
(Justicialismo) in Argentina. Even Pope John Paul II became an ally of neo-
liberalism through his encyclical Centesimus Annus.    
 
Thirdly, the most common conceptualization of neo-liberalism is, as a policy 
framework marked by a shift from Keynesian welfarism towards a political 
agenda favouring the relatively unfettered operation of markets. Often this 
renewed emphasis on markets is understood to be directly associated with 
the so-called globalization of capital (Larner 2000: 6). Academic writers on 
development issues, recounted have noted that “….neo-liberalism is anti-
development in perspective, not in terms of goals but in terms of means and  
by the 1980s, neo-liberalism’s ideas and practices profoundly challenged 
and destabilized post-1945 political projects, policy arrangements and 
practices of governing” (Jenson 2010:59; Peiterse2010:7). Contextually, 
Jenson explains that “… there was a move away from the perspectives on 
social policy developed in the three decades after 1945” (2010:59).  
 
5.6.7.2. Criticism of neo-liberalism 
 
The neo-liberal philosophy that structurally links free markets (which are 
almost never actually free) and democracy (generically regarded as political 
development) fundamentally fails to note a long history of state intervention 
in markets alongside democracy. It is also based on the unfounded 
assumption that unstrained markets will deliver broadly distributed wealth, 
and that neo-liberal economic theory and practice is somehow politically 
value-neutral which, demonstrably, it is not (Kingsbury 2004:11 in 
Remenyi, and McKay et al 2004).   
 
The neo-liberal approach development constitutes a set of policies that 
forces borrowers (governments) to cut back on their state and public 
spending, to raise interest rates and to open up their economies to foreign 
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business and trade. Many Third World countries have become a laboratory 
for a huge experiment in neo-classical theory (Rapley 1996:76 cited in 
Haines 2000:22).  Apter (1987 cited in Schuurman 2004:12), concurs, 
saying that “…as a development model the neo-liberal trajectory denies third 
world countries the policy tools to intercede actively in favour of those 
without jobs, houses, healthcare, schooling, and food.” The process of neo-
liberalization entails much ‘creative destruction’ not only of prior 
institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging traditional forms of 
state sovereignty) but also of division of labour, social relations, welfare 
provisions and ways of life and thought (Harvey 2005).  
 
The neoliberal orthodoxy is experiencing the same problem now as it did 
between the two world wars: the sheer weight of empirical evidence showing 
that the ideology of unregulated, “free” markets is a serious obstacle to 
improvements in economic welfare in modern industrial economies. 
Extensive empirical tests of the neoliberal case for “radical reforms” that are 
supposed to solve the problem of unemployment have failed to find solid 
evidence to support the claim (Baker et al. 2005 cited in Panić 2005:147). 
 
It has been argued by some scholars and critics that “neo-liberalism 
diminishes autonomy as regards national policy and is too costly for those 
members of society who are least capable of bearing the burden. 
Nevertheless, in the last quarter century, the ultimate vision of Western-
style individualism seems to have taken hold, as democracies and liberal 
economies are being propagated all over the world” (Griffith 2006:4).  
 
A probe into the empirical landscape casts further doubt on the intellectual 
underpinnings of the neoliberal orthodoxy in terms of the overall growth 
performance of the world economy. Such growth has been strikingly lower 
and more unstable during the neoliberal era when compared to earlier 
periods. The gap between developed and less developed countries has 
widened and there has been increased divergence within the Third World 
(Rock 1993 cited in Önis & Şenses 2005:267-268). A partial explanation is 
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provided by Stiglitz (1998:9) who noted that “...technical solutions and 
central prescriptions of the so-called Washington census were not enough to 
generate economic growth,” in the countries of the supposed “third” world. 
 
5.6.7.3. Neo-liberalism – Dubai points of convergence 
 
Dubai is the apotheosis of the neo-liberal values of contemporary capitalism: 
a society that might have been designed by the Economics Department of 
the University of Chicago. Dubai, indeed, has achieved what American 
reactionaries only dream of: an oasis of free enterprise without income 
taxes, trade unions or opposition parties (Atia 2005 cited in Davis 2006:60-
61). “As befits a paradise of consumption, its unofficial national holiday, as 
well as its global logo, is the celebrated Shopping Festival, a month-long 
extravaganza sponsored by the city’s 25 malls that begins in January and 
attracts 4 million upscale shoppers, primarily from the Middle East and 
South Asia” (Atia 2005 cited in Davis 2006:60-61).  
 
The neo-liberal route to rapid growth has been apparent not just since 1985 
in Southeast Asia (World Bank cited in O’ Hearn 1998) but also in Dubai 
since 1998. The political economy of Dubai’s economic transformation is 
conceptualized and designed on the premise of state-led free market 
capitalism where the market is king. “...The state’s desire to develop and 
diversify its local economy in recent years has entailed the adoption of a 
number of distinctly market-led strategies. Chief among these was the 
launch of a massive urban construction program driven by newly 
commodified real estate markets, internationalized property ownership laws” 
(Buckely 2012:260).  
 
5.6.7.4. Neo-liberalism Dubai points of divergence  
 
As outlined above by Davis (2006), Dubai is quintessentially the epitome of 
the purest form of capitalism. However, the Dubai Model of economic neo-
liberalism departs from the mainstream literature concerning the minimum 
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role of the state in the economy. Section 10.2 notes that free market 
capitalism perceives the state in the economy as a regulator, facilitator, 
shareholder and main player. The eco-system of the government related 
entities (GRE) provides an expansive imagery of the state's over-arching 
tentacles in the economy. The Dubai state may be easily be described 
without contestation as being corporatist or entrepreneurial.  
 
Additionally, in Dubai and the UAE in general, the government has been 
deliberate in its pursuit of economic liberalization strategies, through 
encouragement of competition in some sectors of the economy; for example, 
рrivatization of the banking sector. Nonetheless, Dubai’s economic activities 
are driven by a state led capitalism. 
 
5.7. Conclusion  
 
The last half-century has demonstrated that development is possible, but 
also that development is not inevitable; and is a phenomenon greater than 
just a matter of technical adjustments, but involves the transformation of 
society (Stiglitz 1998:42). Through the continually growing variety of 
development theories it has become apparent that there is no crystallization 
of development concepts which have coalesced around some fundamentals 
that are constitutive of development. The artificial divide between developed 
and developing countries has contributed to the continued socio-economic 
malaise of citizens in the “third world” countries some six decades after 
development was first championed by President Truman. 
 
The theoretical shifts and seemingly endless debates on approaches to 
development or underdevelopment “gave rise to a veritable industry in the 
social sciences, with a complex and often ambiguous relationship to 
governmental, international, private agencies actively engaged in promoting 
economic growth, alleviating poverty and fostering beneficial social change 
in ‘developing’ regions of the world” (Cooper & Packard 2005:146). 
Paradoxically, in spite of the industry that has sprung up around the desire 
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to modernize and develop societies, the vast majority of the world’s 
population still “languishes in poverty” (Matunhu 2011:66) as mainstream 
and alternative development models have tended to exacerbate an already 
untenable socio-economic situation in non-European countries.  
 
The proponents and protagonists of current development paradigms have 
not been able to effectively address the dialectical unease between western 
hegemonic power (promoted in the form of development paradigms) and 
historical exploitation of the so-called third world, and need to ensure that 
indigenous solutions are found to address the issues of poverty and 
economic stagnation. As a partial and simplistic solution, Haque (1999:130), 
suggests that “the field of development should allow for the epistemological 
flexibility to accommodate various modes (e.g. empirical, interpretive, 
critical) of understanding development and to assess the intellectual 
strengths and weaknesses” of development paradigms.  
 
Consequently; it is safe to conclude that there is no easy solution to the 
problem of poverty, environmental degradation, political exclusions at a 
national level and all the other issues that are constitutive of development 
as a process and in nature, which are fundamental to achieving the 
objectives of development. The subsequent chapter will explain the hybrid 
rentier developmental and competition state model that forms a theoretical 
template to explain Dubai’s socio-economic transformation. 
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 Chapter Six: 
The RDC State Paradigm: Theoretical Framework for the  Dubai Model 
 
We are in part to be blamed, but this is curse of being born with a copper spoon in our 
mouths. Kenneth Kaunda, Former Zambian President 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Based on the proposed theoretical framework for situating Dubai’s socio-
economic development strategies, this chapter argues that Dubai’s 
development strategies cannot be pigeonholed into any one development 
paradigm but instead represent a hybridization of the rentier, competition 
and developmental State theories that were briefly argued in chapter one. 
This chapter thus examines the theoretical framework of the epistemological 
roots of Dubai’s socio-economic development model between 1998 and 
2008, while the mechanics and pragmatics of the model are further 
developed and discussed in chapter seven. 
 
The examination of the abovementioned theoretical and conceptual 
framework originated from the inapplicability of the mainstream 
development paradigms as articulated in chapter five. The approach to 
development in Dubai had an element of uniqueness to it which is not 
reflected in the mainstream theories. In addition, a monolithic paradigmatic 
view cannot be taken of Dubai’s approach to socio-political and economic 
development in the ten years prior to the global financial economic crisis of 
2008/2009. In this chapter the researcher argues that Dubai on its own, 
unlike the other emirates in the UAE, demonstrates combined features of a 
rentier, developmental and competition state. In other words, the city state 
cannot be stereotyped as, a pure rentier-state, competition and or 
developmental state. Chapter seven addresses and clarifies the study’s 
position that while on the surface; the geo-economics of Dubai appears to be 
those of a pure rentier-state, a set more of complex paradigms are required 
to do justice to Dubai’s development during this period.  This, despite its 
initial appearance of being a rentier state, given that the sheikhdom is an 
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insignificant oil producer, coupled with the city being a recipient of 
“economic rent” from its expatriate residents, businesses, visitors and 
directly from Abu Dhabi as part of the federation’s constitutional 
arrangements.  
 
Three main sections make up this chapter: Section 6.2 and its sub-sections 
tackle the important aspects of the state, its role and state–society relations; 
Section 6.3 covers the entire gamut of the three paradigms that forms the 
centrality of the thesis and Section 6.4 concludes and summarizes the 
fundamental issues raised and expounded in the body of the chapter.  
 
6.2. Contextualizing the Notion of a State 
 
The word “state” has two distinct meanings in everyday usage, which are 
frequently conflated. One use refers to sovereign political entities:  those 
states with international recognition, their own boundaries, their own seat 
at the United Nations and their own flag. The other refers to that set of 
institutions and practices which combine administrative, judicial, rule-
making and coercive powers (Owen 2004:2). It is the second of the two 
definitions that is relevant and of importance to this chapter. According to 
Weber, “….the state is an actor able to formulate and pursue its own goals” 
(Luiz 2000:228).  Migdal (1988:19 cited in Luiz 2000:228), using a Weberian 
ideal-type perspective, defines the state as: 
 
[….] an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated 
by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or 
authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well 
as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given 
territory, using force if necessary to have its way. 
 
Implicit in the definition provided above is the fact that the state is not 
static: it evolves over time due to numerous internal and external factors 
such as the dominant political and economic dogmas in vogue at a 
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particular point in time. Similarly, the state and its bureaucracy has been 
an important locus for the use of legitimate power to achieve the will of the 
people, either through a social contract as is customary in Dubai and in the 
neighbouring Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC) nation-states; or through a 
strong state-society relationship as obtains in some western-style 
democracies. The various roles played by the state are discussed below. 
 
6.2.1. Context of state intervention 
 
One of the most extraordinary enigmas in economics lies in the area of the 
state (Luiz 2000:227). The World Development Report (1997) makes the 
salient point that “...around the globe, the state is in the spotlight. Far 
reaching developments in the global economy have us revisiting the basic 
questions about government: what its role should be, what it can and 
cannot do and how best to do it.” As a partial answer to those fundamental 
questions, Fritz and Menocal (2007:540) articulate the view that “in the 
1960s, donors assumed that states in the developing world could act as 
engines of development and therefore could be funded to enable investments 
and generate growth.” 
 
However, regardless of the general admissions by various apolitical groups, 
international donor agencies and government, as well as domestic 
stakeholders, “…the role of the state in promoting economic growth and 
social progress in the developing world has been a subject of contestation 
among international development experts for the past 50 years” (Fritz & 
Menocal 2007:540). All states have a role to play in managing their 
economies, but the nature and extent of this involvement is context-specific, 
as there is no fixed role for the state that fits every economy (Poverty and 
Human Development Report, 2009). Each nation’s distinct ideology 
determines the mix of market and non-market mechanisms used in the 
management of the economy which, in turn, locates the country’s position 
along the continuum between a wholly-planned economy at one end and a 
market-rational economy at the other (Ibid).  
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The Poverty and Human Development Report (2009) further states that: 
 
 ....every state, whether developmental or market-rational, performs the 
following core functions: Defining the national vision and strategic direction, 
establishing medium-term strategies to translate the national vision into 
concrete action, strengthening and aligning the institutional framework for 
implementation of the medium-term strategies, maintaining macro-economic 
stability, addressing blockages to economic growth. 
 
In view of the core functions of state listed above; the Government of Dubai 
through its state apparatus, must “….get the fundamentals right without 
which the core of every government’s mission (….) [without which] 
sustainable, shared, poverty-reducing development would be impossible” 
(WDR1997).   
 
The traditional core functions of the state as societies have come to accept 
them globally over the years have come under tremendous pressure by 
proponents of the Washington Consensus particularly, during the period of 
the 1980-90s when developing countries implemented structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs). However, such pressure has dissipated, 
according to Van Donk (2009), who noted that “…the current global 
economic crisis reasserts the centrality of the state in development. Both 
locally and internationally, there is a move to place the state at the centre of 
development.” The recent wave of neo-liberal restructuring in the developing 
world has increasingly been accompanied by a process of re-regulation. The 
notion of the regulatory state clearly underlines the growing recognition on 
the part of key transnational and domestic actors that market liberalization 
per se in the absence of effective regulation will fail to translate into 
successful economic performance (Majone 1997; Vogel 1996 cited in Bakir 
and Önis 2010:77). This ideological discourse has not been lost on the 
Government of Dubai; however its role has been influenced by history, 
culture, religion and the state of the city’s economic trajectory prior to and 
subsequent to the departure of the British from the former Trucial states of 
the Arabian Peninsula.  
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Table 6.1: Functions of the state in economic development 
Functions Addressing Market Failure Improving 
Equity 
Minimal 
Functions 
Providing Pure Public Goods 
Defence  
Land/Law and Order  
Property Rights 
Macro-economic Management 
Public Health 
Protecting the Poor 
Anti-poverty 
Programmes 
Disaster Relief 
Intermediate 
Functions 
Addressing 
Externalities 
Basic Education  
Environmental 
Protection 
Regulating 
Monopoly 
Utility 
Regulation 
Antitrust 
Policy  
Overcoming 
Imperfect 
Information 
Insurance 
(health, life, 
pensions) 
Financial 
Regulation 
Consumer 
Protection 
Providing Social 
Insurance 
Redistributive 
Pensions 
Family Allowances  
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Activist 
Functions 
Coordinating Private Activity 
Fostering Markets 
Cluster Initiatives 
Redistributive  
Asset 
Redistribution 
     
Source: (World Bank, 1998) 
 
The role of the state (cf. the summary of the content in Table 6), was 
deduced by Rapley as being one “that […] could both develop economies and 
alter societies in such a way as to make them suit human needs. Underlying 
this was the belief that the state could embody the collective will more 
effectively than the market, which favoured privileged interests” (1996). 
Being a city-state on the periphery of the global economy at the beginning of 
the 20th century, the state apparatus of Dubai has embraced the notion of a 
strong autonomous state that would pursue human development in its 
entirety, so as to embody meet the collective will of its people. 
 
6.2.2. State-society relations 
 
It is virtually impossible to construct a theoretical framework to analyze 
Dubai’s socio-economic transformation in recent times without fully 
understanding the state-society relations that have emerged since 1833 
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when the Maktoum family established an autocratic monarchical rule. “The 
concept of hegemony, as developed by Gramsci from Marx and Lenin’s 
conception of the state” (Ayubi 2006: 6) has been a permanent feature of the 
Dubai monarchical state.  
 
For Gramsci, the state does not simply control society through coercive or 
regulatory means. It exercises ideological hegemony by manufacturing 
cultural and ideological consent in civil society (Femia 1981:31-5 cited in 
Landau 2008: 245). Gramsci’s hegemonic concept may be used to describe 
the state-society relations in Dubai, in which the state uses its power to 
display hegemonic power over the society, thus creating a weak society that 
is not able to articulate its ideological tendencies. The state of Dubai is 
linked to the society not by ideological rhetoric, but instead to a large extent 
by religion, culture and language. It may also be argued that Dubai’s state-
society relationship has been fossilised since 1971 “….into an authoritarian 
regime with relatively strong capacity” (Zhao 2001:9) to put down any 
opposition to the legitimacy of autocratic monarchical rule. The approach to 
state-building is a “top down” one, with an emphasis on the formal state 
structures such as the police, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Khalifa 
Development Fund, the Dubai Cares Humanitarian Fund, etc.   
 
The state–society relationship in Dubai is also based on a tacit agreement 
that promulgates a system which engenders economic, social, territorial and 
human transformation of the emirate. This tacit agreement is regarded in 
international political economy discourse as a social contract, as referred to 
in section 3.4.5, which (significantly) lacks political competition and 
coalesces around the subjugation of a weak society. In other words, the 
state-society relations in Dubai lack the “golden triangle” matrix of state, 
citizens and society. Instead, what is attained is an admixture of a 
traditional, hereditary mode of political governance supported by modern 
constitutional provisions that legitimize the coercive power of the state, 
accompanied by its responsibilities, and the rights of citizens.  
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State-society relations as defined by DFID are the “….interactions between 
state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is 
exercised and how it can be influenced by people. They are focused on 
issues such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of state and 
society, negotiating how public resources should be allocated and 
establishing different modes of representation and accountability” (DFID, 
2010:15 cited in Haider 2011:6). This supports the view of Zhao that “state-
society relations (….) are understood in terms of the nature of the state, the 
nature of society and the linkages between the state and the society” (Zhao 
2001:39). Figure 6.0 illustrates an attempt to graphically map and present 
the nexus between state and society. 
 
Figure 6.1: Dubai: State- Society Relations 
 
Source: Adapted from Luiz (2000) 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates that phenomenon which political sociologists tend to 
analyze as “….the weight of a state by vis-à-vis the society it pretends to 
control; i.e. its autonomy in dealing with other socio-economic actors and its 
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capacity to influence their behavior” (Salame 1990:32). “Most western 
industrial countries fall into the category of strong state and strong society.  
The modern state has a long history and has evolved as an outcome of 
struggles within civil society. As such, the state possesses a high degree of 
legitimacy and its authority is firmly embedded in social structures. The 
state system is relatively stable and reflexive” (Luiz 2000:231). From the 
diagram above, it may be observed that no Arab country, including Dubai, 
falls into the Strong-State / Strong-Society category. 
 
In the upper left hand corner of the quadrant in Figure 6.0, Dubai and its 
GCC neighbours are depicted as representing examples of Strong States and 
Weak Societies. Political scientists would regard the state of Dubai as a 
“dirigiste state”, indicating that the state is in total control of national 
planning and the distribution of welfare benefits, or in other words the 
economic space is dominated by statism. In addition, Dubai is not dissimilar 
to the Levant and Maghreb states in the Arab world, where the “state-society 
relationship, is as such, in which the state acts and society reacts, is derived 
in large measure; from the absence of a ‘populist-mobilizational’ history and 
the substantive regime autonomy in economic planning” (Schmidt 1990:20, 
Hertog 2010:61). Given the developmental nature of the post-Pax Britannica 
state in Dubai, there is seemingly a disconnection between the small group 
of bureaucratically anointed functionaries who, to a large degree “...have 
remained isolated from direct pressures stemming from society, [while] the 
state capacity has also been utilized in order to allocate resources in the 
interest of the whole society” (Benczes & Szent-Iványi 2010:1). Nonetheless 
the Dubai society has remained weak and or non-existent and subordinated 
to the state elite and monarchal rule. 
 
Furthermore, the Strong-State, Weak-Society scenario in Dubai may be 
explained as the state having for many years reduced the ideological space 
of civil society, whose expression is monitored by various state apparatuses. 
The socio-political culture and the structure of the society and economy 
must be totally understood in order to design a theoretical framework within 
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which to explain the city-state’s unparalleled meteoric rise to global 
prominence as a model for the developing world to emulate, or not. In this 
regard, Dubai’s state-society relationship cannot be ignored because it is 
intertwined with the development strategies and policies that have been 
deployed by the monarchical and state institutions, as is discussed below.  
 
6.3. Theoretical Framework of the Dubai Model 
 
This thesis adopts the central premise that the theoretical framework of 
Dubai’s development as a city-state cannot be limited to one of the 
mainstream development paradigms but instead is an admixture of three, as 
referred to earlier and depicted graphically in Figure 6.2, illustrating the 
study’s hybrid development model. Each model is a sub-model of the overall 
model.  
 
Figure 6.2: Dubai's RDC State Development: Theoretical Framework 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation (2012) 
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 In the first instance, Dubai may be regarded as the “Arab Falcon” that has 
elevated itself from the background of a nomadic, tribal, paternalistic form 
of governance into a global city. It is in terms of this premise that Campbell 
(2009), posed the question, “….what is the development strategy at work in 
Dubai?” This semi-autonomous city-state’s socio-economic transformation 
depends on a convergence of approaches or development paradigms, or what 
this author terms the “RDC Model”, as depicted above. The proposed model 
is informed by a combination of variables: including the uniqueness of 
Dubai’s development trajectory and a model that does not lend itself fully to 
the application of the main development theories  
 
Secondly, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of Dubai’s development 
trajectory within the rentier-theory paradigm since the discovery of oil in 
1966. The rentier-state conceptual framework which developed over several 
decades tended to articulate views concerning the political economy of 
hydrocarbon rich states within the southern Gulf and has been fully 
explored by theorists. However, the extracting of rent from residents and 
businesses through a burdensome sponsorship system by the state has not 
been explored, a situation which falls outside of the classical definition of 
the rentier-state.   
 
Thirdly, the academic discourses on the development of the oil rich southern 
Gulf States in the Arabian Peninsula are inevitably composed and 
approached from the perspective of the rentier-theory paradigm and the “oil 
curse discourse”. However, there is even less academic debate and analysis 
with regard to Dubai and the UAE in general as a developmental state. The 
emphasis of academics, development practitioners and politicians from 
western countries tends to fall on the lack of western-style democratic 
institutions in the region. 
 
Fourthly, many governments from emerging economies and transnational 
corporations are becoming similar in their modus operandi, as increasingly 
many such governments have redefined their traditional roles (Table 6.0) 
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and have become corporatist or entrepreneurial states.  Essentially, this 
approach to national development uses global expansion business 
strategies; the Government of Dubai, through its growing system of state 
owned entities, is no exception. The city state has developed domestic, state-
owned commercial entities with the strategic intent of turning them into 
competitive national and global entities. Some notable examples of these 
are: Dubai World, Emirates Airlines and Nakheel (a property developer). This 
attempt at national development is underpinned by some tenets of the 
competition state theory. The emergence of a corporatist attitude in the 
Dubai Government and the subsequent expansion of the state have led me 
to advance the proposition that Dubai has been morphed into a mini 
competition state.   
 
In summary, the over-arching features of the Dubai development model do 
not lend themselves to the examination and or application of any single 
development paradigm. This is due in part to the fact that “Dubai has long 
overcome its oil dependency (but retained its rentier structures), 
transforming itself into an economic system strongly orientated to the 
market and the private sector” (Sailer 2009:11), with increasingly larger 
roles being assumed by state institutions. This is in concert with the 
conventional practice of a state-led approach to development and state led 
capitalism. Thus, invariably the fundamental question arising is: which of 
the development paradigms could be used to competently situate Dubai’s 
socio-economic development within a theoretical framework without creating 
a methodological misunderstanding?  
 
6.3.1. Rentier state:  concept and assumptions 
 
The rentier state was theorized and diffused into the hybridization model 
explained above. The “concept of the rentier state was postulated by Hossein 
Mahadavy with respect to pre-revolutionary Pahlavi Iran in 1970” (Yates 
1996:11). However, “….the concept of a rentier state gained renewed interest 
with the advent of the oil era and the emergence of the new Arab oil-
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producing states” (Beblawi & Luciani 1987:49). The rentier-state theory is 
not dissimilar to other meta-narratives on development paradigms and is 
“...a complex of associated ideas concerning the patterns of development 
and the nature of states in economies dominated by external rent, 
particularly oil rent” (Yates 1996:11).   
 
There are many and varied definitions of a rentier-state; invariably these 
definitions will be based on the socio-political ideology of the proponent.  
Hazem Bebalawi, a recognized authority on the concept, acknowledging this, 
stated unequivocally that “….the purpose of an attempt to define a rentier 
state is not to reach an abstract notion of such a state but to help elucidate 
the impact of recent economic developments, in particular the oil 
phenomenon on the nature of the state in the Arab region” (Bebalawi & 
Luciani 1987:51).  
 
The basic definition of a rentier state is: “a state reliant not on extraction of 
the domestic population’s surplus production but on externally generated 
revenues, or rents, such as those derived from oil” (Anderson 1990 cited in 
Kuru 2002: 52). Krause continues that the “rentier state is defined as one 
that obtains at least 40 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) from 
foreign sources or rents” (Meulen 1997:51 cited in Krause 2009: 7). Dubai’s 
daily current oil production would not qualifiy the emirate to be fully 
regarded as a rentier state. However, the UAE receives large amounts of 
revenues from oil exports (Schwarz 2011:431) and as Dubai is a significant 
member of the UAE Federation, the Government of Dubai has been able to 
use extracted rent at a Federal level to develop a functional rentier state or 
semi-rentier state. In conjunction with the distribution of petro-dollars, 
citizens and government alike have extracted external rents from resident 
expatriates under the sponsorship system to prolong the process of 
patronage. In support of this conclusion, Aartun (2002:8) noted that “….in a 
rentier state the government plays a large role in distributing wealth to the 
population, without imposing income tax…” thus, enshrining the culture of 
patronage and state “welfarism.” 
154 
 
Rentier state proponents imply that: “men of a fat and fertile soil are most 
commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contra-wise a barren country 
makes men temperate by necessity and by consequence careful, vigilant and 
industrious” (Bodin 1967 cited in Ross 1999:309). Subsequent to the 
discovery of oil in the 1950s in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the 1960s the 
citizens of this hydro-carbon state have been fed a diet of entitlement from 
the state that morphed them into a people devoid generally of 
industriousness as the state has become their source of patronage.  
 
Hunter and Malik (2005:148-149) have added an important dimension to 
the multiрlicity of definitions stated above by noting, “the rentier-state is 
financially independent from the society, and is politically autonomous…. 
therefore it does not need to obtain political legitimacy through democratic 
representation; and that rentier state inherits its political order from history 
and does not create their own.” Dubai, and the other UAE emirates, is 
governed by a monarchical authoritarian regime that practises dynastic 
succession and is in the process of creating its own political order and 
history, given that it did not inherit a colonial state per se from the British 
when they left in 1971. The canonical literature on rentier states and the 
“resource curse” by Ross (1999), Karl (1997) and others, has shown that oil 
and gas exporting countries have demonstrated a tendency to become 
authoritarian, as is the case with Dubai, albeit benevolently so. It is also a 
view strongly held by experts on the Middle East that the inanimate 
hydrocarbon beneath the earth’s surface of the Arabian Gulf is strongly 
correlated with the dynastic authoritarian regimes in the GCC.  It is 
important to note Dubai’s authoritarian regimes predate the discovery of oil 
in the 1960s and such a discovery only serves to solidify the monarch’s hold 
on political power. 
 
The rentier-state theory has been summarized most thoroughly by Lenin 
(1982 cited in Farfan-Meres 2010:37) who described the rentier state as 
“parasitical capitalism which was condemned to fail.” On the contrary 
Lenin’s prediction has not yet been fulfilled in the GCC states. This is 
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because as long as the external rent keeps flowing, governments are able to 
buy and maintain the political acquiescence or legitimacy of their citizens in 
return for the immediacy of economic materialism and the subjugation of 
political aspirations and pluralism. The Developmental State paradigm is 
examined below as it forms an integral part of theoretical framework of this 
thesis.  
 
6.3.2. Developmental state 
 
The political economy of development took on a new dimension in the 1980’s 
at the height of the debate between the “state versus market” theories 
(Moore 2001:44). The concept of the “developmental state” (DS) was then 
added to the lexicon of development discourse; its socio-political and 
historical nuances are clarified below.  
 
Öniş (1991:111) and Cloete (2010:3) are of the opinion that the DS has its 
origins in “Chalmers Johnson’s (1982) analysis of the development of the 
Japanese state from 1925 to 1975.” He also pioneered the concept of the 
‘capitalist developmental state’ as explained below:   
 
…. Johnson’s model of the developmental state, based on institutional 
arrangements common to high growth East Asian economies, embodies the 
following set of characteristics. Economic development, defined in terms of 
growth, productivity, and competitiveness, constitutes the foremost and 
single-minded priority of state action. Conflict of goals is avoided by the 
absence of any commitment to equality and social welfare. Goals formulated 
specifically in terms of growth and competitiveness is rendered concrete by 
comparison with external reference economies which provide the state elites 
with models for emulation (Öniş 1991:111). 
 
Like the earlier mercantilist arguments, the developmental state thesis 
derives from observations about the actual economic practice, first in Japan 
and later in South Korea and Taiwan (Woo-Cummings 1999:5).  The concept 
of the DS gained unprecedented traction and currency when the global focus 
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and attention turned to the development taxonomy of what came to be 
known as the “Asian Miracle”, in the 1980s. Such traction and currency was 
gained “in a polarised debate about the respective roles of state and market 
in economic development in the 1980s, especially when the role of the state 
was considered pivotal to economic development in East Asian countries like 
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. (…) However, the notion of a developmental 
state is subject to different forms of interpretation for semantic, ideological 
and empirical reasons and is thus controversial” (Cao 2008:167). 
 
Notwithstanding the polarized debate, ideological and empirical controversy; 
Bolesta   notes that  
 
…. the DS concept is not new as historically developmental states existed in 
Bismarck’s Prussia and in Japan during the Meiji era. The governments of 
those states followed a state designed developmental path and until now 
have been favouring a state interventionism over a liberal open market, be it 
in the form of East Asian fast developer or of what later became the 
continental-European model of a capitalist welfare state (Bolesta 2007:106). 
 
However, building on the groundbreaking work of Johnson (1982), scholars 
such as Deyo (1987), Woo-Cumings (1999), Alice Amsden (1989), Robert 
Wade (1990) and Evans (1995), have catapulted the DS concept in to 
prominence as a theoretical construct (www.e-ir.com). This construct has 
been “...positioned between a liberal open economy model and a centrally 
planned model suggests its being neither capitalist nor socialist in texture” 
(Bolesta 2007:106). The description mirrors Dubai’s development trajectory 
which is the very embodiment of it, and strategically straddles neo-
liberalism on the right and state-centric developmentalism on the political 
left.  
 
The developmental state may be defined as a state in which the political elite 
aims at rapid economic development and gives power and authority to the 
bureaucracy to plan and implement efficient policies. A high rate of 
economic growth legitimizes the centralized state apparatus; therefore, the 
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nation tends to be excluded from decision-making processes on economic 
development (Abe, 2006:8). The Executive Council of Dubai represents that 
political elite unit charged with the responsibility to plan and implement 
socio-economic development policies and strategies.  The theoretical 
underpinnings of the DS were aimed at being a counter-revolutionary force 
to the “rising hegemonic position of the neo-liberal orthodoxy and the 
marginalization of the dependency theory, which challenged what was 
regarded as a benign state which would always act in the public interest” 
(Önis & Şenses, 2005:264). Meredith Woo-Cumings (1999:1) describes the 
theory of the “developmental state as the explanation” for the socio-
economic prescription that transformed Dubai from what the dependency 
theorists regarded as the global economic periphery into an economy that is 
fully integrated into the global centre. 
 
Cao hypothesizes that “...a developmental state is a particular historical, 
political and institutional formation with defined normative goals and a 
capacity to effect fundamental change” (Cao 2008:167).  Close examination 
and analysis of Dubai’s period of exponential economic transformation took 
place within the parameters of a set development agenda as outlined in the 
Dubai Strategic Plans of 1996, 2010, 2015. It has been pointed out that “to 
be judged developmental, a state does not need to be in control of everything 
and successful in all spheres. A transformation that is positive overall may 
be accompanied by a range of negative consequences, such as major 
environmental damage or greater social tension, which become problems 
that society and the state have to address in a subsequent phase” (Fritz & 
Menocal 2007: 533). These issues represent the under-belly of the “Dubic 
Inc Model” (cf. chapter nine). 
 
The suggestion that Dubai may be considered a developmental state rests on 
the notion that there exists “a symbiotic relationship between the political 
and bureaucratic elite and entrepreneurs. A variety of interventionist 
measures was used to direct resources away from old to new industries in 
order to alter their long-term development trajectory” (UNCTAD 2007:58). In 
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Dubai, “economic rents were marshalled to address the objective of rapid 
economic growth” (UNCTAD 2007:58). Fundamentally, “….there seems to be 
a deviation from the nostrums” (Moore 2001:45) of the conventional 
developmental state, as the Dubai model of DS is best viewed as 
bureaucratic, authoritarian and service oriented. These and other issues will 
be addressed in chapter seven where Dubai’s development policies and 
strategies are explored within the proposed theoretical framework.  
 
 
6.3.3. Competition state 
 
As the anthropology of Dubai Inc (1998-2008) most transformative period is 
being written, undoubtedly it will reveal what Low (2006:515) describes as 
the “…ubiquitous and omnipotent presence of the,” Dubai state apparatus. 
Similarly, as in the rentier and developmental state paradigms explained 
above, the competition state paradigm forms an integral part of the tri-
modal theoretical framework approach that seeks to explain the Dubai Inc 
developmental path.  
 
The competition state is a useful paradigmatic instrument for analyzing and 
situating Dubai’s socio-economic transformation between 1998 and 2008. 
Rather than attempting to insulate (Cerny & Evans 2004) Dubai from global 
economic and financial integration (globalization) the CEO of Dubai Inc, 
Sheik Mohammed Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, ruler of Dubai, Prime Minister 
and Vice-President of the UAE and his close confidantes (state actors) in the 
Executive Council embraced “international market pressures, marketization 
and openness” (Cerny & Evans 2004). Having said that the question which 
inevitably arises: “what is the conceptual and theoretical underpinning of 
the competition state theory?” Fougner (2006:166) responds by noting. “…. 
the notion ‘competition state’ was coined by Philip G. Cerny.” This was in 
connection with his analysis of how, “… forms of state economic 
intervention, or, in its broader form, the economic and social activities of the 
state (….) – [were changing] in the attempt to respond to, and to shape and 
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control, growing international economic interpenetration and the 
transnational structures to which it gives rise (Cerny 1990 cited in Fougner 
2006:166).  
 
The heuristic theory of the competition state, as originally developed by 
Philip G. Cerny (1990) and Cerny and Evans (2000), refers to “the 
transformation of the state in consequence of elite perceptions of the 
imperatives of globalization. In particular, it is claimed that the shift from 
the Industrial Welfare State to the Competition State has been informed by 
political elite perceptions of global realities which have underpinned state 
strategies for navigating and mediating processes of globalization” (Evans & 
Lunt 2010: 1). Paradoxically, the competition state deviates from and 
negates the Washington Consensus’s neo-liberal prescription of a minimal 
state. Instead Cerny (2007:251) sees that in most cases there is an “actual 
expansion of de facto state intervention and regulation in the name of 
competitiveness and marketization.” Kirby & Hussey (2009) clarify by noting 
that “Cerny et al. recognize that neoliberal public policies ‘do not merely 
constrain but also bring opportunities’.” From the researcher’s personal 
observation, it is clear that the Government of Dubai, through the 
internationalization of local enterprises such as the aforementioned Dubai 
World, Nakheel, Emirates Group and Jumeria Hospital Management 
Company inter alia, is seeking to take advantage of globalization.   
 
The diabolical onslaught and unquantifiable socio-economic consequences 
of the IMF and World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPS) have inspired a new state to emerge in which:   
 
…. the state does not merely adapt to exogenous structural constraints, 
domestic political actors take a proactive lead in the process through both 
the restructuring of the state and policy entrepreneurship. State intervention 
itself is therefore aimed not only at adjusting to, but also sustaining, 
promoting, and, expanding an open global economy in order to capture its 
perceived benefits. Such strategies, while embedding the role and power of 
political elites, also undermine the traditional generic function of the state 
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seen in terms of conceptions of social justice and the public interest and 
create the space for social conflict (Evans & Lunt 2010: 1). 
 
Whereas the DS concept emerged from analyzing the ways in which certain 
developing states in East Asia and in Latin America succeeded in building a 
modern and competitive industrial economy, the competition state concept 
emerged from analyzing the ways in which developed industrial states were 
restructuring themselves in response to the constraints and opportunities 
opened up by neo-liberal globalization in the 1990s (Kirby & Murphy 
2007:4). The transformation of the national state into a competition state 
“lies at the heart of political globalization. In seeking to adapt to a range of 
complex changes in cultural, institutional and market structures, both state 
and market actors are attempting to reinvent the state as a quasi-‘enterprise 
association’ in a wider world context” (Cerny 2007: 251).  
 
Competition state theorists on the other hand, identify a logic that moves 
state actions away from the maximization of welfare towards the promotion 
of enterprise and profitability as national elites respond to the pressures of 
globalization (Kirby & Hussey 2009). As indicated in Section 3.3.2, Dubai is 
presently diversifying its economy in an attempt to develop a new political 
economy in the city: this is spearheaded by a collection of well administered 
Government Related Enterprises (GREs) that are not involved in the 
unproductive, extraction of external rent activities. Instead their aim is to 
create, in a systematic manner, a web of local and internationally based 
group of entities that are globally competitive. It is imperative to note that at 
the summit of the neo-liberal orthodoxy the Dubai state did not deconstruct 
itself and subsequently withers away but instead re-configured itself and 
used externally and internally generated rent to develop into a competition 
state.  
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Table 6.2: Dimensions of each paradigm that constitute the Dubai RDC Hybrid Model 
Dimensions of each paradigm that constitute the Dubai RDC Hybrid Model 
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   Rentier State 
(Beblawi & Luciani 1987, Yates 200) 
Developmental State 
UNCTAD 2007, Evans (1995), 
Woo-Cummings (1999) 
Competition State 
Evans (2009) Cerny (2007), 
Kirby & Murphy (2007). 
The rentier state model is an 
analytical tool understanding 
the lack of democracy in 
economies driven mainly by 
exogenous sources of rent- 
like oil wealth. 
 
In a rentier state - as a 
special case of a rentier 
economy - only a few are 
engaged in the generation of 
this rent (wealth), the 
majority being only involved 
in the distribution or 
utilization of it.  
 
An important corollary of a 
rentier state is that 
government is the principal 
recipient of the external rent 
in the economy.  
 
The rentier-state violates the 
most sacred doctrine of the 
liberal ethos: hard work.  
 
The externality of the rent 
origin is crucial to the 
concept of a rentier-state 
economy. The existence of an 
internal rent, even 
substantial is not enough, 
though it could indicate the 
existence of a strong 
economy.  
The ideology of the 
developmental State is 
fundamentally 
“developmentalist”, as its 
major preoccupation is to 
ensure sustained 
economic growth and 
development on the back 
of high rates. 
 
Thus, what makes the 
developmental state 
effective is not just 
autonomy, but “embedded 
autonomy”, in which the 
State is immersed in a 
network of ties that bind it 
to groups or classes that 
can become allies in the 
pursuit of societal goals.  
 
Legitimacy of the state is 
derived from its 
achievements and 
performance.  
 
Exclusionary, based on 
primarily on close 
relations with selected 
business groups. Labour 
is controlled. 
 
Promote visionary, 
committed leadership; 
create meritocratic civil 
service in key areas, 
imbued by strong esprit 
de corps and concerns for 
national goals.  
 
The concept of the 
competition state refers 
to the transformation of 
the state from within 
with regard to the 
reform of political 
institutions, functions 
and processes, in the 
processes 
of globalization.  
 
A central paradox of the 
competition state is 
that the emergence of 
such a state does not 
lead to simple decline of 
the state but instead 
necessitates the 
expansion of the de 
facto state intervention 
and regulation in the 
name of 
competitiveness.  
 
A shift from 
macroeconomic to 
microeconomic 
interventionism, as 
reflected in both 
deregulation and 
industrial policy 
 
The social security 
characteristics of a 
competition state can 
be described as follows: 
domestic social security 
policy is subordinated 
to the economic needs 
of international 
competitiveness. 
Sources: Adapted from literature by the authors mentioned in table 6.1 above 
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6.4. Conclusion 
 
The sociology of Dubai’s socio-economic transformation is the subject of 
heightened global debate: regarding the way in which the state was able to 
defy the oil curse theory and create one of the wealthiest cities on earth 
within such a short period of time. It is generally accepted that there is no 
one path to development; thus this chapter argues that Dubai’s development 
model cannot be articulated and fully analyzed from the perspective of the 
stereotypical label of its being purely a rentier state because of the 
considerable amount of hydrocarbon under the ground in the UAE and GCC 
in general. The abundance of development theories globally in vogue 
indicates that there is no single development theory that may be regarded as 
the panacea to provide solutions to the ills of absolute poverty and under-
development.  
 
The theoretical framework for analyzing the socio-economic development 
strategies of Dubai over the period of 1998-2008 is part of a broader 
framework for explaining a possible development model constructed and 
implemented by this city-state. The hybrid approach to exploring Dubai’s 
developmental path is deemed appropriate to sufficiently analyze the 
emirate’s developmental goals and efforts which were contrary to “….the 
‘official’ doctrine of the World Bank’s neo-classical policies of deregulation, 
privatization, central bank independence, independent judiciary, and 
dismantling of the welfare state” (Kim 2009: 384). Furthermore, it was found 
that the state-society relationship is important to fully understand how the 
Government of Dubai’s approach to development ensures socio-economic 
progress and social cohesion in a society that is governed by a patriarchal 
monarchy.  
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 Chapter Seven: 
Demystifying the Dubai Inc Model 
In development man is the central actor in the process 
By Bernardo T.G. Chidzero, 
Enrique Iglesias, 
and Michel Rocard 
1992 
________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The economic model of the UAE and Dubai in particular, is an architectural 
design and construct based on the premise of “life after oil and economic 
alternatives” (Peterson 2009:1). This chapter argues that the Dubai 
Government uses an eclectic and pragmatic approach to its socio-economic 
transformation which employs three development paradigms whose 
propositions have been clearly laid out in chapter six. In understanding 
Dubai’s development trajectory as the “Arabian Falcon” and the apparatuses 
of the state that legitimize it, this thesis re-positions the state, not only as 
reflecting the embodiment of any single development paradigm, but instead 
the hybridization of three paradigms. This RDC Model, as referred to in the 
previous chapter, does not place the needs of “big capital” over the needs 
and aspirations of the Emirati population.    
 
The rapid transformation of the UAE has been debated around the world in 
a number of forums as a successful, home grown, Arab developmentalist 
state-led, capitalist model that is able to be replicated. The transformational 
model of the UAE has made its way into annals of development discourse as 
a possible new development paradigm by economists, planners and 
politicians in the developing world. Similarly, stylistically and 
methodologically, the “Dubai Inc” Model (see Appendix II) has been 
questioned by many academics and public policy designers, but nonetheless 
admired.  Especially in an era in which Escobar, in his book “Encountering 
Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World” bemoans that 
the “discursive formation of development, and the subsequent succession of 
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various development strategies and approaches up to the present, are 
always made within the same discursive space” (Escobar, 1995:42). 
 
This chapter attempts to “anthropologize” Dubai’s social and economic 
strategies over the ten year period that may be characterized as one in 
which the most intensive development planning took place in its modern 
era. It consists of the following sections: Section 7.1 Dubai Development 
Policies, 7.2 Development Strategies in Dubai, 7.3 Social Development and 
Welfare, 7.4 Macro-Economic Strategies, Sections 7.5, and 7.6 address the 
Shift from Macro-Economic to Micro-Economic Management and 7.7 
concludes the chapter.  
 
7.2. Dubai’s development policies 
 
A development policy is part of the broader terrain of what is often referred 
to as “the policy sciences”, which in turn are dominated by a focus on public 
or governmental policy (Haines 2004:4). Within the parameters of this 
definition, macro-development policies were agglomerated to achieve social 
and economic development as postulated by the “Truman Doctrine” in the 
post World War II era. Social as well as “economic policy and practice have 
varied widely” (Leftwich1995:401) across countries and are influenced by 
multiple political and economic factors: such as the strength of the state, 
type of political regime, socio-political history and the economic development 
paradigm that dominates the political and academic sphere at a particular 
point in time. In essence, there is no single factor that can be used to 
explain the deluge of development policies experimented with by various 
countries; nonetheless it is imperative to note that: 
 
…the principal goal of any development policy is to create sustainable 
improvements in the quality of life for all people - while raising per capita 
incomes and consumption is part of that goal, other objectives include: 
reducing poverty, expanding access to health care and increasing 
educational levels (World Development Report 1999/2000: 13).  
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The Dubai Model “...is reminiscent of the ‘Big Push’ type models articulated 
by development economists in the 1970s and ‘80s as the solution to the 
problem of underdevelopment and chronic stagnation. In these models, the 
focus is on circumstances that would bring a leading firm (or firms) to invest 
together to grow the domestic market and engender wide-scale 
industrialization” (Chorin 2010: 17). In doing so the government’s public 
policy management system must ensure there is risk mitigation mechanism 
that prevents wholesale socio-economic dislocation of the poor and most 
vulnerable in the society, as the state attempts to achieve its macro and 
meso objectives. The quote below is discussed in greater detail later in the 
chapter. 
 
….As to development policy, the UAE has opted for a free-exchange-rate 
system and liberal trade with an outward-oriented strategy. The main 
objective is to build a diversified economy and create domestic productive 
capacity. Both federal and local governments have started to encourage 
private participation, first by building a modern infrastructure base, and 
then by trying to start a joint stock company with the private sector. The 
local government also recognizes the importance of the free zone in 
encouraging foreign and local investment (Al Shamsi 1999:4 in Al Shamsi et 
al. 1999).  
 
Integrated development planning dictates that “…the UAE’s general 
economic policies are based on the principles of achieving the citizens’ 
welfare through the optimum use of available economic and financial 
resources” (Omaira 2001:11). This statement is not merely a citation of the 
country’s policy position; rather, it is an assertion that lacks an intelligible 
analysis of the deeper rationale behind the design of those policies. It is 
important to note that development policy design in the UAE and Dubai in 
particular is highly unilateral and lacks broader stakeholder involvement, 
such as the general public who are supposed to be beneficiaries of those 
policies. Overall, Dubai is similar to other GCC states in which the 
development policies architecture has been underpinned by what the OECD 
(2012:14) regarded “…as a history of state intervention that has shaped the 
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structure and objectives of state ownership in regional economies.” The 
logical explanation is that the typical Arab state, a monolithic power within 
a patrimonial culture, sees itself as the custodian of national development.  
 
Figure 7.1: An interactive model of policy implementation 
 
Source: Grindle & Thomas (1991:127 cited in Slunge 2011:5) 
 
The Figure above provides a schematic display of the various phases and/or 
stages that underpin the identification of development related issues and the 
array of actors that constitute the process. Fundamentally, this concerns 
either policy issues, and or policy outcomes that make up the facets Grindle 
and Thomas’ model as summarized below:  
167 
 
….human beings are at the core of the UAE development efforts. In any 
country, the human being is the main focus. The human being is the core of 
our thinking and interest. Everything starts with the human being and ends 
with human beings. The aim is to provide comfort for the Emirati citizen and 
boost the federation which will make us strong” (Sheikh Mohammed Ruler of 
Dubai as quoted in the Daily Gulf News February 7, 2007).   
 
Development policies are regarded in development circles as precursors to 
development strategies. In summary, the development policies of Dubai 
encapsulate a unique hybrid model presented as the RDC theoretical 
framework discussed in the previous chapter.   
 
7.3. Development strategies in Dubai 
 
The social and economic development matrix of each nation state is born 
out of a combination of micro and macro variables; or a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative indicators, such as GDP per capita, human 
development index and the poverty index: “….consequently, strategies 
chosen by individual nation states (including the city state of Dubai) seek to 
prepare them for a viable future are reflected by their realities” (Peterson 
2009:4), be these realities under-development, developing, or developed.  
 
The UAE’s socio-economic development planning has not led to uniformity 
and an adherence to one rigid strategy, but instead embraced a number of 
sub-strategies by each emirate that have complemented and reinforced the 
UAE’s overall development (Davidson 2005:162). The national project that  
created a collective indigenous state for the former, autonomously governed 
“Trucial states”, has deliberately by design ensure that each emirate 
maintains some sovereignty over its destiny. In this regard, Mkandawire 
(2011:1) makes a significant statement that “…development is thus not an 
externally imposed ‘discourse’, but is a response to the many challenges 
that the region has faced over the years and still faces today.”  
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Dubai’s development strategies have undoubtedly been influenced by a 
combination of factors, including its: commercial and mercantilist history, 
regional geo-economics and politics, personal visions of its supreme leader, 
and the need to be judged kindly by history. At the federal level, national 
development strategies have contributed to the shaping and the influencing 
of the city’s development programmes and strategies. In spite of the fact that 
Dubai has jurisdiction over its own development policies and strategies, the 
national development trajectory and agenda automatically causes a sub-
fusion of the individual emirate’s socio-economic development strategies into 
the over-arching development posture of the super-state. 
 
Strategically, there is an attempt at the micro (Emirate) level to prevent the 
“fallacy of composition” that may occur at the macro (national level) between  
Dubai’s development path and the other economies that make up the federal  
project. The hybrid model for the Emirate of Dubai discussed in the previous 
chapter is captured in Table 7.1 below. In the said table, an attempt is made 
to depict the city’s overall development framework that is been used to 
facilitate, shape and deliver the desired targeted transformative outcomes of 
development.   
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Table 7.1: Dubai’s integrated development framework 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation (2012) 
 
The political economy of Dubai’s development plans is implicitly an off-shoot 
of a combined typology of development paradigms for which this thesis has 
argued in chapter six, as the RDC hybrid model. As a platform or catalyst 
for socio-economic development, policymakers, after extensive consultations 
with key private sector actors, have engineered the city-state’s integrated 
development plans known as the Dubai Strategic Plans (DSPs). Those of 
1996, 2010, and 2015 represent the creation of a comprehensive, integrated 
and holistic roadmap for the social and economic progress of the Emirate; 
through the establishment of a platform framework that aligns all policies 
and plans with the involvement of sections of the private sector in their 
implementation. As indicated, the fundamental imperatives of the DSPs are 
influenced by the city state’s “catch-up” development agenda and 
developmentalist tendencies. Policy making and implementation in Dubai 
are driven by a small anointed group of close confidants to the Ruler of 
Dubai, who is autonomously embedded, outside the dictates and scrutiny of 
civic movements in the city.  
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Given the complexity and ambiguity of the policy making process (Nutley & 
Webb 2004:14), as depicted above in section 7.2, Dubai’s Strategic Plans 
taxonomically can be described as being “evidence based policy-making, that 
essentially uses statistics and other sources of information to highlight 
issues, inform programme design, policy choice, forecast the future, monitor 
policy implementation and evaluate policy impact” (UNDP 2007:1-2). 
 
7.3.1. Dubai strategic plan (DSP): 1996 
 
This particular plan represented Dubai’s first integrated development plan, 
as previously there were urban development plans, carried out by the Dubai 
Municipality. The primary objective of the 1996–2010 DSPs was to attain a 
developed economy status by the latter date (Pacione 2005:257). “This goal 
[was] being pursued within a context of planned economic growth, by means 
of several strategies including modernisation of production in low value 
added sectors; investment promotion and attraction of well established firms 
in modern high value industries; and diversification, with increased 
development of tertiary sector activities” (Ibid:257). 
 
As with other comparative plans around the world, this particular strategic 
plan “….emphasized five key sectors: Trade, Transport, Tourism, Higher 
Level Services and Manufacturing, with new developments which were 
clustered around the key sectors as part of the DSP initiated by the Dubai 
government” (Helmond & Bas 2007:2). 
 
These authors add, 
 
the five key sectors from the DSP 1996 are each developed into different 
projects. The strength of the clustering is that there is a relation between 
different developments in different clusters. By doing this, different project 
developments are beneficial to more than one key sector of the DSP. This will 
stimulate Dubai’s economic growth (Ibid: 3). 
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In November 1996 the sheikhdom of Dubai, according to Chand (1996) 
writing in the daily Gulf News, decided to “chart a dynamic growth path.” 
The emirate’s first strategic development master plan Into the 21st Century, 
aimed: 
 
(…) to impart new dynamism into the economy, raise living standards and 
increase regional  cooperation through economic high growth, improvements 
in productivity, increased investment in human resources, encourage 
investment and labour market stability, improve productivity,  maintain a 
high non-oil GDP growth and diversify the economic base of the economy 
(Chand 1996; Owais 1996).  
 
The Dubai DSP of 1996-2000 identified human resource development as one 
feature of the supporting framework that was necessary to achieve the 
plan's objectives. The plan recognized the need to further expand and 
upgrade the educational network and training services in the emirate 
(Wilkins 2000: 5).  
 
7.3.1.1. Targets of DSP (1996-2000) 
 
Some of the quantitative and measurable targets are outlined below as 
included in the strategic plan. 
 
(i) (Between 1997 and 2000 a 5 % increase in annual Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
 
(ii) DSP of 1996 targeted to achieve a 7 % annual growth in the non-oil 
and industry sectors. 
 
(iii) By the year 2000, the non-oil sector of the GDP was targeted to reach 
88.7 %.  
 
(iv) An annual population growth of 3 % and simultaneously increase the 
number of nationals (Emiratis) in work force to 10 percent. 
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(v)  The plan’s target was a labour force increase of 3.5 % per annum.  
 
(vi)  Per capita income was targeted to reach US$19,650 by the year 
2010. 
 
It was envisioned that by the year 2000, Dubai would have “caught up” with 
the developed countries globally by using the principles of integrated 
development planning to attract the brightest minds for executive positions; 
the cheapest blue collar and unskilled workers and simultaneously to 
provide a secure safe for financial resources that needed to be safely 
“parked”, even if the returns on investments were negative. 
 
7.3.2. Vision 2010: Shaping The Future (2000-2010) 
 
The Emirate of Dubai has made the attraction of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) a priority in its quest to grow, transform, modernize and develop its 
economy into a formidable regional and global economic epicentre. Such 
ambitions have been captured and fluently articulated in the city state’s 
development plans including its “Vision 2010”. The architects of the 
development plan in the Dubai Executive Office in 2003 cited in Hvidt 
(2009: 406), point out that “‘Vision 2010’ explicitly states that increasing 
amounts of FDI are a prerequisite for further development...” of the 
previously pearl- and- oil- dependent economy. 
  
The second integrated development plan was launched by His Highness, 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, who at that stage was the 
Crown Prince of Dubai before his ascendancy as Vice President and Prime 
Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai in 2005, subsequent to the reign of 
his brother Sheikh Rashid who had been the Ruler of Dubai and Vice 
President of the UAE. The development plan charts a: 
 
“…Vision 2010, spelt out in 2000, envisaged the course he wanted Dubai to 
take over the forthcoming decade. Vision 2010 was very much orientated 
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towards developing the economy and all that is related to it to entice 
investment from abroad and encourage local industry to receive the benefits 
of the burgeoning financial infrastructure” (Gulf News May 23, 2009).  
 
The master plan of “Vision 2010”, according to Randeree and Narwani 
(2009:448), identified “…three major sectors which were believed would play 
pivotal roles in the prosperity of the local economy in the future. The sectors 
include tourism, information technology, and media. In addition, to 
traditional industries such as trade and services, which have underpinned 
the emirate’s prosperity over the past few decades.”  
 
7.3.2.1. Aims of Vision 2010 
 
Its centrality and primacy hinge on the following overarching aims and 
objectives as articulated by the master plan and which include: 
  
(i) Vision 2010 was very much orientated towards developing the 
economy and all that is related to it to entice investment from abroad 
and encourage local industry to receive the benefits of the burgeoning 
financial infrastructure (Gulf News May 3, 2009). 
 
(ii) Having world class companies with core knowledge-based  
competences which will compete effectively, globally, as envisioned by 
Sulaiman (2003), one of the architects of the plan (cited in Randeree 
and Marawani (2009: 448).  
 
(iii)  To catapult Dubai’s development into a 21st century knowledge based 
economy and to bypass the industrialization process followed by 
OECD members (Khoury 2008).  
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7.3.2.2. Key economic targets 
 
Development plans may be indigenously developed or influenced and/or 
imposed by the conditionalities of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPS) or Structural Adjustment Lending (SALs). The DSP contain certain 
quantifiable targets as listed below: 
 
(i)  The target for foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP 
was set at 4 % for the year 2010 (www.uaeinteract.com).  
 
(ii) The development plan “….projected that revenue from oil exports 
would decrease to less than 5% of Dubai’s GDP by the year 2010” 
(DTMFZPD, 2002).  
 
(iii) Vision 2010 originally pegged the contribution of the non-oil sector to 
Dubai's GDP at 70%, particularly from the service sector with the 
anticipated further development of industries such as tourism and 
healthcare (www.uaeinteract.com).  
 
(iv) 25% of GDP would be generated directly from knowledge-based 
industries (DTMFZPD, 2002). 
 
(v) The per capita share of GDP was targeted to cross the US$23,000 
(Dh84, 410) mark in 2010 (www.uaeinteract.com).  
 
(vi) The gross domestic product (GDP) target for 2010 was set at US$30 
billion (Dh110bn) in 2000 (www.uaeinteract.com).  
 
7.3.3. Dubai Strategic Plan (2015) 
 
Unlike many developing countries, Dubai does not experience the severe 
problem of disjointed socio-economic planning caused by changes in 
governments and senior civil servants who are politically appointed or 
aligned; thus it has been able to ensure that the city's developmental agenda 
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and trajectory has not been interrupted by internal political factors. In this 
environment, Dubai’s third development plan was conceived. 
  
The Dubai Strategic Plan (2015) was launched in 2007 by His Highness   
Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum. The Executive Council, under 
his instructions, developed the Dubai Strategic Plan (DSP) 2015 in 2007. 
The architecture of the developmental plan was formulated around five 
pillars or dimensions: 
 
(i) Economic Development:  
o Adopting of free market economic principles 
o Innovation in launching initiatives 
o Speed and accuracy in project execution  
o Unique relationship and partnership with the private sector 
 
(ii) Social Development  
o Protection of the national identity, culture and the way of life  
o Promoting social justice and equality 
o Openness to the world while maintaining uniqueness 
 
(iii) Security, Justice and Safety 
o Ensuring justice and equality for all 
o Maintaining security and stability  
o Protecting human rights  
 
(iv) Infrastructure, Land and Environment 
o Provision of world class infrastructure designed to suit the 
requirements of all users 
o Preserving the environment with international standards 
 
(v) Public Sector Excellence 
o Transparency 
o Sound financial performance and effectiveness 
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o Development of human resources 
o Working effectively within the  Federal framework 
o Accountability and the development of a result based culture (DSP 
2015:12.13). 
 
The DSP (2015), unlike the two previous strategic plans, contains a social 
development policy component that complements similar national policies at 
the federal level. In addition, “…economic development and diversification 
are cornerstones of the Dubai Strategic Plan 2015, a policy document that 
builds on the emirate’s past successes and charts the course forward for 
this city, which is already the center of business, trade, tourism and finance 
in the region” (Amaskati 2011). The advent of the GFC in 2008/2009 would 
have obliged the Government of Dubai to revisit the DSP 2015 and required 
fundamental changes to its economic targets. 
 
7.3.3.1. Targets of DSP (2007-2015) 
 
A key component of the strategic plan is its economic development goal, with 
three main aims: economic growth, enhanced worker productivity and sector 
development as well as diversification. Clear performance indicators have 
been set in all three, including 11% annual growth in real GDP, increasing 
per capita income to $44,000, increasing worker productivity by 4% a year 
and raising the share of high-skilled jobs in the economy from 20% to 25%, 
to be achieved between the present time and 2015 (Sheikh Mohammed 
2007).  
 
Achieving the GDP growth target will double Dubai’s GDP to $108 billion in 
2015 from $54 billion in 2007, while nearly doubling the current workforce 
to 1.73 million. To achieve this, the plan focuses on six sectors: travel and 
tourism, financial services, professional services, transport and logistics 
services, trade and storage and construction (Sheikh Mohammed 2007). 
Given the historical, patriarchal and rentier nature of the society, Dubai’s 
social policy ideology has created an untenable dependence on the state. 
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7.4. Social Development and Welfare 
7.4.1. Social welfare: 
 
The multi-dimensional nature of development articulates the notion that the 
process must be transformational, both socially and economically. In the 
UAE and Dubai in particular, “….the government has made social growth or 
social welfare one of its major priorities” (Davidson 2005:139).  
 
… Recognizing that even in a prosperous country such as the UAE, there will 
always be vulnerable members of society who need assistance, the 
Government has instituted a comprehensive social welfare system operated 
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The Ministry also makes 
specific allocations to women’s organizations to ensure that all those in 
need, particularly women in rural areas, have access both an economic 
safety-net and to assistance in adapting to a fast changing world (UAE 
Yearbook 2000/1:218).  
 
The development philosophy of the UAE Government has been described as 
follows:  
…since the formation of the federation until today the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) including Dubai has taken every step to ensure all 
needs of Emiratis are met so that they could have a high standard of 
living. As such, the UAE introduced the social security system with 
the establishment of the Federal Law No 13, of 1972; and an 
expansion of the same in accordance with the Social Security Law 
which came into effect in 1977 (Salem 2009).  
 
In July 1999, the Federal National Council approved new legislation 
regulating social security benefits. Under the law, people entitled to monthly 
social benefits include national widows and divorced women, the disabled 
and handicapped, the aged, orphans, single daughters and married 
students (Ibid:218). The Government of UAE regards “…social services 
provisions as a part of social development” (UAE Yearbook 2009:221). Social 
services represent a key pillar that undergirds the effort of the state to 
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enhance prosperity and improvement in the quality of life for each national 
of the UAE.      
 
Consider, for example, the following: Pursuant to the promulgation of 
Federal Law No 2 of 2001, “….monthly assistance was provided to the 
following categories of UAE nationals residing within the UAE: Widows, 
Divorcees, Married Students, children from unknown parents, abandoned 
women” (UAE Yearbooks 2007, 2008, 2009). The DSΡ 2015 launched in 
2007 further entrenches social development as a development strategy of 
Dubai by including “seven core development areas as a means of meeting 
Dubai’s rapidly changing socio-economic environment” (DSP 2015:27). 
According to DSP 2015, the areas include the following: 
 
(i) improved quality of healthcare services and  the health status of the 
population, 
 
(ii) increased national participation in workforce and society,  
 
(iii) ensuring that nationals have access to quality educational  
opportunities,  
 
(iv) enriched cultural environment,  
 
(v) preserving national identity and improve community cohesion, 
 
(vii) ensuring quality social services are provided to meet the needs of the 
community, 
 
(viii) ensuring equality and acceptable working conditions for Dubai’s 
workforce in order to attract and retain the required expertise 
 
Personal observation of the city state combined with formal and informal 
interviews has made it possible for the researcher to readily deduce that a 
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benevolent state, coupled with neo-patriarchal rulers, is the prevailing order 
of the day. The magnitude of state benevolence is discussed in chapter nine.   
 
7.4.2. Education as a development tool 
 
It is frequently argued by social commentators and educators that “… 
education is one of the pillars of societal development, preserving the 
cultural, historical and ideological heritage of a country. Education also 
focuses the public’s attention on local, regional and international issues, 
and is the predominant reason for most states being keen to promote 
education in order to keep pace with modern-day requirements” (ECSSR 
2010). In this context, the GCC has endeavoured to develop education as a 
key role in its strategies for human and economic development and to 
address the imbalance in the GCC’s labour market in line with the 
requirements of indigenous employment and citizens’ expectations (Ibid: 
2010). 
 
In this respect, 
 
….the state [UAE] educational policy as an instrument has included a 
number of basic conceptual directives, which consider education as a key 
factor in development, as well as in achieving stability and national security. 
The document also emphasizes the role of education in developing people's 
capabilities to keep abreast with regional and international changes, 
increasing the suitability of education to national and societal needs- 
especially in linking the educational output with the economic, social and 
cultural development needs, promoting cultural belonging and asserting the 
cultural identity of the educated (MOF & UNDP Abu Dhabi 2007). 
 
The former president and founding father of the UAE, the late Sheikh Zayed 
Bin Al-Nahyan, was quoted in 2010 by the Minister of Higher Education in 
the UAE, High Highness Sheikh Hamdan Bin Mubarak Al Nahayan  saying 
that “…. the best investment is in the people and the best reward you have 
from investment is in education” (UAE Yearbook 2010:196).  
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At the local or emirate level, the DSPs of 1996, 2010 and 2015 have 
supported the UAE’s federal policy of universal access of education to all its 
citizens and residents. Brown (2007) of Bloomberg noted that the UAE 
federal government “provided over 800,000 of its citizens with free 
education.”  In the UAE, “…public schools are free for nationals but can be 
attended by expatriate Arab residents for a low fee. Tertiary education is also 
free for nationals, many of whom choose to attend universities in the United 
States, Europe, Australia and elsewhere.” (Interview 17, 2012; UAE 
Yearbooks 2003; 2004).   
  
The polity of Dubai’s development in education has been regarded as a key 
socio-economic building block, one that allows the country’s youth to 
contribute in a better way to the national economy (Khoury 1980 cited in 
Davidson 2005:139). No wonder Khoury (1980:75) commented that “…the 
UAE does not consider education as a mere public service to be provided to 
its citizens but as a productive investment that yields a return in the 
future.”  
 
As a development strategy, free education is provided by the rentier nature 
of the state, in order to thrust the Dubai and UAE in general into modernity, 
equality, social empowerment and to build a competitive and sustainable 
21st century Arab economy. “UAE (including Dubai) citizens can attend 
federal universities free of charge and generous scholarship funds exist 
through the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and other 
organizations (both private and governmental) to allow UAE citizens to 
pursue higher education at universities abroad” (UAE Yearbook 2010:205). 
For example, “…in 2008, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research awarded 550 scholarships to students wishing to pursue their 
education overseas” (Ibid: 2005). Essentially, education or the development 
of human capital is viewed by the Dubai Government and also at the federal 
level to be one of the drivers and shapers of national sustainable 
development.  
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7.4.3. Housing policy 
 
The creation of a rentier-state infrastructure or architecture in UAE and 
Dubai in particular extends to the formulation of a public housing policy 
which ensures that all Emirati do not lack suitable shelter. Al Kitbi (2011) 
notes that,  
 
“...housing in the UAE occupies a central position in the country's social and 
economic policies and in the leaders' understanding of their social mission. 
This is because shelter, just like food and clothing, is considered a basic 
human right sanctified by local and international covenants. In addition, 
planning a rational housing policy helps in cementing good social relations 
within and between communities and in raising expectations and standards 
of living. Ultimately, a good housing policy assures political stability and a 
secured social order.” 
 
In Dubai, “for social and political reasons, the emphasis has been on 
expanding social services particularly in housing” (Peterson 2009:12). The 
“housing policy in the UAE has three different forms. The first is that of 
providing assistance in the form of loans or grants to nationals who own 
land and wish to build a private home” (Al Kitbi 2011). The second form 
advances interest-free, long-term loans for nationals who can repay them 
and the third provides free housing for low-income nationals (Ibid). 
 
7.4.4. Subsidized petrol, water, electricity and food 
 
The politics of patronage in GCC is disguised as a development strategy and 
extends to the subsidization of the petrol price in Dubai by government oil 
companies (Emarat, EPPCO and Emirates Petroleum). Similarly, water and 
electricity supplied by the Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA) is 
heavily subsidized for the citizens of the city-state, but not for the expatriate 
community in the Emirate. The prices of some food items are controlled by 
the Dubai Economic Department and subsidies are extended to Emiratis at 
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the only retail cooperative in the city, known as Union Cooperative. Petrol 
and pharmaceutical items are two of the areas of the national economy 
where both citizens and residents equally enjoy the benefits and subsidies 
provided by the Dubai Government.  
 
7.4.5. Healthcare policy 
 
Similarly, improved healthcare and a comprehensive welfare system have 
been seen as the necessary foundations for the creation of a healthy and 
happy society in which every individual can vigorously contribute to the 
UAE’s future development (Davidson 2005: 139). External rent from 
overseas investment and from the inanimate resource beneath the soil is 
used, both as an instrument to legitimize the leadership and secondly also 
to act as a national development strategy. Quintessentially, the “rentier 
status, revolving around a social contract between rulers and the ruled, has 
been augmented by...” (al Suwaidi 2011:45) the provision of social service or 
healthcare as a public good.  According to the Dubai Strategic Plan 
(2015:26) “...the public healthcare system provides primary and secondary 
care to both nationals and non-national (expatriates). The Emirati citizens 
are provided with free healthcare, whilst expatriates are charged competitive 
user fees to access similar quality services in the public healthcare 
system…”, in comparison to what is charged by private sector health care 
providers. 
 
There are 26 public hospitals in the UAE with a capacity of almost 4,000 
beds, over 2,000 doctors in all specializations, and over 1,000 public and 
private clinics. Free health coverage is universal for nationals and laws have 
been instituted to ensure mandatory health insurance for non-nationals 
(Ministry of Health Report 2008 cited in al Suwaidi 2011:51). Table 7.1 
depicts the number of public and private hospitals in Dubai alone (including 
Federal hospitals). 
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Table 7.2: Health Facilities in the Emirate of Dubai 
 Name of the hospital Category Number of Beds 
 Dubai Hospital Dubai Government 522 
 Rashid Hospital Dubai Government 652 
 Hatta Hospital Dubai Government N/A 
 Al Wasl Hospital Dubai Government 327 
 Al Makthoum Hospital Dubai Government Planning stage 
 Al Baraha Hospital Federal Government 147 
 Al Amal Hospital Federal Government 80 
 Clinics Private/Governmenr Not Applicable 
 Miscellaneous Private 1218 
Source: Field work and Interview (15, 2012). 
 
All of these health facilities across the city are highly regulated by the Dubai 
Health Authority (DHA) and all meet international standards.  
 
7.4.6. Job creation approach 
 
Rentier states at this time, from the 1950s to the mid-1980s, employed 
much of the population, paid well and almost completely avoided taxation 
(Gray 2011: 8). From personal observation of the United Arab Emirates 
labour market trends and dynamics for Emirati citizens, it is evident that 
“traditional rentier theory, which holds that state oil rents contribute to 
raising unearned household incomes and so reduce incentives among young 
graduates to seek productive employment” (al Khouri 2011), is applicable in 
Dubai. It is the fervent belief of Abdulla (1999:55) that: 
 
“…. a major outlet for dispersing oil revenues is government. Citizens regard 
recruitment in the state apparatus as a legitimate aspiration. Assuming a 
social obligation to ensure the employment of their citizens, governments 
find the easiest route to create large bureaucracies to fulfil such 
aspirations.”  
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In accord with Abdulla’s view, it is the researcher’s direct observation in the 
UAE and Dubai in particular that the Government of Dubai uses the 
employment of its citizens as a development policy that demographically 
constitutes somewhat less than 20% of Dubai’s 2 million population. 
Attendant to being a government policy, guaranteed employment in the 
public sector and or with Government Related Entities (GREs) is one of 
many instruments of economically protecting the indigenous population, 
because the percentage of this population is constantly declining. 
 
7.5. Macro Economic Strategies 
7.5.1. Economic diversification 
 
According to Buamim (2008), “….as Dubai diversified its economy and 
lessened its reliance on its dwindling reserves of oil, new sectors have 
sprung up, helping to grow the emirate’s economy. These include real estate, 
construction, tourism, finance, banking, media, sales and marketing, IT and 
health care.”  Fundamentally, the “...service sectors have become the 
mainstay of the Dubai economic model” (Pradham 2009:11).  
 
According to Buamim (2008), “…as Dubai diversified its economy and 
lessened its reliance on its dwindling reserves of oil, new sectors have 
sprung up, helping to grow the emirate’s economy. These include real estate, 
construction, tourism, finance, banking, media, sales and marketing, IT and 
health care.”  Fundamentally, the “service sectors have become the mainstay 
of the Dubai economic model” (Pradham 2009:11).  
 
As pointed out in the Dubai Vision 2010 strategic plan announced in 2000, 
“…Dubai would have run out of oil by 2010 and thus embarked on a 
comprehensive process of economic diversification.” Arnold (2012) quoting 
Jean-Michel Saliba, a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economist, put 
Dubai’s economic diversification into historical perspective when he noted 
that “Dubai started its diversification process in the 1980s.”  
Furthermore, 
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... Dubai has been investing money into: trade, tourism, logistics, aviation, 
infrastructure and banking and finance, in order to diminish its reliance on 
oil and petrochemical sectors. By virtue of this economic risk minimization 
effort, Dubai has become the epitome model of diversification in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (Calderwood 2007; Pradhan 2009:11; 
www.emirates247.com).  
 
The primacy of Dubai’s economic diversification initiatives is two-fold, based 
on points raised above: the first is to develop a post-oil economy that is 
sustainable and the second is to use diversification as a means of wealth 
creation for socio-economic development purposes. 
 
The Emirate of Dubai has transformed itself during the last thirty five years  
or so into a major international service economy building a significant  
capacity for imports, logistics, maritime and air transport facilities, as well 
as  establishing itself as a regional centre for finance, real estate 
development,  shopping, tourism, exports and re-exports. Indeed, the 
remarkable growth of the Emirate’s economy, whose GDP per capita has 
multiplied by more than tenfold between 1975 and 2008, is testimony to 
this transformation. However, in the emerging landscape of the post-global 
economic crisis, Dubai has been challenged by competition from other 
countries, weaker regional and global demand, and more stringent global 
financial markets (DEC 2011: i). 
 
7.5.2. State led capitalism 
 
The canonical literature on the role of the state in free market capitalism 
points to a disentanglement or disengagement of the state from any form of 
economic participation in the economy (Table 6.0 refers), highlighting the 
traditional role of the state); since “state and capitalism” are diametrically 
opposed to each other, it is paradoxical that both words may be twined 
together. According to Kurlantzick (2012), it has long been the view of neo-
liberalists that state intervention in economic affairs runs contra the 
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established wisdom that the market is for promoting ideas. In light of the 
above, the fundamental question being posed may be stated as: “What is 
regarded as State Capitalism?” 
 
Using practical illustrations, Richter (2011) and Maurer (2010) have noted 
that “….the Gulf states are premier practitioners of state capitalism” and 
that the Emirate of Dubai is the epitome of this.  In reality, the concept is 
more than just another academic catch phrase coined to describe the new 
state’s “economic pragmatism” which “….has emerged as the new type of 
capitalism that is viewed as a challenger to the laissez-faire economics” 
(Kurlantzick 2012); it has become part of development DNA in the emerging 
and developing economies of petro and resource poor states. 
 
(...) State capitalism is a system in which the state functions as the leading 
economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain. This trend has 
stoked a new global competition, not between rival political ideologies but 
between competing economic models. State capitalism has four primary 
actors: national oil corporations, state-owned enterprises, privately owned 
national champions, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) (Bremmer 2009:2).  
A less comprehensive but nonetheless useful definition has been provided 
by Maurer (2010), who stated that state capitalism is “…a system in which 
profit-maximizing state-owned companies operate in ostensibly competitive 
markets.” 
 
The policy of state capitalism, which amounts to state intervention, has 
been used by the Dubai Government, as a “….new path to prosperity” 
(Wittchen 2011). The Government of Dubai has created a number of GREs 
that have allowed the state to adopt a corporatist approach to economic 
development (see Appendix III) that demonstrates the complicated eco-
system of state owned entities. It is important to note that Dubai’s 
corporatist approach endorses significant features of the neo-liberal 
paradigm or free market capitalism. 
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As pointed out, 
 
“....the state’s investments run through three holding companies: Dubai 
Holding, Dubai World, and the Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD). 
Sheikh Maktoum directly owns Dubai Holding, while the latter two are 
formally owned by the Government of Dubai … of whom Sheikh Maktoum is 
the absolute ruler. All three holding companies have real estate arms 
charged with developing land granted to them by the emirate. ICD’s Emaar 
Properties developed the Burj Khalifa, while Nakheel created the offshore 
Palm and World developments on reclaimed land” (Maurer 2010). 
 
State capitalism has been associated with developmental state theory as one 
of the ways of explaining the economic success of the Asian Tigers, Brazil, 
China and Ireland as well as late “industrializers”.  This includes the UAE 
and Dubai in particular that, as noted, positions itself as a 21st century 
knowledge based economy (KBE). State capitalism in Dubai and elsewhere 
cannot and should not be viewed or analyzed within the annals of regional 
political economy and/or development discourse as a political ideology, but 
instead, as a development strategy in what Chachage (1987) termed “…the 
inherited states or the bourgeois colonial state.” As is customary with 
developmental states in theory and practice, the Government of Dubai and 
the UAE in general have embarked on a policy path to promote pro-business 
environment, which is discussed below.   
 
7.5.3. Business friendly environment  
 
Neo-liberalism or free market capitalism tends to thrive in an environment 
that is regarded as business friendly or pro-business. The AGS  including  
Dubai in their “…quest to ‘catch-up’ and achieve economic development 
during and subsequent to its humiliating encounter with the West” 
(Mkandawire 2011:1) has led the Government of Dubai to design policies 
that are attractive to small and large businesses alike  to invest in the city-
state. 
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(…) The secret of Dubai's success is that the city-state has succeeded in 
building a friendly business environment that fulfils the needs of 
investors, through the creation of distinguished facilities, such as 
complete income and company tax exemption, and through provision of a 
highly efficient technological structure, professional services and service 
facilities to cater to the needs of investors and their families (HH Sheikh 
Mohammad quoted in the Daily Gulf Newspaper November 10, 2009). 
 
Pradham (2009:11) and Juma Al Majid, chairman of the Dubai Economic 
Council, indicate implicit support for the above statement when they are 
quoted by Bittar (2010:30) as stating that “…the enigma called the Dubai 
Inc – the Wall Street of the Gulf and one of the secrets of Dubai’s success 
behind the city's growth is openness towards global markets where Asian, 
European and American commodities can enter Dubai without constraints.” 
Similarly, the relaxed rules apply to Dubai’s free trade zones that remove the 
barriers which usually discourage multi-nationals from setting up 
operations in a developing country and have transformed Dubai into a 
template of success (Al Fahim 2009).  
 
The sociology of Dubai’s business-friendly polices has demonstrated a 
symbiotic relationship between government and business/the private sector; 
against this background Gupta (2005) noted that “….governments cannot 
hope for development without businesses, and businesses needs 
governments to be successful.” In suррort of this view, Sampler and Eigner 
(2008:138) emphatically state that “….the Dubai business community 
cannot live without government and government without the business 
community.” The congeniality of Dubai’s pro-business, liberal, macro-
economic environment is reflected in the words of the Crown Prince of 
Dubai, Sheikh Hamdan, at the Global Agenda Summit in Dubai in 2009: 
….The policies of Dubai are neither rigid nor complicated. They are 
transparent and flexible. They adapt to changes witnessed all over the world. 
The flexibility of those polices helped the emirate of Dubai become in a short 
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span of time a global hub for business, aviation and tourism (Gulf News 
2009).   
 
In summary, Dubai, either inadvertently, or by careful economic planning, 
has embedded the fundamentals and tenets of neo-liberalism within its 
internally orchestrated pro-business environment development strategies. 
An epistemological analysis of Dubai’s macro-economic framework would 
reveal that the emirate’s pro-business or capitalistic oriented policies have 
been deeply entrenched in its development planning since the 1900s and 
have helped to transform the tiny city state of Dubai into a prosperous 
sheikhdom and a safe haven for investors and proponents of free market 
capitalism. Fundamentally, Dubai uses “….public policy for the private 
sector” (World Bank 2002: ii) development, which by extension creates 
sustainable socio-economic activities. Dubai’s pro-business policies, stable 
macro-economic framework, and functional state created institutions that 
are geared towards the attraction of foreign direct investments bear the 
hallmark of a developmental state.  
 
7.5.4. Developmentalism 
 
In undertaking the arduous task of governing a nation, governments are 
faced with the unenviable task of crafting appropriate policies, programmes 
and projects to meet the development needs of their people. 
Developmentalism is one such development strategy that governments have 
adopted globally. The concept  
 
...has been used in different contexts to describe a developing state’s 
commitment to an ideology of rapid economic development. The specific 
policies of developmentalism vary across time and space. For eg.[sic] East 
Asians’ capitalist developmentalism of the 1960s, 1970’s, and 1980s looked 
to export-oriented production with simultaneous protection of domestic 
markets and firms by a strong activist state (Gallagher 2007:7).  
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Murakami (1992 cited in Abe 2006:6) defines developmentalism as a 
political and economic system based on nationalism, which tends to limit 
parliamentary democracy. However, within the context of Dubai 
“…developmentalism is a national project of development, centred on social 
and economic modernization” (Nilsen 2011). As mentioned earlier, the socio-
economic modernization of the emirate was initiated in 1833 when modern 
Dubai is said to have begun. Since then structural composition of the local 
economy has transitioned from one of subsistence-type agriculture, fishing 
and pearl trading, into one that is fully integrated into the global economic 
system. The economic structural change in the Dubai economy has been 
facilitated by a pro-active, cautiously neoliberal capitalistic “…state that 
assists in the birth and growth of domestic, national firms through its role 
as ‘midwife’ of new firms and sectors and by tending to the husbandry” of 
these growing industries (Evan 1985 cited by O’Riain 2000:163). 
 
Following neither the Washington Consensus nor the Santiago Consensus, 
the Government of Dubai has embraced a more eclectic, statist model which 
is based on significant state intervention. Dubai’s “capitalist 
developmentalism” (Gallagher 2007:7) policies and approach have been well 
integrated and articulated in the development plans of DSP 1996 (1996-
2000), Vision 2010 (2000-2010) and DSP 2015 (2007-2015). Through 
utilising these plans, the state has become the primary driver of socio-
economic development initiatives where the emphasis is on rapid socio-
economic transformation of the economy; clear growth trajectory; 
structurally reforming the economy from being an extractive primary 
producer to a service driven economy.  
 
Dubai’s model is “…built on active and large foreign participation in the 
domestic economy” (Gallagher 2007:7), through the attraction of foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) and a large army of migrant or guest workers 
(skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled). In a seminal piece of scholarly work by 
Davidson (2005) he made an observation, not yet fully explored, about 
Dubai’s political economy: that the Government of Dubai had adopted 
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“…limited import substitution industrialization policies” similar to what 
“some Latin American countries did in 1950, to the 1970s” (Gallagher 
2007:6-7). Dubai’s capitalist developmentalism falls within the remit of a 
developmental state’s modus operandi that engenders in Dubai a doctrine or 
philosophy of urgency, a pragmatic enunciation and a can do approach to 
national development. In addition, the Dubai state, “….assists in the birth 
and growth of its domestic enterprises, through its roles as ‘midwife’ of new 
businesses and sectors and by tending to the ‘husbandry’ of these growing 
industries (Evan 1985 cited by O’Riain 2000:163).  
 
Developmentalism in Dubai goes far in answering the second research 
question. Is there a strong correlation between the state involvement and 
development in Dubai? As has been observed from the real estate and 
infrastructural development bubble in Dubai between 2004 and 2008, 
rentier-ism and state development is an expensive venture, requiring 
substantial capital and re-occurring expenditures. These issues are dealt 
with in the section below.  
 
7.5.5. Financing the developmental model 
 
The RDC state model that forms the theoretical framework of this thesis 
articulates the fact that “the role of the state went well beyond merely 
gathering information and upgrading infrastructure” (O’Rain, 2000:166). 
The Dubai Government, and its complicated web of commercially oriented 
GREs, “were the major providers of funding” (O’Rain 2000:166) of “Dubai 
Incorporated or Dubai Inc” until the advent of the global financial crisis in 
2008 when the Government was obliged to temporarily discontinue its 
seemingly endless series of mega-projects. 
 
State control of finance was the linchpin of the developmental state, followed 
by labour relations, and the autonomy of the economic bureaucracy (Ng 
2008). The emirate of Dubai is not dissimilar to other democratic and non-
democratic nation-states that pursued a developmentalist agenda: 
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(....)  Finance is the tie that binds the state to the industrialist. The 16th 
Century French jurist Jearn Bodin called finance, the 'nerves' of the state. 
Johnson’s essay on Economic Policies in Japan and South Korea and 
Taiwan argues that the state’s control of finance was the most important, if 
not the defining aspect of the developmental state (Woo-Cummings 1999:10).  
 
The continually growing, intricate eco-system of GREs in Dubai has used 
skilful pragmatism and the availability of financial resources on the 
international capital market coupled with the extraction of rent from the 
businesses, residents and profits generated from non-productive business 
activities to finance Dubai’s transformation. 
 
7.5.6. Property led growth 
 
Development strategies have usually focused on rapid urban 
industrialization (Tordaro 2000:14), when countries and city-states around 
the world use urbanization as the linchpin to national development policies 
and plans, and Dubai is no exception to this.  Subsequent to previous urban 
development plans dating back to the 1900s, “…in the early 1990s, the 
government commissioned the Dubai Urban Area Strategic Plan 1993–2012 
to guide the economic and physical development of the city into the twenty-
first century” (Pacione, 2005: 260). Amongst the “….key challenges that had 
to be addressed by the Dubai Urban Strategic Plan was the accommodation 
of urban expansion by allocating additional land in a phased planned 
process to meet current and future needs for residential, industrial and 
commercial uses” (Ibid:260). Figure 7.1, below, provides an aerial view of 
Dubai’s rapid urban expansion which forms part of the city’s socio-economic 
transformation.  
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Figure 7.2: Spatial and urban development in downtown Dubai 
 
Source: Aerial view of the Dubai Marina/Jumeirah Beach project construction (photo 
courtesy of Brent Boden)  
 
 
From the 1990s up to 2008 (and prior to the global financial crisis), Dubai 
adopted a property-led approach as part of its cartography of development 
strategies. This approach has been used by the Government to spatially 
create comparative and competitive advantages for semi-industrial, 
knowledge oriented and technological activities. The focus of the 
government’s policy, especially during the decade leading up to 2008, was to 
place an emphasis on the development of urban residential and commercial 
properties. Property-led development was a deliberate and attractive model 
to the Government of Dubai as a means of promoting economic growth via 
the SOEs. The “Dubai Model” is underpinned by the mantra or concept of 
“build it and they will come” according to Dairabayeva (2009:1). There is 
credence for this notion, as empirical evidence would reveal if a meta-
analysis of the plethora of new communities developed during the period of 
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time on which the research is based were to be undertaken (see Appendix 
VIII). The spatial transformation of the city was undertaken primarily by the 
‘big four’ real estate developers (SOEs); Emaar, Dubai Properties, Damac 
and Nakheel.   
 
Real estate investment is a key contributor to economic growth, household 
welfare and urban development. Construction is one of the sectors with the 
most impact on an economy, according to Hassller (2011:3). It may thus, be 
argued that the Government of Dubai fully understands the social and 
economic ramifications of having a viable construction sector, given the 
significance of the construction industry to spatial development and the 
national welfare of the society as a whole.  
 
7.5.7. Creating institutional structures 
 
The post-Britannia era of the newly formed UAE was characterized by 
underdevelopment of the desert kingdom of the emirates; coupled with a 
lack of economic, cultural, social and political institutions that would serve 
to form the pillars of a strong and stable society and by extension, the 
national economy. A senior economic advisor at the Dubai Economic Council, 
noted, “…that one of the major deficiencies of the Dubai economic journey 
was the lack of sufficient modern public sector institutions in the emirate in 
the 1970s to the 1990s to document Dubai’s socio-economic development 
trajectory” (Interview 18, 20012). This is contrary to the position espoused 
by Okwuchukwu (2011) when he stated “…that strong institutions are 
required for service delivery, government efficiency, strong policy and 
programme implementation.”  
 
Development is no longer seen primarily as a process of capital 
accumulation, but rather as a process of organizational change (Hoff & 
Stiglitz 1998: 389). Social and economic “…transformation cannot take place 
in an institutional vacuum, as savers, investors, consumers, entrepreneurs, 
workers and risk-takers of all kinds need a framework of rules if rational, 
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optimizing decisions are to be made. They also need some guarantee of 
economic stability and certainty, which can be provided only by good 
governance and sound economic policy-making” 
(http://www.palgrave.com/PDFs/9780230222298.pdf). A close analysis of 
Dubai’s exponential transformation into an internationally renowned city 
indicates that this did not take place without the creation of needed 
institutional frameworks, the drivers of the city’s ambitious development 
plans of 1996, 2000 and 2015. 
 
According to Nasra and Dacin (2009:584-585),  
 
...Dubai’s current prosperity and attractiveness are the outcomes of key 
decisions that its rulers took during important historical events and 
junctures. The state not only exploits opportunities for entrepreneurial 
action but also acts as an institutional entrepreneur, by building the 
necessary institutional infrastructure to attract international entrepreneurs. 
 
Quality institutions, as noted by North (1990), play “…a fundamental role 
for institutions in societies: they are the underlying determinants of the 
long-run performance of economies – Third World countries are poor 
because the institutional constraints define a set of pay-offs to 
political/economic activities that do not encourage productive activity.” 
Development, as described in chapter five, as an integrated holistic 
approach, invariably includes the need for a:  
 
“…quest to build sustainable and strong institutions, as strong institutions 
are required for service delivery, government efficiency, strong policy and 
programme implementation. We also need to build capacity divorced from 
our individual, regional, religious and personal aggrandizement in order to 
encourage public and private sector sustenance. We cannot grow or achieve 
much if we depend on individual genius and personality cult and passion to 
run our public institutions” (Okwuchukwu 2011). 
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The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 has shown proponents of the 
Washington Consensus agenda that a “...government is the major 
stakeholder in the national economy and so any absence of its authority 
may jeopardize the people's interests” (El Mouloudi 2010). Similarly, the 
Dubai Government recognized that the successful implementation of 
Dubai’s Development Strategies, Programmes and Projects is contingent on 
the modernization and creation of a new 21st century type public sector. 
Thus, the notion of “‘instrumental rationality’” where institutions are 
unnecessary would not be applicable in the growth of a new nation state 
that is bereft of social, political and economic institutions.   
 
7.6. Free-zones and cluster development:  
 
The GCC region and UAE are significantly dependent on oil and gas. 
However, Dubai is a small producer of natural resources, and expects to run 
out of oil in less than a decade. Consequently, Dubai’s government took 
actions to shift its economy away from oil to a modern economy dominated 
by trade, tourism, real estate, and finance (Zumbach 2010:39). The Dubai 
Government “….has embraced Michael Porter’s cluster model as an 
analytical concept and economic development tool” (Centonze 2010:251-
252), as a clear and formidable component in its development strategy 
framework.  The city-state has “invested heavily and successfully 
implemented cluster development that has been eminently proven by the 
likes of Silicon Valley” (Orchard 2005; Qadir 2005). Field work carried out by 
the researcher between the years 2009 and 2012, based on regular visits to 
a number of these clusters, provides proof of the above economic strategy 
and its success.  
 
Dubai has concentrated on developing “…market clusters as a way of 
enhancing economic growth. It concentrates on developing industries where 
it can gain a competitive advantage. Other countries have adopted this 
strategy for many years and Silicon Valley in California is probably the most 
famous example” (Wilkins 2002:5). Regarding the cluster approach model, 
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via Dubai’s 26 free-zones:  the “…first model is based on attracting foreign 
investment and attempting to embed it in the local economy, and the second 
model which is a more recent model is based on the growth of indigenous 
businesses” (O’Rian 2000:160).   
 
In terms of an academic definition, Porter (2000, cited in Centonze 
2010:252) defines clusters as “geographical concentrations of interconnected 
companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related 
industries and associated institutions (e.g. universities, standards, agencies, 
trade associations) in a particular field that compete but also co-operate.” As 
a socio-economic development strategy, cluster development in Dubai seeks 
to achieve a number of objectives, including:  
 
(i) diversification of the economy, away from its dwindling oil reserves 
(ii) creating employment for its citizens in the private sector which will 
ultimately reduce the public sector wage expenditures  
(iii) increasing regional and global competitiveness  
(iv) fostering and developing a sustainable non-oil hydro economy,  
(vi) developing a multi-faceted/sector economic hub in a region beset 
by socio-political uncertainty an turmoil  
(vii) attracting foreign direct investments  
(viii) the aim of expanding the economic landscape for the private 
sector players in the domestic economy.  
As part of a broader spatial development strategic framework, the following 
free-zone clusters were formed across Dubai. At the time of writing, there 
are 26 free-zones in Dubai alone. Examples and details of some of the 
flagship clusters are described below:  
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7.6.1. Typology of clusters in Dubai 
7.6.1.1. Tourism cluster 
 
Tourism is a significant factor in the Dubai economy, both in terms of 
employment and of GDP, with many of the goods and services consumed by 
tourists also being used by the general population. Dubai has developed a 
strong tourism cluster that has been able to grow revenue (DEC 2009: 74). 
In addition to the many hotels owned by GREs, the Department of Tourism, 
and Commerce Marketing was established in 1997 as a precursor to the 
subsequent tourism related initiatives (such as Dubai Summer Surprises, 
Global Village, Dubai Shopping Festivals and a wide range of other events 
geared at attracting tourists to the city). 
 
7.6.1.2. Dubai Silicon Oasis Authority  
 
The Dubai Silicon Oasis (DSO) is one of the many free-zones established in 
Dubai since the 1980s. It forms part of the wider socio-economic 
development strategy of Dubai aimed at facilitating the diversification 
process of the city-state’s economy. “Established in 2004, the Dubai Silicon 
Oasis Authority (DSOA) is wholly owned by the Government of Dubai and is 
considered the only technology park in the region that provides both a living 
and working integrated community. Silicon Oasis is a Free Zone Authority 
and provides a full package of a free zone incentives and benefits to 
companies operating within the tech park” 
(http://www.uaefreezones.com/fz_silicon_oasis.html). Qadir (2005) points 
out that the 
 
… DSO represents a high point of Dubai’s transition towards a knowledge 
economy. Silicon Oasis hopes to give Dubai a role in intellectual property 
development in semiconductor technology in partnership with industry 
leader Intel. The project envisages an incubation facility for technology 
innovations on the Arab world’s most ambitious plan to bridge the digital 
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divide. All this is in addition to projects like Internet City and Media City, 
whose growth as a cluster development has exceeded all initial expectations. 
 
Dubai’s Silicon Oasis (DSO) spans 7.2 square kilometres, enjoying one of the 
most developed infrastructures in the region. The Authority has injected a 
large capital investment into its infrastructure to cater to the need of high 
tech industries in the free-zone; this ranges from advanced 
telecommunications to a fiber optic network 
(http://www.uaefreezones.com/fz_silicon_oasis.html).  
 
7.6.1.3. Dubai Knowledge Village (DKV) - TECOM 
 
The PKY (2009) Report states that “the Dubai Knowledge Village was formed 
under Law No. 1 of 2000 of the Emirate of Dubai. DKV is set up to position 
the Dubai Technology and Media Free Zone as a center of excellence for 
learning and innovation. This new education and training hub is also set up 
to complement the Free Zone’s other two clusters: Dubai Internet City as IT 
hub and Dubai Media City as Media.”  
 
7.6.1.4. Dubai Logistics City 
 
This forms part of the Dubai logistics cluster. The Dubai Economic Council’s 
Report of 2009 states that: 
 
“…. Dubai has developed a dynamic logistics cluster that is playing a 
central role in the Europe-Asia-Africa trade while also serving as a regional 
trade hub and facilitating the increasing imports to the growing local 
market. The cluster’s ability to connect world-class air and seaport 
capabilities has made Dubai a central location for trade flows that benefit 
from the mix of different transport modes” (DEC 2009: 54). 
 
Dubai Logistics City (DLC) is the world's first truly integrated logistics 
platform, with all transport modes, logistics and value added services, 
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including light manufacturing and assembly, in a single customs bonded 
and Free Zone environment  
(http://www.uaefreezones.com/fz_silicon_oasis.html).  
 
7.6.1.5. Dubai Technology, E-commerce & Media Free Zone Authority 
 
In recognition of the huge commercial potential of the world wide web, the 
Dubai Technology, E-commerce, and Media Free Zone (TECOM) was 
incorporated in 2000 under the guidance of HH General Sheikh Mohammed 
bin Rashid Al Maktoum (Al Tammimi 2006:111). Within the TECOM Zone 
the Dubai Internet City (DIC) operates as the world’s first free trade zone for 
e-commerce. Similarly, the Dubai Media City, Dubai Healthcare City 
(DHCC), Dubai, Knowledge Village, and International Media Production fall 
under the TECOM Authority (Al Tammimi 2006:111; www.uaefreezone.com).  
 
7.6.1.6. Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) 
 
The DIFC is the world's newest international financial centre and represents 
Dubai’s efforts to further develop and strengthen its ambitious financial 
cluster (Bhatti et al. 2006:5). “….It aims to develop the same stature as New 
York, London and Hong Kong, primarily serving the vast region between 
Western Europe and East Asia” (www.uaefreezone.com).  
 
Furthermore: 
 
.… Pursuant to Federal Law No. 8, establishing the basis for Financial Free 
Zones throughout the United Arab Emirate in 2004, the Government of 
Dubai enacted Dubai Law No. 12 that established the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC) Judicial Authority and the DIFC Court System. The 
law guarantees the independent administration of justice in the DIFC 
(Augustine 2009).  
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The DIFC is playing a pivotal role bolstering the economic climate of the city, 
which is one of the central tenets that have been encapsulated in the DSP 
2015.  
 
“…The DIFC is a regional capital market and has been designated as a state-
run, financial free-trade zone. Its mission is to be a globally-recognized 
financial centre and a catalyst for regional economic growth, development 
and diversification. The DIFC has positioned Dubai as an international 
investment hub in the global financial community between Tokyo, Hong 
Kong and Singapore in the Far East, and Frankfurt and London in Europe, 
to capitalize on its time zone advantage” (Bhatti et al. 2006:5). 
 
As a development strategy the Dubai Government uses the DIFC in the 
context, to create a legal entity and jurisdiction subject to British common 
law within the boundaries of the emirate of Dubai and the nation-state of 
the United Arab Emirates, a “country within a country” (Strong & Himber 
2009:38). The DIFC as a free-zone is multidimensional in its strategic intent 
and objectives. However, Strong and Himber (2009:38) observe that:  
 
“… Dubai’s explicit creation of a sovereign enclave within a sovereign state 
sets the precedent for decision-makers (be they political leaders, key 
influencers or the electorates) in other nation-states to realize that prosperity 
can be achieved by means of the credible establishment of existing world-
class legal systems within geographically-bounded free zones; it could 
precipitate an effective movement ameliorating global poverty.”   
 
The strategic intent and pragmatic operations of the DIFC fit into the dual 
theoretical construct of the developmental and competition state paradigms. 
Firstly, because “in a developmental state, government leads a strong, 
concerted drive for economic growth, ensuring the mobilization of resources 
for economic growth (Levin 2008:7 cited in Mahada 2011:3) and secondly, 
the competition state paradigm as enunciated by Fougner  is understood to 
be a state geared towards international competitiveness (2006:165). Thurow  
(1992, cited in Soederberg 2009: 88) noted that “….there is a shift from 
202 
 
comparative advantage based on natural resource endowments and factor 
proportions (i.e. capital labour ratios) to  competitive advantage based on so-
called ‘brain-power’ industries.” 
 
7.7. Shift from macro-economic to micro-economic management 
 
Prudent public policy dictates that as the Dubai Government, and the 
Federal Government by extension, achieves its macro socio-economic 
objectives, it also focuses on micro-economic intervention policies via what 
is known as state capitalism, discussed above. Dubai is obliged, of 
necessity, to focus on micro economic policies and governance as a 
development strategy, given that it has ceded its fiscal and monetary policy 
planning authority to the Federal Government.   
 
As with other competition states, the Government of Dubai is an activist 
state that has become a major investor in a number of local companies 
(chapter ten refers, with regard to state entrepreneurialism as a matter of 
public policy for developmental reasons). Essentially, this is one way of 
compensating for the small indigenous private sector at the local level and of 
simultaneously de-leveraging the power of transnational corporations in the 
economy. State capitalism, interventionism and activism extend to the 
Government of Dubai, initiating and being involved in a number of 
commercial initiatives and entities of such some examples include: Emirates 
Airlines, Dubai Disneyland, Palm Jabel Ail, the Palm Islands, and Emirates 
National Oil Company (ENOC).  
 
Another, related pillar of micro-economic intervention (Soederberg 2009: 85) 
is the nationalization of the labour force; a social policy initiative aimed at 
weaning the society off “welfarism” to workfare (Ibid: 85). While this micro- 
intervention in the economy might not be warranted in other societies, in 
Dubai, however, the demographic profile and labour market dynamics 
necessitate state intervention to bring about equity and balance in the 
domestic labour market.  
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The string of development strategies outlined in this chapter so far is 
reflective of the development priorities of the society and by extension, the 
dictates of the global market place as is evidenced by the deepening process 
of economic globalization. The AGS, including the UAE, is regarded as a net 
exporter of capital and remittances due to the make-up of Dubai’s (and the 
UAE’s) labour market (chapter eight refers), and thus, in order to “….reverse 
capital flight, the government has undertaken a series of deregulation efforts 
(i.e. removing regulations that impede the entry of foreign firms or restrict 
competition) and property reform measures” (Soederberg 2009: 84). 
Examples of this are found in such matters as the aforementioned creation 
of special economic zones (SEZs) known as free-zones (see Appendix IV) and 
through “…Law No, 7 passed in 2005 by the ruler of Dubai which legalized 
freehold ownership of land and property for non-GCC expatriates” (Kumar 
2012, May 10). Proponents of the Washington Consensus and neo-liberalists 
enjoyed a morale boosting moment when the Government of Dubai partially 
liberalized the real estate market. 
 
7.8. Conclusion 
 
The socio-economic, cultural and political history of the Dubai state is 
important in understanding its functions and relationship with the citizenry 
of the emirate. In addition, since the formation of the UAE there has been a 
sub-fusion of the “Dubai state” into the super-state of the UAE; political, 
economic and policy implications accompany such subjugation, of limited 
sovereignty to an over-arching super-state. On the surface, Dubai, based on 
the rentier tendencies of the super-state described above, is often described 
as being a pure rentier state; however, the Government (through the 
monarchy) has always been a major player in the socio-economic 
development of Dubai.  
 
However, unfortunately the emphasis has been on Arab autocratic 
governance, lack of human rights, the need for western style democratic 
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ideals, and regime change in some states; as opposed to contextualizing the 
development journey within development studies discourse. 
 
The Government of Dubai used a typology of unique development strategies 
that transcend any single conventional development paradigm to attack the 
ills of underdevelopment that were prevalent during the era of the presence 
of Europeans and in the immediate period of their departure from the former 
Trucial states. The hybrid model described in chapter six and earlier in this 
chapter, aims to fundamentally prevent what MсNamara (1980) cited by 
Keeton (1984:290) called the “self-perpetuating plight of the absolute poor 
that tended to cut them off from economic progress that has taken place 
other societies.”   
 
Dubai has transformed itself into one of the world’s pre-eminent commercial 
hubs; its success is built on a number of foundations along with the crafting 
of an unprecedented developmental agenda in the Arab world by the 
Government of Dubai which was born out of necessity. According to a long 
time resident and businessman in Dubai, “…the government had to pursue 
an agenda that would inevitably make Dubai a force to be reckoned with in 
the region, given that the city is surrounded by hostile neighbours who have 
territorial expansionary ambitions” (Interview 1, 2009). The city will not be 
able to sustain the social and economic progress it has made between 1998 
and 2008; unless it has been able to holistically develop its’ human capital. 
The next chapter delves into the need for human resources development in 
the UAE.    
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 Chapter Eight: 
Emiratization and National Development 
We shall be following the plan that aims at training nationals so as to raise them to a level of 
efficiency and capability that would qualify them to meet their responsibilities in fully 
running national wealth. (Sheikh Al-Nahyan). 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The social and macro-economic development of the UAE and Dubai in 
particular cannot be divorced from the demographic make-up of its labour 
force. This is central to the development trajectory of the society; given that 
there is a serious shortage of the indigenous skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour supply needed to satisfy the growing need for manpower to 
run Dubai’s mega-projects and expanding public sector. The architecture of 
national development policies and strategies is premised on the utilization of 
a large army of expatriate workers which forms a labour force from over 150 
countries: ranging from domestic workers to Chief Exectives Officers of 
MNCs, through to committee members involved in economic strategising in 
federal government.  
 
Nationalizing the labour force of the UAE has its genealogical roots in the 
socio-economic realignment of all the economies of the GCC states and the 
UAE, including Dubai. Tectonic shifts of the demographics have occurred 
due to the frenetic pace at which petro-dollars were used to transform the 
once backward economies of the Arabian Gulf. These shifts have culminated 
in a demographic imbalance where expatriates far outnumber the local 
Emirati population. The impact of these dramatic shifts has attracted the 
label “minority state” to describe the UAE and other GCC countries.     
 
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the literature which addresses 
the process of labour market nationalization or localization, properly known 
in this context as Emiratization (Tawtin), and also to answer the research 
question highlighted in Chapter one, Section 1.2.1: “…how did Dubai protect 
and empower its minority population in the process of national 
development?” In addition, this chapter addresses the rationale for 
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nationalization or Emiratisation of the UAE domestic labour market 
amongst other thematic issues.   
 
The chapter is made up of nine sections: 8.1 Liberal labour market and the 
dependence on foreign labour; 8.2 What is Emiratisation and what are its 
aims?; 8.3 Emiratization policy framework; 8.4 Institutional reform; 8.5 
Emiratization strategies; 8.6 Environmental drives of Emiratization; 8.7 
Expatriate workers’ contribution to the UAE’s development; 8.8 Constraints 
and challenges. Section 8.9 concludes with a summation of the issues raised 
and elucidated.   
 
8.2. Liberal labour markets and their dependence on foreign labour 
 
GCC labour markets are unique in their dependence on expatriate labour 
(Forstenlechner 2009:135). Concurring with this statement, Mohamed 
(2002) cited in Al-Waqfi & Forstenlechner (2010: 364-365) writes the 
following: 
 
“...The shortage of local labour, when rapid economic development started 
with the arrival of oil exploration around 40 years ago, has induced 
governments in the GCC region to adopt a liberal policy with regard to the 
influx of foreign workers into these countries. In order to facilitate the 
undertaking of major infrastructure projects and to support the growth and 
development of local businesses – despite the shortage in local labour – 
employers have been allowed to freely recruit foreign workers with limited 
government intervention. In the case of the United Arab Emirates, the 
current expatriate majority can be seen as a direct result of ambitious 
development plans to transform the country into a regional economic 
power.”  
 
To support the country’s socio-economic development strategies, “…the 
emirates’ open economic policy has long encouraged multinational 
corporations and their laissez-faire employment practices. Thus, expatriates 
have a high profile in the UAE labour market; overwhelmingly so in the 
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private sector” (Al-Ali 2007:367). This liberal approach is similar to the 
practice of other states within the GCC and Singapore.  
 
In essence, the socio-economic framework within which the labour market of 
the UAE, including Dubai, operates enjoys some theoretical similarities with 
the neo-liberal development paradigm of 1990s. It is necessary to note that 
the governments of the GCC states, including the UAE, arising out of their 
own need to survive economically, were obliged to purse a liberal and open-
door labour market policy. The uniqueness of the UAE’s labour market 
conundrum is captured by Birks and Sinclair (1980:72) who noted that “the 
UAE is perhaps the best example of a capital-rich state suffering from 
severely limited indigenous human resources.” To use other words, 
proponents of the neo-classical economics theory describe this situation as 
occurring when “…international migration is caused on a macro-level by 
geographical differences in the supply and demand of labour” (Massey et al. 
1998: 434).  
 
The UAE and Dubai in particular quintessentially represents a classic 
example of a capital-rich country that is from a shortage of indigenous 
human resources; thus the city has become highly dependent on a large 
contingent of expatriate labour for over four decades. It is therefore 
unsurprising that Ulrichsen (2011) cited in Forstenlechner and Rutledge 
(2012) commented that “….no other region in the world is so directly and 
continually reliant upon such high ratios of ‘temporary’ non-national labor. 
While we will contend that this relationship has, for the most part, been 
mutually beneficial, it is currently, perhaps more than ever before, also 
giving rise to an array of genuinely felt concerns.”  
 
Coury and Lahouel (2010:3) as well as other sources (including the 2005 
census), note that the UAE “….workforce originates predominantly from 
countries in East Asia and the Middle East and comprises mostly unskilled 
workers.” The over-reliance on expatriate labour is deeply embedded in the 
socio-economic and political colonial history of the former Trucial states that 
208 
 
became the UAE. Davidson (2005: 120) concurs: “….the economic structure 
of most Arab economies had become more externally oriented than that of 
any other group of countries in the developing world.” In examining this 
issue, a deeper analysis of the demographical profile of the labour market is 
carried out in Section 8.2.2.  
 
The labour market of the GCC and the UAE in particular, may be 
characterized as being two tiered and bifurcated; with the expatriate workers 
and the economically active indigenous population comprising the labour 
market of the UAE. However, the two tiers are governed by seemingly 
different sets of regulations.  Girgis (2002:28) emphasizes this point when he 
clarifies that… 
 
….duality in the GCC and the UAE in particular takes different forms. To 
illustrate, a dual labor market is established when government policies 
insure that clear preferences are made for hiring nationals with limited 
quotas imposed on hiring/retaining expatriates. Generally in the GCC, a 
dual labor market situation emerged over time and reflected each nation's 
attempt to deal with labor scarcities and national priorities during a period 
of rapid growth. 
 
Girgis’ explanation describes the attempted nationalization of the UAE 
labour market. The desire to Emiratize the UAE labour force is supported by 
a Federal Labour Law of 1980 and subsequent amendments, all of which go 
to the core of a creating a two-tiered structure or duality in the labour 
market.  
 
8.2.1. Evolving UAE labour policies 
 
Labour economics experts and literature have consistently mooted the view 
that economic transformation is partly dependent on labour market 
regulations and the quality of the institutions. Thus, at a federal level there 
has been a variety of initiatives prior to and subsequent to the formation of 
the UAE as a federal state in 1971. Below is a list of selected initiatives 
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undertaken by the federal government as opposed to individual emirate 
governments, given that labour matters fall within the domain of the federal 
government, as constitutionally enshrined.   
 
Table 8.1: Chronology of labour policy in the UAE 
Year Events 
1972  The Civil Service Council decided that first preference in 
hiring would be given to UAE citizens and then to nationals 
of other Arab countries. 
1980  Sheikh Zayed issued the Federal Labour Law. 
1990  Government introduced a job-creation plan aiming at 
placing 700 jobs for nationals annually. 
1992  Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry set up the 
Emiratisation Council. 
 
 Vocational School opened at Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
1993  Council of Ministers decided to introduce the annual 5% 
Emiratisation quota system to the insurance sector. 
 Debate over Emiratisation in banking sector started in the 
Federal Government body. 
 Some universities started career fairs. 
1996  UAE became a member of WTO. 
 FNC recommended the setting up of a supreme board for the 
appointment of UAE citizens and to follow up on national 
manpower. 
1997  Committee for Human Resources Development in the 
Banking Sector (CHRDB) set up. 
1999  National Human Resource Development and Employment 
Authority (TANMIA) set up. 
2002  UAE government ratified a part of the treaties of 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
2004  Council of Ministers decision No. 1/259 of 2004 obligates 
2% Emiratisation quota in the private sector (trade 
company) . 
2005  Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs ordered its decisions 
No. 41 (2 % Emiratisation quota to trade company), No. 42 
(5% Emiratisation quota to insurance company), and No. 43 
(4% Emiratisation quota to bank). 
2006  Dubai government set up Emirates National Development 
Program (ENDP). 
 Complete Emiratisation of Public relations officer (PRO), 
secretarial and personnel affairs positions. 
2007  Emirates Foundation set up Emiratisation programme 
‘Tawteen.’ 
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 UAE government announced ‘UAE Government Strategic 
Plan.’ 
 Dubai government announced ‘Dubai Strategic Plan 2015.’ 
 Ministry of Labour ordered an expansion of the coverage of 
Emiratisation to the Tourism, Exchange, Hotel, 
Construction and Service sectors. 
2008  National Demographic Structure Committee was set up by 
the government under the Ministry of Interior. 
  
Source: [al Abed et al 1996; Davidson 2005; Koji 2011]. 
 
From the above table it may be deduced that “….the first and most symbolic 
labour policy was the decision that UAE nationals be given first priority in 
employment [UAE Labour Law Article 9]. The federal Labour Law was 
enacted in 1980 and basic labour-related regulations were introduced by the 
early 1980s” according to Koji (2011:45). The typologies of labour market 
initiatives over the last 35-40 years are primarily aimed at breaking the 
hegemonic stronghold that expatriates have on the labour market. It also 
demonstrates the strategic importance that the government of the UAE has 
placed on the development of its indigenous human capital. 
 
8.2.2. Demographics of Dubai 
 
The demographic structure of UAE society has been altered considerably by 
the sharp rise in population since the foundation of the state (UAE Yearbook 
2005:219). This is explicable, based on the manifold expansion of economic 
activities in the UAE generally and Dubai in рarticular.  
 
David Sorenson, in his book, Interpreting the Middle East, wrote that 
“…since the 1970s, but particularly with the end of the ‘bonanza oil decade’ 
in the 1980s, the demographic challenge has become the most acute socio-
economic problem for an increasing number of Middle East countries” 
(Sorenson 2010:67).  The Markaz Report of 2010 commented that “…the 
demographic structure of a country or region has wide-ranging implications, 
from health and education, to labor force make-up and fiscal budgeting. The 
population is the driving force of an economy; it is the unit by which 
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economic output is realized and as such, should be invested in and shaped 
in a manner to better influence economic growth” (Markaz Research Report 
2010: 2).  
 
The UAE suffers from deep demographic imbalances between UAE nationals 
and non-nationals in the private and public sector organizations; a situation 
that is being rapidly exacerbated. Some 360,000 foreigners entered the 
country on work visas in 2006. According to the 2005 population census, 8 
out of 10 people living in the UAE were born abroad. If the current double 
digit annual economic growth continues, the percentage of non-citizens will 
reach 90 % by 2015 (Abdullah, 2007). A unique characteristic of the UAE, 
even among fellow GCC countries, is the demographic setting 
(Forstenlechner, 2009: 137). The percentage of UAE nationals living within 
its borders is estimated to be around 15 % to 20 % of the total population. 
The remainder is made up of expatriates on residence visas, mostly attained 
through sponsorship from an employer or to a much smaller extent, 
sponsorship through a business partner or ownership of freehold property 
(Government of the UAE, 2007; Grant et al., 2007; Toledo, 2006 cited in 
Forstenlechner, 2009: 137). The effects of the laissez-faire employment 
policy that existed in the UAE are commented on by Ali (2008) cited in 
Randeree (2012:7): 
 
….throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the UAE followed a relatively 
laissez faire employment policy. As a result, the population of the UAE 
reached 4.5 million in 2004; of this figure, only 20% was made up of UAE 
nationals and the rest comprised of other Arabs, South and Southeast 
Asians, Europeans, and Americans, among others.  
 
By 2006, 91% of the country’s 2.4 million strong labor force was made up of 
expatriate workers, leaving a workforce comprised of only 9% UAE nationals 
(8% in the public sector and 1% in the private sector) (TAMNIA 2006 cited in 
Randeree 2012:8).  Government of Dubai 2005 statistics showed “…in Dubai 
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alone, local citizens accounted for only 2% of the labor force, while over 50% 
were from India.” (Randeree 2012:8).   
 
An analysis of the demographics of the city of Dubai alone provides many 
clues to the issues of human capital that the country as a whole is facing. 
The demographic data of Dubai indicates that it is a unique city, even in a 
global context (Madar Research Group 2004 cited in Randeree 2009:3). 
Further findings by the Madar Research Group 2004 indicate that “…the 
city ranks highest in the world as regards to the male to female ratio (2.62 
males to 1 female); the workforce to population (68.33 %); expatriate as a 
percentage of the total population (82%); population growth per annum 
(7%), and population under 65 years of age” (99.35%) (Ibd: 3).   
 
Table 8.2: Dubai’s demographic world records 
Parameter Ratio % World Rank 
Male to female ratio 2.62 males to 1 
female 
Highest 
Workforce to population  68.33 Highest 
Expats as a percentage of population 82.00 Highest 
Population growth 7.00 Highest 
Population under 65 years 99.00 Highest 
   
Source: Madar Research Group, “Dubai Knowledge Economy 2003-2008,” Vol. 2, 2004 
cited in Randeree (2012)  
 
A close examination of the table above reveals that the city state of Dubai is 
primarily a male dominated city, with a fairly young population and a labour 
force dominated by expatriates. These statistics are a microcosmic reflection 
of the other emirates in the country. Based on his own observations from 
living in Dubai for eight years this researcher supports the demographical 
profile outlined in Table 8.3 below. The UAE and Dubai especially is 
cosmopolitan in nature while geographically, it is also strategically located 
between Africa, Asia and Europe; in addition, “…it is a place where people 
run to and not from” according to US President Barack Obama (section 8.1 
refers). 
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Table 8.3: National and expatriate population make-up between 1998-2008 
Category 1998 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nationals 133110 N/A N/A N/A 137,573 144,296 151,127 157,514 
Expatriates 649890 
 
N/A N/A N/A 1,188,880 1,277,516 1378665 1488459 
Total 783,000 826387 1029000 961,000 1,321,453 1,421,812 1529792 1645973 
Percent of 
Expat/Total 
83 N/A          N/A                 N/A N/A 79.9 96.7 90 90.4 
         
Collated Sources: Dubai Statistical Centre 2011 Report, Gulf News January 9, 2003,           
http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/ReportPDF/Population%20Estimates%202006%20-
%202010.pdf, 
http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Population_of_UAE_climbs_7.4pc_in_2001/4796.ht
m http://www.ameinfo.com/16342.html  
http://www.dubaidreams.net/505/about/race-and-nationality-in-dubai/  
 
It is patently clear to this researcher that the nationalization of the labour 
force policy in the UAE has come about as a result of the growth of the 
expatriate labour force as illustrated by the demographic figures outlined in 
Table 8.2. Dubai has witnessed an astronomical increase in its expatriate 
population by some 838,569 individuals that are legally accounted for, in 
just 10 years. The Emiratisation policy is deeply influenced and informed by 
the size of the expatriate population and by extension, the size of its labour 
force, of which only fragmented data is available to the public at the time of 
writing. Horinuki (2009b: 71–72) cited in Koji 2011:43) writes that… 
 
….The cause of this demographic imbalance can be explained by the 
national development process in the UAE. During the state-building period 
in the 1970s, the UAE brought in massive numbers of expatriate workers 
due to a lack of skilled and unskilled national workers. Then the UAE 
government attempted to develop the non-oil sector to reduce the nation’s 
dependency on oil revenue in 1980s. Thus, non-oil sectors such as 
manufacturing, construction, and services have expanded; however, these 
sectors create job opportunities mainly for expatriates because nationals 
tend to avoid working there due to the working conditions.  
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8.3. What is Emiratisation and what are its aims?  
 
In recent years “Nationalization” has been added to the lexicon of Human 
Resources Development literature, which has led Al-Rumaithi et al. (2005:2) 
to pose the question: “….what does the term really mean?” Mashood et al. 
(2009), citing Metcalfe (2007), partially explains that nationalization is a 
“state-led labour market policy,” also known as Emiratization in the United 
Arab Emirates. It has “…long been recognized by political leaders 
throughout the Middle East that the over dependence on an expatriate 
workforce has serious long-term political, economic and social 
consequences” (Al-Lamki, 1998 cited in Rees 2007: 33).  
 
Rees et al (2007:33) point out that: 
 
“…As a result, the region has seen various politically led nationalization 
strategies designed to encourage and support the employment of nationals 
in preference to expatriates. For example, in Oman, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), these nationalization strategies, given the titles 
of Omanization, Saudization and Emiratization respectively, represent key 
policies that influence and to an extent, dictate aspects of employment 
practices in both the public and private sectors of these countries.” 
 
Emiratisation is an example of “…the interventionists approach often taken 
by governments of the region” (Harry 2007 cited in Mashood et al. 2009:2-3). 
A more expansive definition was coined by Al-Ali (2007: 368) who posited 
that “Emiratisation is [sic] a focused social capital program, which seeks to 
overcome structural barriers to Emirati employment in organisations and 
address social issues arising from citizens’ entry into the labour market.” In 
2008, Al-Ali  re-stated his definition and provided a most succinct summary 
of the nationalization of the labour market in the UAE by stating that the 
process of Emiratization is the situation “…whereby the UAE’s  federal   
government attempts to force job opportunities for their nationals” 
(2008:29).   
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An alternative description is provided by Godwin (2006:8) who postulated 
that “Emiratisation is an affirmative action, quota driven employment policy 
that ensures UAE nationals are given employment opportunities in the 
private sector.” Invariably, the given policy is strongly correlated to the 
human resources development of the indigenous population. The quotation 
cited below in Section 8.3.1, by the former President of the UAE, clearly 
articulates the nexus between the socio-economic development of the UAE 
and the technical and managerial competence of its local population. In 
summary: according to the Abu Dhabi Government (as Capital of the UAE), 
“Emiratisation, [is] the name of the nationwide programme launched to 
effectively assimilate the UAE national workforce in the labour market.” 
http://www.abudhabi.ae/egovPoolPortal.  
 
8.3.1. Aims of Emiratisation 
 
The founding father of the United Arab Emirates, the late Sheikh Zayed Bin 
Al-Nahyan, was quoted by Al-Rumaithi et al. (2005:2) as saying 
“….developing human beings is a national necessity that the precedes 
building of factories and establishments. Without the right man or woman it 
is impossible to achieve prosperity for this nation...”, by which he meant the 
UAE. Thus, the architecture of the Emiratisation programme is designed to 
achieve socio-economic objectives and to foster social cohesion within the 
local community. It is within this context that the Federal Government, 
under the direction of TAMINA, has stated its strategic vision: 
 
 
“...[it] favours a three pronged strategy: (a) to improve the mobility of all 
workers including expatriates; (b) to advance the productivity of Emirati 
citizens whereby no job is considered off limits, and Emiratis can compete 
with foreign nationals on a ‘level playing field’; and (c) to integrate the output 
of educational establishments with the needs of the labour market. All of 
these measures are designed to create an authentic Emiratisation process” 
(Randeree, 2009). 
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Many Emiratis face social exclusion from the labour market by numerous 
foreign owned private sector organizations operating in the UAE and 
especially in Dubai; thus, the political decision was made, and subsequent 
initiatives undertaken, to localize the labour market. Emiratisation may 
therefore be described as: “….a policy which aims to reduce the country’s 
reliance on expatriate labour and to increase the participation of nationals 
in the labour market” (Wilkins 2001:8 cited in Mashood et al. 2009:2). In 
other words, the over-arching strategic and socio-political aim of 
Emiraization is to achieve ‘flexi-curity’ among other issues on the national 
political agenda, as described below: 
 
According to Wilthagen and Rogowski (2002:250) cited in Wilthagen and 
Tros (2004): 
  
“Flexi-curity is a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a 
deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work 
organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security 
– employment security and social security – notably for weaker groups in 
and outside the labour market, on the other hand.” 
 
Through the pragmatic approach of Emiratisation, policies and regulations 
are being crafted and enacted to achieve and strengthen the integration of 
the Emirati indigenous population in the domestic labour market. If the so- 
called flexi-curity process is able to absorb and integrate the indigenous 
population that suffers from a skills deficit and which is also a minority 
group, into the labour market as well as bolstering their career progression, 
then the policy makers would have achieved their political aim.   
 
8.4. Emiratisation policy framework 
 
Nationalisation or Emiratisation of the human capital has now become the 
predominant desired and articulated policy of all rulers of countries that 
form the GCC as noted by Randeree (2009:1). Heard-Bay believes that 
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Emiratisation has a long history, starting as far back as the 1930s, and had 
its roots in the al-khawiya (the oil exploration by foreign firms in the early 
1930s) when the rulers insisted that as part of their concession agreements, 
the firms should be obliged to recruit and train some of the local population, 
rather than importing all of the labour (Heard-Bay 1982, cited in Davidson 
2005).  
 
As may be observed from Table 8.1 above, the more recent and extensive 
attempt at Emiratization began in 1972, through the 1980s and the 1990s. 
According to an Abu Dhabi Planning Department Report (1976:14) cited in 
Davidson (2005:151): 
 
“...The Emiratisation strategies became more comprehensive in the decades 
of the 1970s and 1980s with the official economic and social development 
plans outlining a comprehensive programme aiming to rehabilitate as many 
UAE nationals as possible by educating and training them to participate in 
the work force.” 
 
The Labour Law of 1980 provides that UAE nationals should take priority 
over any other nationalities when seeking jobs (followed by other Arab 
nationals). This means, in theory, that the Ministry of Labour will not permit 
non-UAE nationals to be recruited where its records show that there are 
unemployed nationals who could perform those roles (Latham & Watkins 
2009:2). These requirements are currently not applied in the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC) but may be applied in other Free Zone 
areas. As part of its Emiratization programme, the UAE has sought to 
identify suitable industries in which its nationals can work. Banking and 
insurance were identified as two such industries a few years ago, and there 
are now specific annual quotas for companies operating in these sectors 
(Latham & Watkins 2009: 2-3).  Randeree (2009:11) annotates this: 
 “…Legislation set out by the Ministry of Labour includes the issuance of a 
decree for Emiratisation of all HR managers, personnel managers and most 
secretarial positions in private companies, with work permits for expatriates 
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no longer permitted in those positions since July 2006. Consequently, 
foreign nationals holding secretarial posts would lose their jobs by default at 
termination of their fixed term contracts or expiry of their labour cards.”  
 
While nationalization strategies differ from one country to another, they all 
commonly involve mainstream strategic human resources activities (Looney, 
2004 cited in Rendeere 2012:6). Another commonality between Saudization, 
Omanization, Bahrainization, Omanization and Emiratization is that they 
all: “…consist of a number of quotas and incentives encouraging public and 
private companies to employ Emiratis, both men and women” (2005 cited in 
Raven 2011:136). 
 
Fundamentally, at a policy level via decrees, initiatives and or legislation (the 
labour act of 1980) there is a comprehensive attempt to correct the labour 
market incongruity that exists in the domestic labour market. The present 
system of labour policies and initiatives will, to some extent, help to 
decouple Emiratis from the public sector and force them to seek 
employment in the private sector. The rather truncated set of initiatives 
outlined in Table 8.1 may be viewed as using state power to address, “….the 
isolation of Emiratis from their burgeoning economy, to bridge the gulf from 
a traditionalist Arab culture to the materialism and immediacy of Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai” (Al Ali 2008:372).  
 
The use of existing institutions, and/or the creation of new ones, is part of 
the policy package in vogue to achieve the mandate of the politically 
sensitive social policy of labour force nationalization. 
 
8.5. Institutional reform 
 
The full benefits of development, whether human or economic, cannot be 
realized without efficiently functioning institutions which play a pivotal role 
in the developmental process. The multi-dimensional nature of development 
as described in Chapter five requires the fundamental support of both civic 
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and state institutions. The colonial heritage of the former Trucial states, now 
the UAE, included a common lack of functional state supported agencies or 
institutions.  
 
Drawing on the theoretical constructs of New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
which “…abandons the standard neoclassical assumptions that individuals 
have perfect information and unbounded rationality” (Ménard & Shirley 
2008:1), the Federal Government of the UAE has established new 
institutions with the intention of providing information to its citizens 
concerning employment opportunities, without depending on the free 
market mechanisms to provide information to those who are economically 
active and are particularly seeking employment opportunities in the private 
sector.  
  
For example, “...in 1997, the Committee for Human Resources Development 
in the Banking Sector (CHRDB) was set up with the aim of having 50% of 
banking jobs being performed by UAE citizens by the year 2007. Similarly, 
the National Human Resources Development and Employment Authority 
was established by presidential decree” (Al Shaiba 2008:8); as an agent that 
implements federal government policies and provides regulatory oversight of 
the labour market.   
 
The National Human Resources Development and Employment Authority, 
also called TANMIA leads the Emiratization effort (TANMIA, 2006 cited in 
Mashhood et al. 2009:3). The main functions of this Federal Government 
Authority are to achieve the following objectives being to: 
 
• Create job opportunities for the UAE National Workforce 
• Reduce the unemployment ratio 
• Enhance the skills and productivity of the national workforce  
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•Recommend relevant policies to the UAE Federal Government”   
(TANMIA, 2006 cited in Mashood 2009:3). 
 
Other supporting institutions tasked with a similar mandate of 
promulgating the process of Emiratisation in individual emirates, have led to 
the formation of the Abu Dhabi Emiratisation Council and the Emirates 
National Development Programme of Dubai. These institutions owe their 
existence to, in the first instance, the imbalance in the demographic 
composition of the labour market and the need to implement the affirmative 
action policy to eliminate the duality that exists in the labour market.  
 
In the second instance, they play a role in attempting to redress the acute 
underdevelopment and under-utilization of the national labour force despite 
the increase in adult literacy. Thus, these institutions have been established 
to ensure that labour market reforms and the existing labour law and 
ministerial decrees are adhered to, and simultaneously to develop a labour 
force that possesses the correct skills set, coupled with the right aptitude to 
function in the private sector.  
 
Inevitably, these newly created institutions, in conjunction with the Ministry 
of Labour (MOL), will seek to hasten the process to “….reduce the 
dependence on foreign workers and to ensure that UAE citizens benefit from 
the economic growth in the country” (Latham & Watkins, 2009: 2). Given 
that the UAE ratified the treaty establishing the International Labour 
Organization, national legislation undoubtedly will seek to “….protect the 
rights of foreign workers in accordance with national laws and international 
treaties on labour and human rights” (UAE Yearbook 2007: 217). 
 
8.6. Emiratisation strategies 
 
Holistic development cannot take place on its own or in a vacuum, but 
instead must be accompanied by a set of strategies; similarly, the 
Emiratization programme requires the requisite strategies. The following are 
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some of those that have been implemented with the aim of correcting the 
aforementioned demographic imbalance that has resulted in social and 
economic exclusion.  
 
8.6.1. Education and human resources development  
 
As mentioned earlier, education is considered to be a key element in 
promoting the necessary skills for social and economic development; thus 
free education is provided for all UAE citizens (UAE Yearbook 2001:198). 
With specific reference to Emiratization, a special emphasis was placed on 
courses and subjects relating to business practices and the professional 
skills demanded by other areas of the economy; the government via TANMIA 
also offers training programmes for nationals to ensure that they have 
acquired adequate skills to be hired by the private sector (Davidson 
2005:151, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010).  
 
At the private sector level, there has been a groundswell of support for the 
nationalization effort. An interview conducted by the researcher with long 
time resident in UAE, in which the respondent noted that “…increasingly, 
companies are providing on-the-job training for Emiratis and have also 
made yearly budgetary provisions for training and development of nationals 
within their companies” (Interview 9, 2011). Training and development of 
nationals is fundamentally important in the light of what Ian Giulianotti of 
NADIA Recruiting Consultancy says: “….there is a ‘perceived’ shortage of 
suitable candidates in the market place” (Gulf Business 2008 April).  The 
development trajectory of the UAE is to diversify its domestic economy from 
hydrocarbons to a more knowledge driven 21st century economy, (Chapter 
seven refers) and if nationals (Emiratis) are to play a meaningful role in their 
own economy then a radical paradigm shift will need to take place in raising 
their level of skills and competences.  
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8.6.2. Quota system for strategic sectors 
 
The affirmative action policy imposes employment quotas on the banking, 
insurance and trade sectors (Goodwin 2006, Davidson 2005; Gulf Business 
2008 April). The targeted sectors were selected based on two principal 
criteria: the economic health of the industry and its importance to the 
country and the availability of skilled jobs where good working conditions 
exist for nationals (Ministry of Foreign Trade 2010).  
 
TANMIA makes the point that: 
 
To achieve targeted Emiratisation, the government focused on banks for the 
overarching strategy of ensuring that the leadership of a key economic group 
was a national priority, and a pragmatic approach to the availability of 
skilled jobs in a working environment acceptable to UAE nationals. In 1998, 
Cabinet Decree No. 10 directed all banks to achieve 4 per cent annual 
incremental increase of Emirati staff. The banks already had, for UAE, 
substantial numbers of national employees, and the quota was considered a 
sustainable target (TANMIA, 2004 cited in Al Ali 2008: 369). 
 
Given; the strategic and developmental role that the insurance sector plays 
in the economy, making it an important employer of nationals. The Council 
of Ministers issued its resolution No. 202/2 for 2003 obligating all insurance 
firms operating in the UAE to raise their intake of national employees to 15% 
by the end of 2003, at the rate of 5% per year. And in 2005, the Cabinet 
issued its resolution No. 42 entrusting TANMIA with the task of monitoring 
Emiratization of this sector (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010).  
 
In addition to the insurance industry, the trading sector in the UAE is of 
major interest to the country in terms of its strategic role and contribution 
to the local economy; making it an important employer of nationals too. 
Against this background the Council of Ministers issued its resolution No. 
259/1 for 2004, obligating all trading firms employing 50 or more workers to 
raise their intake of national employees at the rate of 2% annually, starting 
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from 2004 (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, Gulf Business 2008, 
October). 
 
In summary, the Federal Government has strategically targeted sectors 
within the local economy that would allow them easily achieve its affirmative 
action quotas and simultaneously embracing and protecting the principles 
of free market policies. 
 
8.6.3. Long amnesty period 
 
The Government of the UAE has in recent years embarked on an extended 
amnesty period for foreign workers who have remained in the country 
without a valid visitors or residence visa (Davidson 2005). If the illegal 
expatriates take advantage of the amnesty period, only minimal penalties 
are levied on them. This critically important strategy employed by the state 
is aimed at achieving the nationalization objectives. Davidson (2005:153) 
noted that “….in 1996 over 200,000 illegal immigrants were deported.” 
Similarly, the Gulf News (14 November, 2007) reported that “….some 
342,000 illegal immigrants took advantage of the amnesty and out of the 
grand total, some 175,000 ‘over-stayers’ left the country whilst the others 
legalized their status.” The stance taken had its roots in an event in1996, 
when the mass exodus of primarily low skilled workers, who took advantage 
of the amnesty period either to leave the country or legalize their status, 
created an acute labour shortage in the construction sector.   
 
From the list of polices and strategies outlined above, it is clear that there is 
a concerted effort by both government and private sector stakeholders in the 
economy to ensure that nationalization of the labour market is a success. In 
the next section of this chapter the main drivers of this seemingly 
complicated, but necessary, social policy will be examined.  
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8.7. Emiratisation: environmental drivers 
 
In undertaking an environmental scanning of the key variables driving the 
political project to nationalize the labour market in the UAE, a number of 
social, political, economic and cultural variables were uncovered. In 
attempting to appease the local population, the federal government of the 
UAE faces the dichotomy of balancing the interests of the local business 
community with that of its own people. Some of these issues are discussed 
below. 
 
8.7.1. Economic sustainability 
 
State elites throughout the GCC have long recognized that the dependence 
on an expatriate workforce has serious and long-term political, economic, 
and social implications (Al-Lamki 1998 cited in Randeere 2012:6). In light of 
the indicated transformation of the UAE’s society, “…the government has 
recognized the need to involve nationals in mainstream economic activities 
along with creating employment opportunities for women in order to further 
integrate them into the formal economy” (Randeree 2012:4). In addition, the 
UAE Government Strategy 2011-2013 strives to ensure that all Government 
work is conducted according to a set of guiding principles that puts citizens 
first (www.uaecabinet.gov.ae). Not being full participants in the economic 
success of the society could “….exacerbate long standing socio-economic 
problems” (Ibrahim 2008:1) of some Emiratis who are on the periphery of 
the society.  
 
A young Emirati citizen, noted in an interview that “…from an economic 
perspective, there is a need for locals to be involved in the main stream 
economic activities as they have a direct interest in the success of the UAE” 
(Interview 11, 2012) Without ignoring the notion in which “….economic 
theory states that international migration will confer benefits to the host 
country in the form of an immigration surplus representing an increase in 
national income accruing to the natives” (Borjas 1995 cited in Hui & Hashmi 
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2004:9), there is also a fiscal problem of massive outward remittances from 
the host country (UAE) that places…  
 
...Pressure on fiscal policy: given the sheer size of the money fleeing the 
economy, it is expected that this would weaken the efficacy of the fiscal 
policy. The growing size of these remittances adds downward pressure on 
the government spending multiplier. In other words, when the government 
plans to boost spending in case of recession, this spending level should be 
relatively higher to offset the remittances leakage (Naufal & Termos 
2009:10). 
 
Fiscal pressure, due to leakage from the economy at a macro-level, will serve 
as a stimulus for the government to ensure that there is full nationalization 
of the labour force. In addition, the failure to ensure that Emiratis are 
integrated into the country’s labour market “….could result in both a social 
and economic cost to the region in general and the UAE in particular in 
terms of the loss in potential human capital utilization and returns from 
education” (Arab Human Capital Challenge 2009:14).  
 
8.7.2. Unemployment 
 
The growing trend of unemployment in the rentier oriented state of the UAE 
is one of the variables or key drivers pushing for a more quantitative shift in 
the demographics of the labour market. As has been observed, 
 
“...the recent economic landscape in Gulf countries has been characterized 
by high economic growth and industrial expansion. But despite a strong 
economic performance and phenomenal employment growth, unemployment 
amongst nationals is relatively high” (Bashi 2010: 14). 
 
The indigenous population in Dubai and the UAE in general tends 
experience structural unemployment given that the  nature of the economy 
has evolved into a knowledge based economy which requires a new skills set 
and too often Emiratis are not able to provide  ‘that’  skills set.   
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Abdullah Al-Awadi, a consultant at TANMIA, was quoted as saying “…the 
UAE society, like other Gulf societies, is suffering from an unemployment 
crisis that is moving in an upward line because of the continued surge in 
expatriate workers and difficulties in the implementation of the job 
nationalisation programmes” (Kawach 2010). In the absence of credible 
unemployment figures in Dubai, Hraiz (2009:1) provides a snapshot of the 
unemployment crisis gripping the capital city of Abu Dhabi. 
 
Table 8.4: Approximate Unemployment Rate Abu Dhabi 
Category 1985 1995 2005 2008 
Nationals 3.4% 5.7% 12% 12.7% 
Expatriates 1.2% 1.5% 2.5% 2.5%  
     
Source: Amna Bin Hrainz (2009), adapted from the Abu Dhabi Statistics Centre 
Report.  
 
A careful analysis of the unemployment figures amongst the Emirati 
population in Abu Dhabi reveals cause for concern as reflected above in 
Table 8.3.  As Hrainz explains, that some “…12.7 % of the 96, 000 Emiratis 
of working age in the capital city is unemployed, when compared to 2.5% of 
the 823,000 expatriates of working age….” represents a serious social crisis 
in the making, with political implications.  
 
Nationally, based on different pieces of research carried out by the Federal 
National Council and the National Human Resources Development 
Authority, unemployment in the UAE had reached an unprecedented high of 
13% since the formation of the federal state. “….This means that the 
number of UAE national job seekers has broken the 40,000-mark for the 
first time since the country was founded… in the past, unemployment rates 
ranged between three and six per cent, almost equivalent to Gulf and global 
levels” (Kawach 2009). 
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Having a phenomenal influx of expatriates employment growth rates whilst 
nationals remain unemployed is socially unacceptable and could lead to 
alienation of youth as well as threatening the social fabric of the society 
(Bashi 2010:15). Thus, it is unavoidable that the rise in unemployment 
amongst the citizens of the UAE is sufficient reason for positive 
discrimination in the form labour force nationalization to be put into effect. 
 
8.7.3. Public sector rationalization 
 
In the UAE there is an unwritten rule that the public sector is responsible 
for securing job opportunities for all national workers (Girgis 2002:4) and 
thus, either by design or coincidentally, “….at present, the majority of 
nationals work in the public sector” (UAE Yearbook 2005:220). The past 
decade has seen the focus shifted toward nationalization of the private 
sector workforce. This shift took place because the various governments 
realized that they could not indefinitely take the lead role in employing 
national workers. In addition, they have started to demand professionals 
who have specialized in such fields as education and health, because of the 
population dynamics (Fasano and Goyal 2004:17). This re-orientation in the 
socio-demographical structure of the UAE public sector is based on the fact 
that this sector has “….reached saturation point and is therefore, incapable 
of absorbing” (UAE Yearbook 2005:220) the increasing number of Emirati 
graduates that are entering the job market. Thus, it is important that 
Emiratis must be encouraged to change their mindset and seek employment 
in the private sector, irrespective of their suppositions that the public sector 
offers a better opportunity.  
 
8.7.4. “Governmentality”   
 
Drawing on the concept of governmentality, as articulated by Foucault 
(1991), there is a nexus and a seemingly strong correlation between the 
concept of Emiratisation and governmentality within the rentier state 
structure of the UAE. To justify the researcher’s argument it is observed that 
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“….the state uses mechanisms such as entitlements and welfare allocations 
typically found within the Gulf countries” (Krause 2009:3) to determine how 
citizens should behave towards the state and the political elite as a whole. In 
employing the principle of “verticality” the UAE state assigns the 
promethean challenge of reversing the deeply entrenched imbalance in the 
domestic labour market to a newly created state organ, the aforementioned 
National Human Resources Development and Employment Authority 
(TANMIA). This is in effect “….bolstering the power of the state through 
vertical encompassment” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002 cited in Krause 
2009:7), via the localization or nationalization of the local labour. The use of 
the ruler’s decree or legislation to regulate the conduct of the non-
indigenous private sector, so as to achieve the political objectives of 
governmentality in the name of Emiratisation, is deemed appropriate as it 
reflects the image that the government wants its citizens to see.    
 
8.8. Expatriate workers’ contributions to the development of the UAE  
 
This study agrees that contrary to the findings of Wise and Coverribles 
(2007:9) who noted that “….underdeveloped countries tend to find 
themselves with redundant population reserves,” Dubai’s socio-economic 
history has largely been one of underdevelopment and lacking human 
resources. Subsequent to the discovery of oil in the GCC and the UAE in 
particular, respective governments have developed national development 
plans as discussed in Chapter seven of this thesis. These plans were 
inextricable linked to the usage of highly skilled, unskilled and or semi-
skilled workers, to be absorbed in the economic transformation that 
accompanied massive inflows of petro-dollars to Dubai and the UAE.  
 
Al Khouri (2010) noted that  
 
“...using the significant financial liquidity generated from the petroleum 
revenues, GCC countries (including the UAE) followed a gradual 
development and modernization pathway to pursue their economic and 
social transformation plans. Due to increased oil prices, which reached 
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unprecedented levels between 1970s and 1990s, a large number of migrant 
workers started to inflow the GCC countries. This workforce primarily 
participated in the following three strategic sectors: infrastructure, industrial 
and social services development.” 
 
According to Girgis (2002: 4) this was “…the first, the Major Influx that 
arrived in the UAE between the early 1970s and early 1980s when the flow 
of oil revenues provided the financial resources required to build the UAE’s 
infrastructure.” In the UAE, it is commonly said that the first contract 
workers came to build up the country, while the migrants of today maintain 
it. In fact, with massive help from the foreign workers the Gulf States 
developed in record time from poor, underdeveloped states into highly 
modernized countries (Sutter 2005:4). It is the expressed view of many, 
including Girgis that expatriate labour has contributed immensely to the 
socio-economic development of the UAE, including Dubai, and will continue 
to do so in the future. As the national economy intensifies its diversification 
efforts, inevitably different skills sets of guest workers will be required to 
contribute significantly to the socio-economic development architecture of 
Dubai and the wider GCC states. In 2009 the Minister of Labour Saqr 
Gobash was quoted as saying, “…the 4.1 million foreign and local workers 
were the UAE development stakeholders” (Salama 2009).   
 
Going forward, experts, economists and business people agree that the role 
of expatriates across all sectors will continue to be vital. A focus on 
Emiratisation may help boost local participation in the private sector, but in 
view of the ongoing economic growth targets, analysts say the reliance on 
foreign nationals is unlikely to dissipate (Broomhall 2011:4). Ibrahim 
(2008:1) comments that a continued reliance on expatriates “...is essential if 
the UAE economy is to sustain the generation of unprecedented wealth and 
creating new generations of wealthy citizens.”  
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8.8.1. Harnessing the expatriate labour for national development 
 
The sustainable development of any community or national economy is only 
achievable on the basis that the requisite national labour force is available 
to implement development policies and strategies. Contrary to this trend of 
thought, the GCC and the UAE in particular suffers from an acute 
demographical imbalance that poses a serious threat to the political project 
of achieving economic diversification, empowerment of local citizens and 
preservation of national wealth for future generations.  
 
The GCC and Dubai in particular may have eluded the typical oil curse or 
“Dutch Disease” syndrome; however the society finds itself facing a 
conundrum where, in spite of the vast socio-economic transformation that 
has taken place in the UAE including Dubai, and despite having one of the 
world’s largest sovereign wealth funds (SWF), its public education system is 
in crisis. The Abu Dhabi based Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and 
Research opined that, “currently there is an education crisis facing the Gulf 
countries including the UAE (Dubai), the most prominent aspect of which is 
the failure of the educational output to satisfy the needs of the labour 
market” (ECSSR 2009: 13).  An anonymous interview conducted by the 
researcher with an educator who has been living in Dubai for twenty years, 
elicited a fundamental point, that: 
 
…. The public education at the secondary level is in an appalling state in the 
UAE generally, and yet the country appears to be investing heavily in 
nationalisation and skill development of undergraduate and postgraduate 
national students, but for some odd reason, the powers that be, seem 
reluctant to work from the ground up.  I’m not sure what the reason for this 
is, but in my opinion, it’s a glaring omission (Interview 16). 
 
A World Report of February, 2008 made an observation similar to that by 
Pinto, highlighting the concern that “….the education level in the Arab world 
was extremely low” (ESSR 2009:13).   
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There has been a groundswell of concern within Dubai and generally in the 
UAE as how to harness expatriate labour for sustainable development of the 
emirates without the continued extensive over-reliance on cheap foreign 
labour that does not have the nation’s interest at heart. Randeree (2009) 
cited in Randeree (2012:4) reiterates that “…the economies of the GCC 
cannot afford to have their long-term development needs seconded 
indefinitely to foreign experts, and must now be firmly placed in the hands 
of a growing national workforce.”  Therefore, a concerted attempt must be 
made to harness expatriate labour, if the political project of “…redressing 
the socio-demographic imbalances within the labor markets” (Randeree 
2012:4) is to be tackled effectively. 
 
It is therefore imperative that policy-makers in Dubai (and the UAE) devise a 
range of policy instruments, coupled with some appropriate incentives that 
would motivate expatriates to coalesce around a mutually beneficial 
training, development and skills transfer agenda. From the experiences of 
Australia, South Africa and the USA, affirmative action, or “indigenization” 
of the work force using almost exclusively a quota system is not a pragmatic 
way to address the fundamental problem of local skills shortages in a 
growing economy that is increasingly becoming knowledge based and 
oriented.  
 
Leveraging skills and professional development amongst Emiratis cannot be 
done at the expense of the expatriates who will have to train their 
replacements. Similarly to the integrated approach in the design and 
crafting of national development plans, the nationalization of local labour 
has to be a multi-pronged and inclusive approach.  It must be borne in 
mind, and consistently so, that policy prescription is not aimed at “…job 
creation as this is not the biggest challenge of Dubai and the UAE as much 
as the mis-match between national labors’ demand and supply in the job 
market” (Markaz Research Report 2012:21).  
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This stance is somewhat ironic in that nearly half-a-century ago, the Gulf 
nations were desperate to see expatriate workers stream into their oil-rich 
region. Today, they are struggling to assist them to stream out. While their 
policy in the past achieved success, it is currently not equally successful 
(Kawach 2010). Fundamental challenges encountered by private and public 
sector stakeholders in their efforts at re-aligning the labour force are deeply 
embedded in the phenomenon of expatriate labour.  
 
8.9. Constraints and challenges 
 
The discourse around the success, failure, relevance or perception of the 
Emiratization initiative has to be debated within the context of the UAE’s 
“socialization process, common values, customs, religion and quality of life” 
(Budhwar & Mellahi 2006:10).  
 
8.9.1. The ‘Mudīr Syndrome’ 
 
The process of Emiratisation and its effectiveness is seriously undermined 
by what is regarded as the “mudīr syndrome” which refers to the 
characteristic, very common to the UAE and other GCC states, “….where 
everyone wants a professional or managerial job, not a menial, semi-skilled, 
or technical one, despite the need for those in the economy to create 
employment” (Champion 2003:200-202 cited in Gray 2011:24). The 
education sector at the secondary and primary levels has not been insulated 
from the said, all encompassing syndrome. It is very rare to find an Emirati 
educator in private schools. Being a school teacher does not carry with it the 
materialism and immediacy of wealth and status as do other areas of the 
national economy. Thus, it is not an attractive professional choice for 
Emiratis, male or female. In essence it may be described as “this is what 
foreigners do and not us.” 
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8.9.2. Rentierism and welfarism 
 
The rentier nature of the UAE state, and the emirate of Dubai especially, is 
paradoxically proving to stymie the development of the Emirati labour force. 
The machinations of the Federal and emirate governments tend to be 
distributive of its oil rent and this makes it very difficult to wean Emirati 
citizens off their state dependency. Similarly, it is just as difficult to wean 
the private and public sectors respectively off migrant labour. This is 
turning out to be a double-edged sword for both state and citizens; but 
especially so for the state, which uses oil revenue to ensure political stability 
and social cohesion. 
 
8.9.3. Termination of employment 
 
An Emirati citizen, in his final year at the Higher College of Technology 
(HCT), he explained that “….a local cannot be fired by a foreigner who owns 
and or manages a company in Dubai and the UAE in general.” (Interview 10, 
2012) This is a causation factor that prevents or discourages foreign owned 
Dubai (UAE) based companies from hiring UAE citizens. The aforementioned 
comment is a systemic problem which can best be described as a myopic 
policy that will hinder the holistic achievement of the objectives of the 
Emiratisation national project. Similarly, as mentioned above in Section 
8.1.1, provisions are made under the federal labour law to give priority to 
Emirati citizens in terms of employment regardless of their costs and 
productivity.  
 
8.9.4. Perception 
 
Stereotypes may be defined as generalized “...beliefs about the 
characteristics, attributes and behaviour of members of certain groups”, 
according to Hilton and von Hipple (1996:240 cited in Al-Waqfi & 
Forstenlechner 2010:368). When the “….epistemic perspectives” (Ndlovu- 
Gatsheni 2012:1), of the Emirati work ethic is published it will be riddled 
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with stereotypes about the incompetence and laziness of the citizens of the 
UAE. The stereotypes may be rooted in the fact that the vast majority of the 
local labour force is absorbed into the public sector. 
 
Furthermore, “…the negative stereotypes of the citizens are probably caused 
by these realities, the privileges that are given to citizens in the public sector 
over the past several decades created a sense of entitlement among citizens 
that affected their expectations and attitudes and contributed to these 
negative stereotypes” (Al- Waqfi & Forstenlecher 2010:375). UAE based 
social commentator Al Gergawi opined that the “antecedent to this sense of 
entitlement” (Al Gergawi, 2008 cited in Al- Waqfi & Forstenlecher 
2010:375)…, is the system of unrationalised and unjustified distribution of 
rewards available to citizens in the public sector, where payment is 
motivated by welfare rather than performance considerations” (Abdalla et 
al., 2010 and Forstenlechner, 2010 cited in Al- Waqfi & Forstenlecher 
2010:375).  
 
Stereotypes are echoed by the immigrant community who view the 
Emiratisation programme in a similar way to that in which affirmative action 
is viewed by some sections of the South African population. A senior 
employee from a MNC located in Dubai, echoed the view that “…these 
‘locals’ –[…] UAE citizens were incompetent and do not possess the requisite 
technical and administrative skills to operate effectively in a Multinational 
Corporation of noted repute” (Informal Interview 1, 2007) From the 
researcher’s personal experience of living in Dubai for almost a decade, it 
becomes easily understandable why some expatriates may harbour negative 
stereotypical sentiments about the citizens of the country. These negative 
perceptions are also reinforced by some locals who have a tendency to use 
the religious term, “in shallah”, meaning: god willing (to indicate the pace at 
which a task will be performed and or when a decision will be made on a 
matter). This is often construed by Westerners to mean that there is a lack 
of competence in the individual/s who are tasked with the responsibility to 
serve the public. 
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Drawing again on his personal observation and study of the society, the 
researcher feels able to say categorically that the uninformed fail to 
understand the following: the socio-political structure and cultural 
dynamics of the society; the rentier nature of the state; the tacit social 
contract between leaders and the citizens as well as the traditional 
“sultanic” regime that dispenses power with a soft autocratic govern-
mentality. Lack of information and understanding makes it easy to be drawn 
into negative perceptions about the society and its people.  
 
8.9.5. Retention of talents 
 
One of the challenges that both the private and public sectors suffer is high 
staff turnover. The Gulf Business [2008: 166] explained that “….companies 
that are able to find the right local candidate to fill the quota cannot rest 
since they have to work on concerted plans to retain the people they hired.” 
Increasingly there is competition at the federal and local levels of 
government for the same pool of talent; thus retention of nationals has 
become a major concern for organizations and government entities alike.  
 
The impact of a very mobile Emirati labour force is felt in the private sector 
as: “….nationals do not like the working conditions in the private sector and 
also the salary is generally not attractive enough to retain them and thus 
[they] prefer to work in the public sector”(Interview 9, 2011). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that even at the government levels nationals prefer to 
work with the local government, as opposed to the federal one, because the 
compensation is more lucrative. In essence this challenge, faced by both 
private and public sectors, will thwart the Emiratisation process and 
inevitably prevent fast-tracking of the affirmative action government-led 
initiative. 
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8.9.6. Labour supply of locals 
 
Exponential economic growth in the UAE over the last decade and half has 
not been matched by equivalent “quantitative and qualitative” (Koji 2011) 
growth in human resource development across the country. Just over a 
decade ago Girgis (2002:2) remarked that “….the combined demand for 
nationals in the public and the private sectors falls short of the supply of 
national labor, most of whom are first time job seekers. For the private 
sector, it is difficult to respond positively to government demands to hire 
nationals at higher wage rates with less work experience compared to 
expatriate workers” (Girgis 2002:6).  
 
In view of Girgis’ observations, coupled with the researcher’s personal 
observations, in the banking, law, education and construction fields 
Emiratization in the private sector will continue to lag behind that of the 
public sector as there is an acute and persistent shortage of Emiratis with 
the requisite experience and qualifications to fill managerial and supervisory 
posts.  
 
8.9.7. The cultural dilemma  
 
There was a time during the not too distant past in Dubai when “traditional 
cultural norms and practices ensured the seclusion of women from 
mainstream economic activities as women were relegated to work within the 
domestic, or household arena” (Talhami 2004 cited in Randeree 2012:4). In 
addition, “….under these traditional, religious, social and cultural norms in 
the UAE, women and girls were socialized into the nurturing roles of mother 
and wife, rather than encouraged to develop careers” (Baud and Mahgoub, 
2001 cited in Nelson 2004:7). However, “Emirati women are now entering 
the labour force in increasing numbers and the reasons for the increase 
relate directly to higher educational achievements and changing attitudes 
towards working women in the UAE and the region as a whole” (Nelson 
2004:7). For example, in the United Arab Emirates, “….the contribution of 
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Emirati women to economic activity has increased from a mere 5.4 per cent 
in 1995 to 27.9 per cent in 2008” (UAE Yearbook 2009). 
 
However, as women in the UAE have become more career oriented and 
educationally empowered, “gender stereotypes are often used to support 
their traditional roles. These stereotypes are closely connected to the 
surrounding culture in that they reflect cognitive beliefs about the 
differences between masculinity and femininity” (Best, 2004:11 cited in 
Omair 2011: 18). It is the researcher’s firm conviction that cultural mores 
pose a serious threat to the greater involvement of Emirati women in the 
labour market.  Metle (2002 cited by Katlin 2011:21) suggests that “…there 
is a tacit official understanding that men should be given priority for 
promotion to leadership positions and that women should be discouraged 
from working if a man is available to fill the respective position.” In reality, 
the notion of the glass ceiling comes into play for Emirati women in the 
private and public sectors in the UAE, which is contrary to the socio-
political agenda of the state as this cultural-cognitive mind-set hampers the 
growth of women’s role in the domestic labour market.  
 
8.10. Conclusion 
 
It is ironic that after centuries of domination by foreign powers and for the 
second time in the history of the former Trucial states of the UAE its people 
are struggling for recognition in their own land. The UAE, along with Qatar, 
may be considered minority states, thus making for an urgent need to 
protect the cultural identity, birth-right and socio-economic progress of the 
society for present and future generations.  
 
The impact of economic modernization on the UAE is in part due to rapid 
economic growth and development in the aftermath of the discovery of oil 
which has had unquantifiable social, economic and political ramifications 
for its people. A young population, combined with the confinement of women 
to their houses, due to cultural and religious norms, has created a 
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monumental shortage of labour in this respect. As such, there has been an 
influx of contract workers to the UAE to perform a wide range of jobs who, in 
the process, have created demographic shifts in the population and social 
exclusions for Emiratis.  
 
Against that background, this chapter has dealt with the UAE’s liberal 
approach to the use of foreign labour; the evolution of labour policies and 
regulations that have eventually led to the nationalization of the labour 
market. There are targeted sectors of the national economy in this regard: 
banking, insurance and trading, based on their contribution to GDP of the 
economy. Challenges and constraints have prevented the anticipated 
success of the process as “….most private sector firms are not willing to 
train unskilled and inexperienced nationals and then pay them considerably 
more than the rates paid to foreign workers” (Wilkins 2001:156). It is within 
such a context that “Emiratisation will remain a key element of the UAE’s 
public policy for the foreseeable future” (Wilkins 2001:156). The centrality of 
the discourse on Emiratisation is perhaps explained most appropriately by 
Barnett (1998:9) who stated, “…it is usual in the sociology of development to 
be concerned with development at one or all of the following three levels-
social, cultural, and political.” Thus, for a change, “….the political-economy 
discourse on the Arab Gulf will not be focused on its geostrategic 
importance, but instead on the demographic pyramid profile and the 
idiosyncrasies of its labor markets” (Forstenlechner & Rutledge 2012). This 
quintessentially then shifts the focus to the centre of all national and local 
economies: their people or their “human capital”. 
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 Chapter Nine: 
Dubai Inc Model: An Analysis of its Merits and Demerits 
 
History is no longer exclusively written in rich countries: emerging economies 
have been outperforming and depending less and less on the growth in the countries 
of the North. (Dr Laurent Lavigne du Cadet, CEO, Amwal Investment Bank) 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
9.1. Introduction  
 
Encountering development (Escobar 1995) or just mere economic growth 
has been the subject and emphasis of many policy-makers, politicians and 
the central foci of national development plans, structural adjustment 
programmes, modernization and neo-liberal development paradigms. 
However, only a few countries in Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean island 
states and the Arab states have been able to sufficiently display attributes of 
development as policy makers, international financial institutions and  
donors  have envisage the outcome of the process. 
 
The relatively small and previously insignificant city-state of Dubai defies 
economic literature by avoiding the rentier theory curse syndrome. Prior to 
the advent of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009, the Emirate was 
heralded as a socioeconomic development miracle and was seen to represent 
and embody the ideals and aspirations of citizens in the Arab world. The 
Dubai Model has become the quintessential representation of what a state 
led approach to development is able to achieve and should achieve in petro-
rich and labour poor states as well as in labour rich and resource poor 
states. 
 
This chapter comprises eight major sections, further divided into sub-
sections: Section 9.1 introduces the chapter, Section 9.2 deals with the 
economic performance of the Dubai Inc Model while Section 9.3 looks at 
State capacity and Section 9.4 explains the Embedded Autonomy of Dubai 
within the Federal State. Section 9.5 examines Replicability of the Dubai 
Model.  Home Grown Development Strategies are addressed in Section 9.6 In 
Section 9.7 the Social Dimension of Dubai’s Development is explained; while 
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Section 9.8 discusses Criticisms of the Dubai Model and, finally, 9.9 
conclude the chapter. 
 
9.2. Economic performance of the Dubai Model 
9.2.1. Economic growth 
 
This section describes Dubai’s economic performance by examining the 
city’s economic growth statistics between 1998 and 2008 within the 
framework of its Strategic Plans, as outlined in chapter seven. The 
barometer, by which all societies are rather myopically judged, is the 
strength of their economic growth rate. This is a relic from the “….attitude 
that was associated with the predominance of Keynesian economics, with its 
emphasis on broad economic aggregates, in the 1950s, when widespread 
attention was first paid to the problems of development and 
underdevelopment” (Keeton 1984:276). Pragmatically, policymakers should 
confine their analysis of “…economic growth within the context of it being 
just a measure of the productivity (Blakemore & Herrendorf, 2009:4).  
 
The UAE has defied inter--country analyses which apparently showed, by 
way of empirical studies, that countries with an abundance of hydro-carbon 
are susceptible to what has been known as the “oil curse.” The cluster of 
skeikhdoms, including Dubai, has pursued “….liberal economic policies that 
contribute to strong growth, although the volatile price of oil, upon which a 
large share of the country’s revenue depends, creates an unpredictable 
revenue stream” (Sherif 2008:168).  
 
Expansion of economic activities in the Emirate of Dubai over the last 
decade has been remarkable with double digit growth being achieved during 
the years 2000-2007; in the process, a significant percentage of the 
government’s macro-economic targets, outlined in Dubai Vision 2010 and 
announced in 2000, were achieved by 2005. Inevitably, a new master-plan 
was conceived to take Dubai to the next stage of its ambitious growth and 
social development trajectory.  
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In 2007, when the ruler of Dubai and Vice President of the United Arab 
Emirates, Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, announced the 
Dubai Strategic Plan (DSP) 2015, he chronicled an impressive and 
unprecedented economic performance by the sheikhdom. His Highness 
noted: 
 
 ...The Vision 2010 was announced in 2000. By 2005, Dubai had achieved 
what was planned to be achieved by 2010. In the year 2000, the plan was to 
increase GNP to US$30 billion by 2010.  In 2005, that figure was exceeded, 
with GNP reaching US$37 billion, he said. 
The plan also included an increase in income per capita to US$23,000 by 
the year 2010. In 2005, the average income per capita reached US$31,000. 
In other words, we realised, in five years, economic achievements went 
beyond those which were planned for a 10-year period (Sheikh Mohammed 
2007).  
 
In an attempt to put into perspective the level of economic growth that 
occurred in a decade: Dubai’s real economic expansion comparatively   
outpaced the “…emerging East Asian economies of China and India, and 
was much higher than developed economies of Ireland, Singapore, and the 
USA” (Jayashree & Rodriques 2008:3; Ghubash 2009:7). Similarly, Dubai 
outperformed many of the regional economies; but its GDP figures were 
substantially below its oil rich sister, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, as shown 
below, in Table 9.0.  
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Table 9.1: Timeline of Fiscal Years (1998-2008) (In millions of UAE Dirhams 
Year 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Abu 
Dhabi 
 
94,081 
 
148,439 
 
158, 321 
 
191,148 
 
226,170 
 
286,544 
 
359,497 
 
400,047 
 
667 
Dubai    45,918 62, 335 70,033 81,281 98,923 140,200 168,779 226,513 302 
Sharjah 16,803 21,380 24,842 28,795 35,393 35,718 42,837 68,463  
Compiled Sources: IMF Country Report No. 09/120—Statistical Appendix 
IMF Country Report No.07/348---- Statistical Appendix 
Dubai Statistic Centre Yearbook 2005 
 
The expansion of a country’s national output does not occur through mere 
wishful thinking, nor does it occur in isolation, but is due to a combination 
of economic and political factors. The macro-economic, geo-economic and 
political factors fuelling the growth spurt in the city-state include the 
following: 
 
“…government investment in infrastructure which boosted economic 
activities, increased private investment, availability of cheap capital and few 
capital controls, and the availability of relatively cheap labour from 
neighbouring Arab countries and the Indian sub-continent” (Sherif 
2008:168; Dubai Chamber of Commerce 2010: 1).  
 
Furthermore, “…Dubai’s growth success story is further driven by visionary 
leadership, innovative human resources, pro-business and friendly policies” 
(Ghubash 2009; Pradham 2009:3; Sampler & Eigner 2008). Other variables, 
based on the researcher’s personal observations, include:  
 
(i) Regional conflicts and quasi-conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran.  
 
(ii) Rise in disposable income of the local population, due in part to 
increased oil prices over the last ten years and the subsequent 
distribution of resources to the citizens of the city.  
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(iii) Creation of tax-free clusters of economic zones to enhance the 
economic diversification of the local economy. Chapters three and 
seven refer. 
 
(iv) Sound fiscal and monetary management.  
 
It is generally accepted, in modern development discourse, that economic 
growth is not tantamount to development; a close analysis of GDP figures 
shown in 9.1 would reveal that there are inequalities in the distribution of 
income at the household level generally. Within sub-groups of the expatriate 
community, however, the levels of inequality are excessive. The simple 
reality is, “….not everyone in the city will have access to the same level 
income or standard of living” (Willis 2005: 8-9).  State capitalism, of the 
magnitude seen in Dubai, cannot take place without a strong, innovative 
and competent state; requiring a discussion on the capacity of the Dubai 
state apparatus.  
 
9.3. State capacity  
 
The developmental model and culture of Dubai is one that engenders a 
doctrine or philosophy of urgency and pragmatic enunciation as an 
approach to national development goals. In an era where development 
policies are influenced and or designed by the Washington Census 
crusaders,  
 
…state capacity is a necessary condition to make use of opportunities 
provided by globalization and also to protect and promote the interests of 
vulnerable groups in societies. The state plays a critical role in alleviating 
poverty, protecting the environment, promoting human rights, ensuring 
gender equity and human security (Rondinelli & Cheema 2003: 8). 
 
This realignment of the state away from wholly following the ruling neo-
liberal dogma to embracing the dirgiriste approach of “more state and not 
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less” in the economy has inevitably strengthened the Dubai state which 
emerged from a fledging system in the early post-Britannica period into a 
strong, modern state which demonstrates flexibility and operates in an 
efficient, effective and capable manner. It is with this in mind, that Anouar 
Boukhars has commented that in “…the recent years the small emirate of 
Dubai emerged as the poster city-state for all those theorists and policy-
makers who believe that autocracies are best positioned to build up state 
capacity (the sequential argument) and elevate their countries from 
underdevelopment and backwardness (developmental state)” ( 2011: 156).  
 
Afshin Molavo, writing for the International Newsweek, states that the state 
apparatuses in Dubai and elsewhere in the region “….are not sinecures for 
tea-sipping bureaucrats, they attract top talent” (Molvao 2007). And in so 
doing, the emirate was able to “….mobilize and allocate  resources, and 
design institutions, to transform the domestic economy and society, in an 
orderly way, from a status of being underdeveloped to one of being more 
developed” (Gore 2000:789); in a very short period of time, especially 
between 1998 up to 2008. The state has displayed  enviable: “…even though 
over-stretched, the ability to meet rising demand for public utilities– 
including health care, education, access to jobs in the public sector and 
social welfare” (Ulrichsen 2011:94).  
 
It is the researcher’s observation that a combination of factors have 
contributed to the building of state capacity in Dubai. Firstly, political 
stability exists at the federal level and there is a nexus or an intertwining 
between federal and local institutions. This makes it very difficult for 
dissenting voices amongst functionaries in the bureaucracy to commit acts 
of sabotage against the state as a whole. In other words, the nation-building 
ethos of the state cannot be circumvented by the will of any one individual 
or group of individuals, given the agglomeration of local and federal 
institutions that provide technical and human strength to the process.  
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Secondly, the socio-cultural values of the society strengthen the legitimacy 
of the state on the basis that successive rulers of Dubai have since 1833 
“…held power under the principle of first amongst equals” (Al Rashid 
1997:127). Thirdly, in Dubai, “…few challenges exist to undermine the 
status quo in the political environment. There is no organized political 
opposition, as political parties and pressure groups are not permitted and 
positions within the government tend to be determined by tribal loyalties 
and economic power” (Sherif 2008:168). Fourthly, unlike many other 
countries around the world, state bureaucracy is bolstered by an army of 
skilled and experienced expatriate managerial cadres that are recruited from 
the best consultancies, government departments and universities around 
the world; a distinctly positive attribute of the emirate’s developmental 
initiatives and strategies.  
 
9.4. Embedded autonomy within the Federal State 
 
The term “embedded autonomy” was first introduced by Peter Evans in his 
studies of developing countries. He emphasized “…that markets work only if 
they are embedded in other forms of social relations” (Evans 1995 cited in 
Nasra and Dacin 2010: 600). In this section the researcher deviates from 
Evans’ notion of embedded autonomy, examined elsewhere in the thesis. 
The formation of the Federal State in 1971, and as envisioned, created a 
loosely structured supra-state. In this entity, each of the seven emirates 
retained a degree of limited autonomy (having ceded most of their 
sovereignty to a larger political project, namely the UAE), as laid out in the 
provisional constitution that was eventually adopted in 1996.    
 
Dubai is politically, institutionally, legally and economically embedded 
within the architectural framework or structures of the federation and its 
supporting operational infrastructure. To conceptually and stylistically echo 
Evans (1995), the Emirate of Dubai may be described as being in a state of 
“embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995 cited in Nasra and Dacin 2010: 600). 
The city–state has been able to maintain this unique institutional 
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arrangement (Ibid 2010: 600) and is able to use its residual autonomy to 
pursue a number of time bound, integrated, and comprehensive socio-
economic economic development strategies whose “…goals and objectives 
fall within” (Kay and Gwynne 2000:53) the overall national development 
agenda.   Nasra and Dacin (2010:598) remark that “…as a relatively small 
emirate, independence for Dubai could have led to isolation from the huge 
market opportunities that the Arab and Muslim regions represent.”  
 
Dubai does not possess the oil wealth beneath its sandy surface that its 
sister Emirate, Abu Dhabi does. However, due to the sheikhdom’s 
embeddedness within the structures of the federation, the city has benefited 
from the spin-off effects of the revenue generated from the federal budgetary 
allocation, social development projects in Dubai and the multiplier effects of 
private sector consumption and investment in the UAE generally.   
 
The Government of Dubai has benefited from the fact that, “through the 
establishment of free zones, […] the city has been able to decouple and 
distance its international economic activities from their national 
institutional frameworks” (Nasra and Dacin 2010: 600), yet remain still 
firmly embedded within the super state structure of the federation. This can 
be viewed a plausible arrangement that is able to provide a win-win outcome 
for the people of the UAE as whole.  
 
9.5. Replicability of the model 
 
This section addresses the research question as to whether the Dubai Model 
is replicable in the region or in other regional blocs. Prior to the global 
financial crisis of 2008/9, Dairabayeva (2010) noted, “…the Dubai Model 
has been working in Qatar, UAE, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan — who have 
seen the merits of the model and have adopted elements of it such as growth 
through private investment in the research and development (R&D) driven 
sectors.” Similarly, the model may be found “…in the African ‘micro state’ of 
Djibouti at the foot of the Red Sea” (Chorin 2010: 19). At times, writers have 
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waxed lyrical about the model and at other times have been less than 
complimentary about any attempt to replicate the Dubai Model elsewhere. 
One such writer, Yasser Elsheshtawy, in an article entitled “Dubai: Behind 
an Urban Spectacle”, describes “…various more (or less) successful attempts 
to recreate aspects of the Dubai built environment, in Sudan, Libya, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan” (Yasser Elsheshtawy 2010 in Chorin 2010:1). 
 
The ‘Dubai Model’ may not be perfect, but the researcher argues that there 
are merits to it, and in the era of neo-liberalism and unbridled capitalism, it 
has demonstrated that the state still has a constructive and developmental 
role to play. Contrary to the theoretical thinking of neo-contractarianism, the 
Dubai State according to Chang (2004:26) has shown that “….the sanctity 
of” development does not lie totally in the hands of the private sector or the 
proponents of a “minimalist state” (Ibid: 26). The Dubai hybrid model, of 
successful state led development has created a new political economy, not 
only in the UAE, but the entire Arab world, which is most notable “….in Abu 
Dhabi and Qatar” (Peterson 2009: 10). The political economy being created 
in Dubai is born out of the city’s home grown socio-economic development 
strategies.  
 
9.6. Home grown development strategy 
 
After the departure of the British from the Trucial States in the Southern 
Arabian Gulf, and the subsequent formation of the United Arab Emirates 
(Dubai included), the UAE, in keeping with “…desires of other newly 
independent nations to acquire not only political but economic 
independence from their former colonial masters put rapid economic 
development at the top of the political agenda” (Toye in Chang 2004:20).   
 
Dubai’s three development plans that were designed and implemented 
between 1996 and 2007 (Chapter seven refers), have not been influenced by 
international financial institutions which strongly emphasize and advocate 
macro-economic stabilization and liberalization in their balance of payments 
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support programmes. In addition “…through their lending activities and 
political support from the major industrialized countries, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were able to exercise considerable 
leverage on the design and implementation of developing countries’ 
macroeconomic and development policies” (UNCTAD 2006:42). Instead, 
Dubai developed a home grown cock-tail or hybrid model of development 
strategies and policies.  
 
For decades, it has been widely discussed and accepted that highly trained 
human capital forms one of the fundamental pillars of social and economic 
development. However, the city-state of Dubai has defied such conventional 
thinking about the human development perspective. An example of this is 
given by Hvidt (2009:403): 
 
“...while other countries struggle to educate and re-educate their population 
as they pass through various stages of development, Dubai basically 
purchases its workforce on the international market to suit current needs: 
construction workers and domestic servants from the Indian subcontinent; 
nurses, doctors, and teachers from Egypt, for example; and highly educated 
persons with qualifications in technical or economic fields from Europe and 
the United States.”  
 
The example above is just one of the tenets or pillars of a growing list of 
home grown development socio-economic development strategies pursued by 
the Government of Dubai. 
 
9.7. Social dimension and indicators of Dubai’s development 
 
In chapters three and five, the term “development” has been defined and 
contextualized to mean a process that involves people and their non-
economic wellbeing and not just the superficial calculation of the per capita 
income or the real/nominal GDP of a country. Table 9.2 summarizes some 
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of those fundamentally vital areas which are used as barometers to measure 
development.  
 
Table 9.2: Components and Indicators of Socio-Economic Development 
Components Indicators 
Population  Crude birth rate 
 Crude death rate 
 Life expectancy at birth 
 Population density 
 Crude rates of natural increase 
Education  Illiteracy rate 
 Percentage of children of school going age who are not at 
school 
 
  Economic Prosperity  The rate of unemployment 
 Percentage of households above the poverty line 
 Poverty rate as measured by the United Nations 
 Percentage of the population having access to social 
infrastructure (water, electricity and telecommunications) 
Health  Percent of the population without toilet facilities 
 Percentage of the population with access to primary and 
secondary health care 
 Ratio of doctor to patients 
  
Source: Adopted from Evans Chazireni 2003. The Spatial Dimension of Socio- 
Economic Development in Zimbabwe 
 
Within the context of the content in Table 9.1, “…there is an awareness in 
the UAE that the only guarantee of sustained development is the continuous 
investment in education, health and social services, with the provision of 
meaningful employment for all” (UAE Yearbook 2009: 205). At the local or 
emirate level, the “Dubai Strategic Plan (DSP) 2015 also concurs with these 
sentiments, stressing that strategic success requires social development to 
complement and parallel economic development” (Ibid:205). 
 
9.7.1. Improvement in social welfare 
 
The standard of social welfare in the UAE is considered as one of the best 
globally and is looked upon as a basic right of its citizens, which in turn, is 
considered as stemming from the responsibility of the UAE authorities to 
improve the societal welfare of all the population (UAE National Bureau of 
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Statistics 2009: 41). Subsidies and Transfer for the following Emirates listed 
below: 
 
Table 9.3: United Arab Emirates: Government Current Expenditures by Economic 
Emirates 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
Abu Dhabi 10,7782 6,590 7,272 13,836 23,066  23,748 N/A  
Dubai 888¹ 1,008 1,207 1,469 2,103 4,906 7,582  
Sharjah 42 45 63 120 134 1535 N/A  
Compiled Sources:  IMF Country Report No. 09/120-- United Arab Emirates: 
Statistical Appendix (2009),IMF Country Report No. 11/112- United Arab Emirates: 
Statistical Appendix (2011),IMF Country Report No. 07/348 United Arab Emirates: 
Statistical Appendix (October 2007). 
 
¹ Excludes water and electricity, which are settled in an off-budget account 
2 For 2005 it includes AED 6.2 billion that the government of Abu Dhabi contributed to its 
pension fund. 
 
The illustration of the historical expenditures for three of the seven emirates 
that are spent on social welfare on an annual basis, over a seven year 
period, as presented in Table 9.2, provides a snapshot of the nature of 
rentierism and the extent to which government takes its responsibility 
seriously. Dubai in particular has spent some AED 20 billion or US$ 5.438 
billion between 2002 and 2008 on social welfare, on a population of less 
than 2 million people and an even smaller local Emirati population that 
receives social welfare directly from the states in many different forms, as 
indicated in chapter seven. Through social welfare expenditures the 
Government of Dubai has been able to ensure that the poor and most 
vulnerable in the society are provided with a safety net to ensure social and 
economic dignity and survival. 
 
9.7.2.   Progress made in healthcare provision 
 
The UAE has seen notable growth in its health care system. Over the past 
years government health strategies have focused on the welfare of the 
citizens who are considered to be the country’s major resource and are 
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integral to national development. Comprehensive health programmes have 
been adopted to meet the needs of the UAE society (Jalal 2011) and the 
Emirati population is provided with free healthcare at government owned 
facilities, though in some cases a small user fee has to be paid. (Chapter 
seven refers). This is not the case in the expatriate community however, 
where such residents are required to pay the full economic costs of 
healthcare either through medical insurance and or by cash payment. In 
terms of Dubai’s basic vital statistics with regard to health it is comparable 
to any of the countries who identify themselves as developed countries. 
Table 9.3 below depicts Dubai’s Health Basic Vital Statistics Indicators 
 
Table 9.4: Dubai’s Health Basic Vital Statistics Indicators 
      Year     99     00       01     02     03      04     05    06     07 
CBR1  18.3 19.0 18.4 18.4 18.3 15.5 14.1 12.4 14.1 
IMR2 8.1 6.8 8.1 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.9 9.0 8.0 
Combined Sources: Dubai Statistics Centre Reports: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007 and 
2008      
1Crude Birth Rate per one thousand  
2Infant Mortality Rate per 1000 live births 
 
 In the Emirate of Dubai the quality of the healthcare infrastructure and its 
low doctor-to-patient ratio has contributed significantly to an internationally 
accepted infant mortality rate per thousand. The rate of IMR between 1999 
and 2007 averages 6.9 deaths per thousand live births. This figure is 
comparable to that of the USA, which according to the World Bank (2012), 
reports an average “…infant mortality rate of 7 per 1000 live births between 
1998 and 2002 and a similar figure between 2003 and 2007.”  An analysis 
of the World Bank’s infant mortality rate on a country by country basis 
shows that Dubai has a lower infant mortality rate than its regional 
neighbours Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen.  
 
Other vital socio-demographical statistics on the city of Dubai as reported by 
the Dubai Statistics Centre revealed that life expectancy at birth by gender 
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in 2007 was 75.8 for males and 75.7 for females (DSC 2007). Other social 
development indicators include the following: 
 
   For the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, Dubai boasted the enviable 
record of 100% of all households in the city having access to potable 
water.  
   In 2005, 2006, 2007, in the city of Dubai, 100% of all households 
benefited from access to electricity.  
   For the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, Dubai boasted the enviable 
record of 100% of all households in the city having access to 
sanitation facilities (DSC 2007). 
  
Dubai is an example of what rapid “…economic growth, unprecedented 
scientific advances” (WHO 1999:7) in healthcare and investment in 
healthcare infrastructure can accomplish. The overall health system 
performance of the UAE (including Dubai) “…was ranked 27th in the world 
by the World Health Organization” in its 2000 report. Advances in the 
education system in Dubai have been equally impressive, due mainly to the 
growing number of private educational institutions to be found across the 
city, as addressed in the following section. 
 
9.7.3. Improvement in human capital   
 
In acknowledging that a functional and well resourced education system, 
coupled with the equivalent human capital, is fundamental, “….the Federal 
Government of the United Arab Emirates has pursed educational excellence 
for its citizens through the provision of free education for all nationals 
from KG- Grade12 to University” (Goodwin 2006:1). 
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Table 9.5: Dubai’s Education Basic Vital Statistics 
 2008 
 
2007 2006 2005 
%age of illiteracy to 
population                                   
 4.7 5.0 5.4 
Illiteracy rate (15 yrs & 
above 
4.5 5.4 5.8 6.1 
Literacy rate 95.5 94.6 94.2 93.9 
Net employment ratio in 
primary education 
 81.0 80.5 81.3 
% of male students  52.0 51.8 51.8 
% of female students  48.0 48.2 48.82 
Combined Sources: Dubai Statistics Centre Yearbooks 2007 and 2009  
 
Table 9.5 above provides concrete evidence of the exponential strides that 
the Government of Dubai has made in providing universal education to all 
its citizens and, by extension, using education at all levels of the system to 
achieve social advancement. From the statistics in the abovementioned 
table, it may be observed that women, who were previously disadvantaged in 
this part of the world, have made tremendous strides educationally, through 
the sustained efforts of the state. No longer are women the face of illiteracy 
in the UAE where they are now just as literate as men, according to the 
Statistical Centre Reports of 2007 and 2009. The literacy rate in Dubai for a 
developing country is indeed very high and is steadily improving. The next 
section of this chapter will explore some of the demerits and the vulnerable 
underbelly of the city–state. 
 
9.8. Criticism of the model 
 
The study of development as an academic discipline and Encountering 
Development, as articulated by Escobar (1994), reveals that there is no 
single road to development; nor is there any utopian development paradigm 
because, if that were the case, there would not be so many theoretical 
constructs, each seeking to displace its predecessor as the best development 
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approach since the ascendancy of development economics within 
mainstream economics.  
 
9.8.1. Embedded rentierism 
 
The socio-economic development model of the oil rich sheikhdoms of the 
GCC, including the UAE, as has been emphasised, is built around political 
patronage or rentierism. The genealogical discourse on rentierism in the 
Gulf States (including the UAE) gained traction as outlined in Section 6.2.1 
from the writings of Hossain Mahadavy (1970), Beblawi and Luciani (1987) 
and Luciani (1990). Further insight is provided by Davidson who notes: 
 
[….] Dubai’s rentier structures continue to tie the hand of the government to 
the burdensome distributive practices and breed a certain unproductive 
mentality among the indigenous or local population. High oil revenue allows 
the state to set up a system of distributed wealth in which all members of 
the national population, even the recently  urbanized Bedouin, were 
provided with jobs, housing, education and welfare (Davidson 2008:177-
178). 
 
To contextualize Davidson and other scholars of the Middle East: the rentier 
nature of Dubai’s political economic has created an unhealthy dependence 
on the state to provide opportunities for its citizens. The rentier and social 
welfare, nature of the city–state acts as an inhibitor of the productive 
application of the local population’s human capital. In addition, in this post-
oil era, with limited sources of state revenue, the government of Dubai has 
had to start extracting rent from non-Emirati residents in the city, 
manifesting in the form of employment and/or commercial sponsorship. The 
machinations of this system, in short, require that every foreigner working 
in Dubai has to be sponsored by a company (employer) and every 
commercial entity that has set up operations in Dubai (outside of a free 
zone) has to be sponsored by another, an Emirati citizen, or company, and 
which by Federal Law No.8 of 1984 owns 51% of the ex-pat’s company.  
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This rent-extracting arrangement holds serious implications for state-society 
relations, as well as for the ultimate support of the legitimacy of the state. In 
essence, the continued constitutional arrangement that guarantees its 
citizens generous social welfare forms the basis of the city’s rentier political 
economy that could stymie further economic development if rentier 
tendencies in the city continue to sabotage the human resources 
development architecture.  
 
9.8.2. Heavy reliance on expatriate labour 
 
Chapter seven highlighted the Dubai Strategic Plans (DSPs) in terms of their 
social and macroeconomic strategic objectives. The developmental goals of 
the three developmental models discussed in the previous chapter have 
fundamentally changed the structural architecture of the economy and 
social nostrum of Dubai. The economy of Dubai, which is similar to that of 
the UAE as a whole, has been thus described: it “….is a transitional 
economy that is in an advanced process of  diversifying away from 
hydrocarbon-based to non-hydrocarbon-based economic growth” (Al Awad 
2010:11).  
 
Hence, at a macro level, the Government of Dubai, purely out of socio-
economic and political necessity, has pursued a hybrid model for a state 
centric capitalism agenda that has inadvertently ushered in a new 
development paradigm in the Middle East, to the extent that:   
 
“.since the early 1990s, Dubai has been engaged in a process of economic 
expansion and diversification driven by the knowledge that oil production, 
having peaked at 410,000 barrels per day in 1991, is in decline and now 
accounts for less than 10% of GDP” (Pacione 2005: 257).  
 
Pacione, (2005:255) and Alzaabi ( 2012:iv),  have noted that “….the economic 
transformation of Dubai over recent decades has been accompanied by 
major changes in relation to its demographic structure and social 
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transformation which have been fuelled by economic expansion based on 
the oil industry that created a demand for labour and expertise that could 
only be satisfied from abroad”. The demand for foreign labour has not 
abated; instead, it was exacerbated between 1996 and 2008, just before the 
global financial crisis temporarily dampened the appetite for foreign labour, 
largely due to the implementation of all the developmental objectives, as 
outlined in chapter seven. 
 
For Sholkamy (2012:96) the raison d’étre for the unending demographic 
shift in the structure of the Dubai population, is that noted by Kanna, in a 
piece of scholarly work entitled Flexible Citizenship in Dubai: Neoliberal 
Subjectivity in the Emerging “City-Corporation”: the fact that “Dubai’s 
citizen population is too miniscule to be productive on a national scale”; 
this, coupled with the “…generous welfare and rentier structure of the 
economy enables citizens to work in well paying public sector jobs with 
short hours, leaving the private sector staffed by a foreign labour force” 
(Kanna 2010:103-104).  
 
A second compounding reason for what Davidson (2005) regarded as heavy 
reliance on foreigners is that, “…compared to UAE nationals, the high 
economic rent associated with foreign workers and their ability to tolerate 
relatively poor working conditions and to work long hours have blown up the 
reliance on them until they dominated the private sector with more than 
98% of overall labourers and when combined with the public sector it 
amounts to over 90% of the national workforce [sic]” (Al Awad 2010:11, UAE 
Yearbook 2009: 212).  
 
Here, Al Awad is implicitly referring to the massive army of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers who are important constituents in this transitional 
economy. However, there is also, at the summit of “….the social stratum, a 
network of….” (Moore 2001:52) what Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill 
(2004) along with Robert Cox (1987) call the [...] “transnational managerial 
class”, in conjunction with what Leslie Sklair describes as the “globalizing 
257 
 
bureaucrats” (2001). To further compound the problem, at the meso or 
micro level, from personal observation, Emiratis in Dubai consider certain 
tasks as too menial to do, irrespective of their own socio-economic status in 
the society. They suffer from what is known as the “mudīr syndrome”, 
referred to in Section 8.8.1.   
 
Dubai, along with countries such as the Seychelles, Singapore and Hong 
Kong, “…sits astride an uncomfortable dilemma in terms of its national 
development policy as the massive presence of foreign workers has 
contributed greatly to the development process in the UAE” (Kirk 2010:1; 
Alzaabi 2012: iv, 23). But, in a paradoxical twist of fate, the Emirate’s policy 
of high dependence on foreign labour comes with a price in terms of the 
social costs to its society. Al Awad’s (2010:11) perspective on this matter is 
that:  
 
….the cheap cost to private sector companies may not be true for the society. 
The large presence of foreign workers (foreign population) demands 
amplification of the services provided by the government, including security 
and other measures, and they may threaten the national identity of the 
country. 
 
A development strategy that relies on the predominant use of guest workers 
in Dubai has socio-political consequences because, collectively, the foreign 
labour force has “…become a revolutionary force on which the nation’s 
government rests for its prosperity” (Alzaabi 2012:23). 
 
This author adds: 
 
… The legal rights and privileges of expatriates in the UAE have, over time, 
exceeded those of UAE nationals. As this occurs, it becomes apparent that 
the host nationals (and their voices) are marginalized. This notion, in and of 
itself, threatens the stability of nation by the loss of its own identity (Ibid: 
23). 
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In addition, Al Awad (2010:4,5, 6 and 23) noted, “ …there are social costs to 
be borne by local and federal governments and society for the employment of 
workers which includes the use of infrastructure and public facilities, they 
add to the cost of maintaining security, they consume some of the subsidies 
on petrol, electricity, health, education, public transportation and water.”  
 
As is further noted by Al Awad, this, 
 
“…social cost makes around 21% of overall annual cost of labor in general in 
the UAE including Dubai.  However, it can be argued that the overall social 
cost is under-estimated since only items that can be valued in money terms 
are included in the calculations. Other items such as the impact on culture 
and national identity, and on the causation of unemployment among UAE 
nationals, as a result of competition from relatively cheaper labor, are 
extremely hard to monetize, but are equally as important as other included 
items” (Al Awad 2010:6).  
 
Not included in Al Awad’s analysis are the billions of US dollars that move 
out of the country every year in the form of remittances to what are known 
as “labour sending countries”. It is estimated that on average, USD 12.5 
billion is repatriated from the UEA annually, which represents a substantial 
leakage from the local economy that could have been used for consumption 
of goods and services or for other economic activities that would ultimately 
further boost growth and development of the city. Similarly, the 
environmental damage has not been quantified and or explained as a social 
cost to the society. A compressed explanation of the environmental 
degradation is provided below. 
 
9.8.3. Unsustainable environmental model 
 
It is believed that “…the destruction and displacement of flora and fauna 
during development is a major cause of biodiversity loss and habitat 
fragmentation” (Gardener & Howarth 2009:30) in any society; the situation 
in Dubai is similar to that of other countries which have experienced the 
259 
 
gravity of massive urbanization that has occurred in the city over the decade 
prior to the global financial meltdown. The New York Times, on October 27 
2010, published an article entitled “Dubai faces environmental problems 
after growth” in which the author wrote,   
 
“...Like a Middle Eastern version of Las Vegas, Dubai’s biggest challenge is 
water, which may be everywhere in the Gulf but is undrinkable without 
desalination plants. These produce emissions of carbon dioxide that have 
helped give Dubai and the other United Arab Emirates one of the world’s 
largest carbon footprints. They also generate enormous amounts of heated 
sludge, which is pumped back into the sea” (Alderman in The New York 
Times, October 27, 2010).  
 
Environmental issues have gained the attention of UAE policymakers, but 
remain subsidiary to the imperative of economic development. According to 
the World Wildlife Fund’s 2010 Living Planet Report, the UAE also continues 
to have the world’s biggest per capita “ecological footprint” which may be 
described as the amount of land and water area needed to produce the 
resources a population consumes, and to absorb its CO2 emissions (BTI 
2012: 19). Of relevance here is, Section 3.2.6 of this thesis where Elgendy 
(2012), is quoted when he points out that,  
“…Throughout, [sic] the last three decades, the city of Dubai has not been 
known for its emphasis on sustainability as guiding principles for its 
development. Not only did it adopt an unnatural rate of growth by Middle 
Eastern and global standards, it has also long disregarded the 
environmental and social consequences of its rapid urbanization. Dubai’s 
growth relied on - and was economically fuelled by - a development model 
which imported inappropriate and inefficient building forms and planted 
them in its extreme climate.”  
 
For, example, “…a 1,500 square miles city (3,885 square kilometres) with 
isolated island buildings that are not only divorced from their environments, 
but which also require a great amount of fossil fuel energy to remain 
habitable” (Elgendy 2010). Similarly, McEachern et al. (2006) noted that 
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“…Dubai is producing large quantities of waste products from hotels, 
airlines, and other types of business activities coupled with a waste 
management programme that is poorly managed,” which has become a 
major concern for environmental activists.”  
 
A former senior manager for a construction company commented, that 
“….ecological concerns were always expressed by certain sections of the 
population (Interview 21). The biggest concerns according to the respondent 
“….were over the reclaiming of the sea to build the palm and world islands” 
(Interview 22) He noted that the “ecology is very fragile and that 
environmental damage to coral reefs and fishery would have long-term 
implications for the environment” (Interview 22). In other words, one 
attendant problem of sustained economic growth is the manifestation of 
environmental social costs.  
 
Renowned geographer, Michael Pacione, in an insightful article on the urban 
development of Dubai feels that “….the emirate’s housing policy has several 
consequences for the physical development of Dubai – as plots of land are 
provided to individuals rather than to households, the total amount of land 
required for nationals’ housing is increased” (Pacione 2005:261). This policy 
lends itself to possible misuse of land in a city where the shortage of land is 
becoming a constraint in the busy conurbation (Henderson 2006:95) of the 
city.  
 
The macro-economic targets that undergird Dubai’s SDP and the objectives 
of the city’s Urban Strategic Plan unequivocally illustrate the Government of 
Dubai’s commitment to economic growth (especially via tourism 
programmes); however, the state “….appears to have overlooked less 
desirable ramifications or social costs that emanate from increased tourists 
[sic] arrivals and other economic activities on coastal and desert areas” (Al-
Mehairi, 1995; EIU, 2005b cited in Henderson 2006: 95). Across the city, 
residents and ecologists have been most vociferous about the fact that 
“…road traffic has increased with private car ownership, resulting in 
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congestion and atmospheric pollution” (Ibid: 95). From personal, non-
participatory observation, the researcher has noted that the pristine 
ecological balance of what is left of the Dubai desert landscape is rapidly 
being destroyed by the commercial activities in the form of organized sand 
dune bashing by one of the many Safari Adventure companies in caravans 
of 4x4vehicles.   
 
9.8.4. Lack of citizenship  
 
The concept of citizenship revolves around a number of political, economic, 
social and cultural rights and the civil freedoms acquired by individuals 
through their membership of a certain society on the basis of equality with 
others (Al Kitbi 2009:63). More specifically,  
 
“...Among UAE nationals, the nation-state is accepted as highly legitimate. 
There is also broad agreement as to the concept of citizenship and who has 
the right to be a UAE citizen. In principle, citizenship is available to 
foreigners who have lived in the UAE for a minimum of 20-25 years, 
although cases exist where citizenship has been granted by the rulers on an 
individual basis” (BTI 2012:5). 
 
It is however important to point out that the above is the exception and not 
the rule.  
 
In Chapter eight, the contribution of the expatriate community to national 
development is documented; however, there are thousands of Europeans, 
east Africans, Americans and predominantly south Asians who have lived in 
Dubai from the time when it was a Trucial state under the British, yet have 
not been awarded citizenship or permanent residency status. These 
residents still have to be sponsored by an Emirati citizen if they work 
outside one of the many free zones that have been formed in recent years. 
As noted, there is a different regulatory framework that governs the 
ownership structure of an incorporated entity and by extension the 
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sponsorship of employees in these economic zones. Estimates “….suggest 
that there are between 20,000 and 100,000 residents in the country who 
lack citizenship, including people mainly of Iranian or Asian origin who have 
lived in the UAE for longer than three decades” (BTI 2012:11).  
 
The Federal State has jurisdiction over matters of nationality and 
naturalization and all constituent Emirates abide by Federal Laws. With this 
in mind, Federal Law No.17, concerning Nationality and Passports, that was 
issued on 18/11/1972 and later amended by Federal Law no. 10/1975 
dated 15/11/1975, specifically Article 2 C and D of the legislation, define a 
person who cannot be a citizen as follows:  
(2.C)  Anyone born in the country or abroad, to a mother who is a citizen by 
law, whose fatherhood is not substantiated. 
 
(2.D)  Anyone born in the country or abroad to a mother who is a citizen 
         by law; whose father is unknown or without nationality. 
 
Legally, these two clauses, according to Al Kitbi (2009:74), “…adopt a 
discriminatory policy posture against Emirati women that limits the exercise 
of citizenship rights by depriving them of the ability to pass on their 
nationality to their children born to a foreign father or a father of an 
unknown nationality.” 
 
The UAE is not bereft of innovative ideas and thus uses “…a variety of 
methods to limit the residency and citizenship rights of foreign workers. 
Such methods include sponsorship systems in which workers are tied to a 
particular employer, rotational systems of migrant labor to limit the 
duration of foreigners’ stay, and also limits on the ability of migrant workers 
to bring their families with them, and curbs on naturalization rights” (Misra 
2007:3). For example only employees who earn a minimum salary of 
AED4000 (US$1100) on a monthly basis are permitted to sponsor their 
family to live with them in Dubai or the UAE generally. 
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Given that a non-Emirati resident in Dubai cannot become a citizen as a 
matter of policy (unless a woman marries an Emirati man and is allowed to 
become a citizen after ten years of continuous marriage), this does not bode 
well for the developmental sustainability of the city-state. Its status of being 
a net importer of labour will continue to prevail if the law is not changed in 
the interest of sustainable development and good public policy. This single 
piece of legislation goes a considerable distance in hindering the country’s 
development path.  
 
9.8.5. Abuse of migrant labour  
 
Beneath the untrammelled prosperity of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and the city state of Dubai in particular lies the plight of an exploited 
migrant workforce (Tock 2010: 109). In observance of the 150th staging of 
International Labour Day, the Minister of Labour, Saqr Gobash Saeed 
Gobash of the UAE, in a speech to commemorate the day, declared that 
“…the UAE (including Dubai) see workers as an important stakeholder in 
the growth of the country as well as development stakeholders” (Salama 
2009). The constitution expressly provides that, “…foreigners present in the 
UAE are entitled to the rights and freedoms and are subject to the 
correlative duties provided for under the respective international 
instruments or under conventions and treaties to which the UAE is a party” 
(http://www.uaeim.ae/labour-market). Contrary to legal provisions, Tock 
(2010) and Hunt (2012) submit that “…international human rights law is 
neglected and, indeed, violated, in an unrelenting pursuit of economic 
growth and embodies capitalism’s worst excesses, where the luxurious 
lifestyle of the rich depends upon the quasi-slavery of millions of migrant 
workers” in Dubai and the UAE generally. 
 
The Human Rights Watch Report (2006), noted that “…the UAE federal labor 
law of 1980 makes provisions that apply to both UAE nationals and migrant 
workers. But the federal government of the UAE has abdicated almost 
entirely from its responsibility to protect workers’ rights by investigating, 
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prosecuting and remedying abusive and unlawful conduct by employers 
towards the construction workers. It has failed to enforce UAE law that 
since 1980 has required the government to implement a minimum wage.”  
 
In “Dubai, together with its Emirate neighbours, has achieved ‘the state of 
the art’ as it relates the disenfranchisement of labour. In a country that only 
abolished slavery in 1963, trade unions, most strikes and all agitators are 
illegal, while 99 percent of the private-sector workforce is immediately 
deportable non-citizens. Indeed, the deep thinkers at the American 
Enterprise and Cato Institutes must salivate when they contemplate the 
system of classes and entitlements in Dubai” (Davis 2006:64).  
 
Anecdotal stories, non-participant observations and informal interviews with 
migrant or guest workers across different communities reveal shocking and 
unparalleled abuses. Similarly, Keane and McGeehan (2008) and Hunt 
(2012) have noted, below:   
“…Stories of passports confiscation, withheld wages and squalid living 
conditions. Workers building the Burj Khalifa – the towering icon of Dubai’s 
ambition – on wages of just £2.84 a day, rioted in 2006, attracting 
international coverage. The UAE's exploitation of the relative economic 
weakness of its South Asian neighbours has led to a situation that can be 
characterised as bonded labour of migrant workers, a form of slavery as 
defined under international law.”  
Dubai, like its neighbours, flouts ILO labour regulations and refuses to 
adopt the international Migrant Workers Convention. In 2003, Human 
Rights Watch accused the Emirates of building prosperity on “forced labour” 
(Davis 2010).  Meo writing for the The Independent (March 01, 2005) 
previously emphasized, “...the labour market closely resembles the old 
indentured labour system brought to Dubai by its former colonial master, 
the British.” “…Like their impoverished forefathers”, the London paper 
continued, “today’s Asian workers are forced to sign themselves into virtual 
slavery for years when they arrive in the United Arab Emirates. [...] newly 
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arrived guest workers’ rights disappear at the airport where recruitment 
agents confiscate their passports and visas to control them” (Meo 2005, 
March 01). Meo also highlighted that, “…the resemblances between the 
indentured labour system and the system of slavery that accompanied 
Britain’s nineteenth century imperial adventures in the sheikhdoms are 
palpable” (Meo 2005 cited in Tock 2010:117). The text box below provides a 
specific case of labour rights violations and abuses. 
 
      Text Box 1. 
 
El-Mectawel LLC is a Dubai Incorporated business that has offers a number 
of services such as Real Estate, Government Typing and Translation 
Services, Building Maintenance and Catering Services. In one of the 
buildings under its management, there are nineteen employees from the 
following countries: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Cameroon. The 
employees work virtually seven days a week: this is in violation of the UAE 
labour law. The Cameroonian, a qualified air conditioning technician, is paid 
AED 2200 (US$651.27) per month; the Indian cleaner/watchman receives a 
salary of AED 1200 (US$326.264) on a monthly basis. The Bangladeshi 
maintenance staff get AED 1000 (US$271.89): The Pakistani company driver 
earns AED2500 (US$679.71). They all receive the aforementioned monthly 
salaries if there are no fines due to them not answering their phones on their 
day off, and or if they are caught smoking close to their place of work.  
 
The Cameroonian shares a dog kennel-sized room provided by the company 
as part of its compensation, with two other workers. In the room there is only 
enough room for a bunk bed and a single bed. The semblance of a shared 
kitchen is a space shared with two giant garbage skips. A toilet and shower 
facility is provided that is fit only for animal usage, not human beings. The 
workers do not have a place to wash their clothes or to hang them.  They are 
given a return ticket once every two years even though they are eligible for 
annual leave every year.  
Source: Personal observation and interview (Interview 20, 2012). 
 
In an interview that the researcher conducted in May 2009 with a Nepali 
security guard at one of Dubai’s International Schools (who was also the 
266 
 
translator for six other security guards) he revealed similar labour rights 
abuses to aforementioned by their employer. 
 
The respondent stated that:  
 
“...he and his almost two hundred colleagues were paid a basic Dhs 740 or 
USD 202 per month while with overtime their monthly take home pay 
amounts to Dhs 1300 or USD 354. They work 30 days a month on twelve 
hour shifts; they are given [an] annual vacation every two years. The 
accommodation of these security guards is in the neighbouring Emirate 
Ajman, which takes them 2 hours in the morning to reach their postings 
while a return trip could take a minimum of two hours, depending on how 
freely the traffic is flowing. There are twelve grown men sharing one kitchen, 
one bathroom and six of them sleep in a very small room” (Interview 2-8, 
2009).  
 
Ironically, all of the abovementioned working conditions described by the 
interviewees are in violation of the UAE’s 1980 Labour Law. However, the 
state has toed a careful line in enforcing its own labour regulations in 
protecting the rights accorded to the expatriate workforce under the law. A 
partial explanation comes against the background that an employee is free 
to find an alternative form of employment if he/she is not happy with the 
terms and conditions of their employment or contracts.   
 
The Ethiopian Consulate General officials complain bitterly about the 
inhumane treatment meted out to this country’s citizens who work as 
domestic workers in the homes of Arab nationals. One official showed third 
degree burns all over the bodies of ladies as he tried to drum up support for 
his fund raising effort to raise enough money to repatriate at least two ladies 
per month back to Ethiopia. This is not unique to the Ethiopian Consulate 
General, as the Philippines, and Sri Lankan Consulates in Dubai face 
similar experiences and challenges.  
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It is against this background that Abdul-Ahad of the UK Guardian writes: 
 
“...behind the dizzying construction boom is an army of migrant labourers 
lured into a life of squalor and exploitation. All around, a city of labour 
camps stretches out in the middle of the Arabian desert, a jumble of low, 
concrete barracks, corrugated iron, chicken-mesh walls, barbed wire, scrap 
metal, empty paint cans, rusted machinery and thousands of men with tired 
and gloomy faces” (Abdul-Ahad, Guardian, October 8, 2008,). 
 
Another reporter from the UK based newspaper The Independent, reported 
that: 
 
“… In plain view very evening, the hundreds of thousands of young men who 
build Dubai were bused from their sites to a vast concrete wasteland an 
hour out of town, where they are quarantined away. Until a few years ago 
they were shuttled back and forth on cattle trucks, but the expats 
complained this was unsightly, so now they are shunted on small metal 
buses that function like greenhouses in the desert heat. They sweat like 
sponges being slowly wrung out. In one location called Sonapur which was a 
rubble-strewn patchwork of miles and miles of identical concrete buildings, 
some 300,000 men live piled up here, in a place whose name in Hindi means 
"City of Gold". In the first camp I stop at – riven with the smell of sewage and 
sweat – the men huddle around, eager to tell someone, anyone, what was is 
happening to them” (see Appendix VI) (Hari, The Independent, April 7, 
2009). 
 
It is generally known in Dubai that the Department of Labour, on the 
surface, advocates for the protection of the rights of the city’s guest workers 
accorded to them under the 1980 labour law. However, on the ground, the 
reality is fundamentally different. It is not surprising that the critics of 
Dubai’s state-centric development write that, “…the libertarians would argue 
that those who had overlooked the authoritarian side of its successes would 
not be able to respond to the charges that crony capitalism and workers’ 
oppression went hand in hand” (Moore 2001:46). This observation by Moore 
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correlates positively with, and is a manifestation of, a typical developmental 
state, whose governments face a moral and legal dilemma. At the macro 
level the state pits its developmental objectives against the individual 
aspirations of its citizens. 
 
It is unavoidable for one to harbour the feeling that human rights abuses 
make for good business, and that what is deemed good for business has to 
be good for Dubai Incorporated; thus the authorities are hamstrung in 
acting more decisively to deal with the widespread violations of workers’ civil 
liberties and human rights. Like good bedfellows, human rights abuses 
appear to be inseparably linked to discriminatory practices. 
 
9.8.6. Institutionalized discrimination 
 
Despite recent progress against racial inequalities (Emerson & Yancey 
2010), the issue of racial discrimination still exists in many parts of the 
world, including Dubai. To state this more pointedly, racism is 
institutionalized in the UAE and Dubai in particular. Dr Naeem Zumfuli, a 
professor at Sharjah University specialising in human resources, agrees 
when he notes that: 
 
“… racial discrimination in pay was "a big problem" in the UAE. There is a 
lot of discrimination according to nationality and religion in the labour 
market, which affects the contribution of those who suffer from it. They feel 
dissatisfied and this reflects in their work and affects the lives of sometimes 
large families in the UAE and abroad.” (Zumfuli 2009 cited in Stafford, 
2009).  
 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights goes 
further by noting that “….racism and other forms of discrimination are not 
only human rights violations but also major obstacles to achieving 
development” (OHCHR May 2007). If the systemic racism and 
discrimination, which are so deeply embedded within the private and public 
sectors in Dubai, are not surgically removed, then the ramifications on the 
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society will be too costly to be quantified. Discrimination in Dubai manifests 
itself in a number of ways. The text box below itemises ways in which 
expatriates are discriminated against in Dubai and the GCC generally.  
 
 
Textbox: 2 
Discriminatory Employment Practice—Advertisements in the Daily Gulf News 
Publication  
December 1998: Advert # 1 
Operations Manager needed with a civil engineer degree. The candidate 
must be SA/UK/US or Australia educated.  
December 1999: Advert # 2  
Sales Executive needed for international sports company preferred 
candidate should be UK/US/Australia educated.  
May 2008: Advert # 3  
One of the most successful global pharmaceutical organizations is seeking a 
polished personal assistant (PA) to the Managing Director. Preferred 
candidate should be UK/US/SAF/Aus or western educated.  
(See Appendix V  for others) 
Sources: Compiled from a number of Gulf News daily publications 
 
It is common to find these types of advertisements in the local newspapers 
daily. From personal experience, formal and informal interviews conducted 
with a number of teachers, and other professional groups in the city, there 
seems to be a hierarchy that determines who is recruited for executive and 
managerial positions in both the private and public sectors. Americans, 
British, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans and other 
Europeans form the top of the pecking order. Asians, followed by Africans, 
are at the bottom of the pecking order. Ironically even within the Asian 
community there is systemic racism: Indians are the kingpins, followed by 
the Pakistanis, then the Sri Lankans, while at the bottom of the ladder are 
the Nepalese for certain types of jobs: banking, accountancy, construction, 
gardening, security guards and petrol attendants. In the retail and 
hospitality industries, Filipinos are preferred for their fine physical features 
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and courteous old fashioned manners. Table 9.6 gives an indication of the 
ethnic hierarchy that is constitutive of Dubai’s labour market for domestic 
workers.  
 
 
Table 9.6: Salary Structure: For household workers 
Nationality Monthly Salary AED (USD)  
Sri Lankan 900 (244.23 ) As per the Sri Lankan embassy 
Philippino 1400 (380.12) As per the Philippines’ Consulate 
Indian 1100 (298.66) As advised by the Indian Embassy 
Nepali 900 (244.23) As advised by the Nepali Consulate 
Ethiopian 800 (217.21) As per Ethiopian Consulate General 
Source:  Kapur (2012) and Kader (2012) 
 
It is generally acknowledged in Dubai that migrant workers are paid based 
on which passport they hold. However, being an Indian with an American 
passport does not automatically promote one to the top of the employment 
hierarchy. In an interview with a senior medical engineer, he pointed out 
firmly that “….an Indian will never be paid the market rate based on his 
qualification and experience, in Dubai, even if he has an American or British 
passport” (Interview 21, 2013). This applies to Africans and other Asians 
unless a particular individual possesses a rare skill that a company is 
unable to fill in the short run. From personal experience in Dubai where the 
researcher has been a part of the expatriate community and by extension, 
the labour force, he has had the undignified experience of being overlooked 
for promotion primarily on the basis of the colour of his skin. He has also 
been offered less attractive employment packages at some of the city’s top 
academic institutions for doing the same work as his European, Australian 
and Canadian colleagues with lower qualifications and less experience than 
himself. Paradoxically, he has also been paid more than his Asian colleagues 
with similar experience and qualifications.   
 
In Dubai the colour of one’s skin determines which doors are opened to one. 
Like other regional economies, and those of the former Asian tigers, the 
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exponential growth and diversification of the economy that made it a hub for 
finance, aviation, tourism, logistics and trade exacted a price in terms of 
human suffering and the stripping away of individuals’ dignity, especially 
those at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder. In human capital 
theory, this is regarded as taste based discrimination, and companies are 
willing to pay a high economic cost to Europeans and their descendants 
from the so-called civilized world. Pepe Escobar (2008, June 7) summarizes 
this most appropriately in stating that Dubai (is) “…the ultimate socio-
political model for the 21st century: a Blade Runner which is a melting pot of 
neo-liberalism and subterranean economy fuelled by an army of disposable, 
imported cheap labour.” Dubai displaying characteristics of a developing 
economy that is on the “global-periphery” (Kay & Gwynne 2000:57) however 
the city:  
 
Has been able to be the centre of trade, tourism, finance and aviation and by 
extension the quintessential representation of a new centre- periphery 
labour market model in terms of stratified and systemic taste based 
discrimination against guest workers from the so-called LDCs.    
 
Dubai, unlike any other society, has developed the reputation, through its 
home grown transnational corporations, of importing so-called guest 
workers and then creating an artificial racial stratification system. In so 
doing it has created a new Marxian type class struggle between the owners 
of capital and the vast army of the underclass that comprises the city’s 
mobile and transient workforce.  
 
9.8.7. Domination by MNCs and external economies 
 
The economic structure of GCC states and Dubai in particular displays an 
unhealthy “….domination by multinationals that has led to over- 
dependence on foreign technology” (Davidson 2005:120). The Arab world, 
and Dubai specifically, imports virtually all of its industrial and other means 
of production and as such (Ibid:120) it is becoming “…. increasingly 
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apparent that many of the new sectors, especially those geared towards 
attracting foreign investment are making Dubai even more reliant on foreign 
economies than it was during the oil booms” (Davidson 2008:177). 
 
The unrelenting emphasis on the diversification of Dubai’s economy away 
from the diminishing dependence on hydro-carbon creates a socio-economic 
and political dilemma for the Emirate, which is to embrace the orthodoxy of 
the benefits that accompany MNCs while hoping to mitigate the “pernicious 
consequences” (Driscoll & Clark 2003:75) in the form of social costs to the 
society as a whole that may emanate from the operations in the city-state.  
 
A second, but equally important point was made by, a senior corporate and 
investment banking lawyer in the city who explained to me that “….an over-
dependence on foreign companies by the Government of Dubai is risky in 
the sense that if the state were to introduce new economic policies that 
represent a significant departure from a prior policy path, it may culminate 
in the relocation of some companies to other jurisdictions” (Interview19, 
2012). The respondent further noted that, “….if corporate and income taxes 
were to be implemented in Dubai, then the city may experience serious 
economic fallout as businesses seek to domicile in countries with policies 
that are amenable  to the overall strategic objective” (Interview 19, 2012).  
 
The replicability of the Dubai Inc., development model in Eurasia, Africa and 
the wider GCC states further demonstrates the socio-political and economic 
risks based on a policy of overdependence on MNCs as businesses do not 
owe their loyalty to any nation state, but instead only to their shareholders. 
In his trademark lively style, Moore (2000), mooted that “… outside its 
national borders the capitalists will search the seas for cheaper or better 
sources of raw materials and labour and also be in search of a higher rate of 
return on their non-productive portfolio investment.” Essentially, MNCs will 
go where the return on capital is highest. 
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Dubai is classified as a developing economy in spite of its internationally 
comparable GDP, GDP per capita, and social indicators; thus, as it has been 
emphasised several times, the city falls on the periphery of the international 
financial and capitalist system. Consequently, SOHCs of Dubai have 
parasitically aligned themselves to individuals, international capital and 
money markets stemming from what dependency theorists regard as 
“centre” economies in terms of the global capitalistic system, for the sole 
purpose of capital extraction and accumulation. Driscoll and Clark 
(2003:76) caution against such over-reliance on FDIs from MNCs as they 
have expressed the view that “….western MNCs are not interested in 
development at all, only in making bigger profits by ensuring that the poor 
stay poor.” In the words of Todaro (2000:587-590), “….MNCs, like portfolio 
investors, are not in the development business and just maybe there can be 
a congruence of interest between the profit making objectives of MNCs and 
the development priorities of MNCs and the development priorities of the 
host country.”  
 
The neoliberal approach to development and modernity in Dubai exposes 
the city to external shocks and systemic vulnerability that could lead to the 
deconstruction of the emirate’s state-centric interventionist developmental 
project. The global financial crisis of 2008 highlighted Dubai’s economic 
vulnerability to its over-dependence on “….external financing that leaves it 
prone to volatile cycles and invariably this is one of the side effects of rapid 
economic growth” (Economist 2012, April 7) built around an “….FDI-Growth 
Model” (Kerbl 2004: i). The over-dependency on foreign capital is noticeable 
when visiting some of the multi-sector free economic zones such as Dubai 
Internet City, Dubai Investment Park, Dubai Multi Commodities Centre 
(DMCC), Silicon Oasis etcetera.  
 
Such heavy reliance on portfolio investments or external economies is a 
risky strategy for any economy that is demographically dominated by 
foreigners. Coupled unfortunately with an indigenous private sector that is 
still very much dependent on a patron-client relationship with the state and 
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is quantitatively too small to achieve the ambitious macro-economic targets 
set out in DSP 2015, it invariably and unavoidably opens up the domestic 
economy to the machinations and efficacy of the international financial 
system. The risk of such a policy is not lost on His Highness Sheikh 
Mohammed Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, who commented, whilst addressing the 
MENA Frontier Conference in Dubai, that “…. the repercussions of the crisis 
is [sic] felt more severely by economies that are open and interactive with 
international markets.” (Gulf News, November 9, 2010). The global financial 
crisis referred to by His Highness impacted negatively on Dubai’s state-led 
debt-driven commercial and development activities, explained below.  
 
9.8.8. Debt leveraging 
 
Some observers have held the view that “…Dubai is a sort of financial 
mirage or sub-prime in the desert" (O'Grady 2009 cited in Bornstein-Botz 
2012:4), creating an “…artificial economy dependent on borrowed capital” 
(Ibid: 4). This scenario is not unique to Dubai, as thorough analysis of the 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that were imposed upon many 
developing countries around the world in the 1980s, would show similar 
parallels that could be drawn. However, the exception here is that Dubai 
pursued a deliberately crafted strategy of debt financing for its 
infrastructure projects, hotels, free zones, mega-projects as well as port 
facilities locally and in other countries that are owned by the government 
related entity, Dubai World. Using a debt financing strategy in Dubai was 
necessitated by the fact that the fiscal space for Dubai’s GREs had become 
increasingly limited as the city had started to experience dwindling revenue 
from its hydro-carbon sector needed to finance some of the city’s audacious 
megaprojects that were conceived as major some of the city’s state owned 
holding companies (SOHC) (see Appendix III for list of SOHCs). 
 
Apart from being built on the sweat and blood of migrants and, as some 
scholars and observers would say, “slave labour” from Asia, Africa, and 
former Soviet Union states, the city of Dubai operates on credit, according to 
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Jim Cranner, who made the salient point on the BBC World Service News 
Hour, in an interview, that “…the economic history of Dubai has been on 
credit. In the 1950s, Sheikh Rashid borrowed £400,000 from Kuwait to 
dredge the creek. He mortgaged the city.” (Cranner, BBC World Service News 
Hour, 05 December, 2009).  
 
This policy of mortgaging and debt leveraging was in vogue until the global 
financial crisis and was central to the Government of Dubai’s economic 
development strategy. In addition, the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 
“…brought to light that something had gone” (Chachage 1987), profoundly 
wrong in the glitzy city of Dubai, one of the Middle East’s most enviable and 
economically prosperous sheikhdoms. In International Relations literature 
Dubai would be described as possessing hegemonic economic power in a 
region beset by strife and conflicts. 
 
As mentioned, Dubai’s growth model was a remarkable achievement, but 
entailed high risks. The large scale and highly leveraged property 
investments, as well as the expansion into real estate and private equity 
aboard brought […] about the tripling of Dubai’s debt during the period 
2000-2008 to almost 100 percent of GDP (IMF 2011:56). The Table below 
illustrates this. 
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Table 9.7: Estimates of Dubai and its GREs’ Debt Burden 
 
Source: Batori, Paolo and Mohammed W. Jaber. “UAE: A Closer Look at Dubai’s Debt.” 
Strategy & Economics. Morgan Stanley Research. December 7, 2009 cited in Frasca 
2011, pg.34. 
 
As depicted above, over the years in the city, both the “….public and private 
institutions have increasingly relied on external sources to finance their 
rapidly expanding development projects and investment programmes. Both 
government and corporate entities, notably in the financial sector, turned to 
foreign banks and international bond markets to secure their financing 
requirements in the form of longer term lower cost of funds” (Moubayed & 
Vogel 2009:2). During the property frenzy, developers piled up debt as if, to 
put it colloquially, there was no tomorrow. A cursory glance at Table 9.6 
would indicate that Dubai’s debt problem was exacerbated by the borrowing 
appetite of “…Dubai World, Investment Corporation of Dubai and Dubai 
Holding or in other words Dubai Inc” (see Appendix II) (Moody’s, 2008, 
Economist, January 5th 2013). 
 
Dubai’s economic transformation was and still is debt-financed. The sharp 
increase in the funding requirements of Dubai’s state-owned corporations in 
order to finance their ambitious plans and the decision of many to tap into 
conventional debt and Sukuk  (Islamic finance) markets has resulted in a 
sharp increase in both rated and unrated debt (Moody’s 2008: 3). The debt 
trap in Dubai is further exacerbated by the previously noted fact that the 
city state is not only developmental, but has a deeply entrenched rentier 
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structure, lacking a tax system that could off-set the government’s 
budgetary commitment to its citizens, infrastructural development and the 
internationalization of domestic development and commercial strategies. The 
development strategy pursued by the Government of Dubai is supported by 
Dr. Mohammed Obaid Ghubash who commented that: 
 
“... international foreign and local bank credits were available to all but it 
was Dubai that appropriated and utilized it far better than the rest and that 
if Dubai did not borrow money, it would not have developed” (Ghubash 
2009:7).       
 
The use of local and foreign debt stocks, as part of Dubai’s development 
financing arsenal, opened up the domestic economy to the influence and 
exigencies of the international capital and money markets that fall outside of 
the sovereign political jurisdiction of the Dubai state and also outside of 
what Gramsci (1971) calls the hegemonic power of the state. The apostles of 
cheap sovereign financing, for both soft and physical infrastructural 
development, have failed in their fiduciary duties by engendering the breach 
in Dubai’s economic sovereignty.  
 
The principality of Dubai further ceded some of its economic and political 
sovereignty, not to the federal political structure, but instead to Abu Dhabi, 
when the Emirate threw Dubai an initial life-line via the Central Bank of 
USD 10 billion out of debt of USD 20 billion to meet its debt financing 
obligations for Dubai World, Nakheel and other GREs that developed severe 
liquidity problems, when Dubai’s property market crashed in 2008-2009. 
This was similar to other bailouts that took place in Latin America, Africa 
and the Caribbean, from the World Bank through its structural adjustment 
programmes. The financial assistance from the Government of Abu Dhabi 
was offered to bail-out the aforementioned bankrupt GREs, came with 
strings attached or conditionalities. International economic law discourse 
argues that a “…fundamental attribute of state sovereignty, is economic 
sovereignty and without this political sovereignty is not complete” (Subedi 
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2006: 22). In essence, as already emphasised, Dubai’s debt financed 
development model has compromised Dubai’s political and economic 
sovereignty. This situation might become intractable, “….in the absence of 
policy change, (…) according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its 
periodic report on the UAE which might eventually lead to greater fiscal 
vulnerability in the emirate of Dubai” (IMF 2011 cited in Zawya, May 24, 
2011).  
 
9.9. Conclusion 
 
Dubai has developed a pragmatic approach to poverty alleviation and 
development in which this seemingly post petro- city state has had to  re-
orient the state in such a way that it was able effectively embrace the 
process and benefits of economic globalization. The economic growth 
momentum that was achieved between 1998-2008 in Dubai and GCC 
generally, “…. has had a ‘wealth effect’ in the creation of a new generation of 
high net state and […] corporate entities” (Gulf Business pg. 175, April, 
2008), and by extension, a modern and wealthy city-state. It is instructive to 
note that “….neither structuralism nor the dependency theories foresaw the 
rapid growth” (Kay and Gwynne 2000:54) of peripheral economies such as 
that of Dubai. With the city fast running out of oil resources it was forced, of 
necessity, to develop a cocktail of home grown economic growth and 
development strategies. The aforementioned economic success of Dubai may 
be partially explained by Bardhan (1990) when he notes that “….beyond the 
obvious self-aggrandizement of the leadership, there exists (in the case of 
Dubai) state-led developmental coalitions aimed at making a difference 
towards achieving the city’s collective aspirations.”  
 
Social and economic development polices and strategies in Dubai are carried 
out by excessive state intervention. The local elite deem state intervention to 
be fundamentally important for various reasons, including cultural ones and 
the bolstering of state or monarchical legitimacy. Empirical evidence has 
shown that political legitimacy has been obtained through the adoption of 
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rent–extracting and state led developmental economic policies that have 
brought benefits to the state, state elites and the wider Emirati citizenry. 
However, the global economic crisis of 2008 has uncovered the weaknesses 
in the Dubai Inc Model.  
 
The narrative in this chapter speaks to the challenges of pursuing the 
process referred to as development. With the exceptionally rapid 
transformation that took place in Dubai, it was inevitable that there were 
bound to be attendant negative externalities and human exploitation 
(Textbox One refers). As indicated, the pursuit of individual, corporate and 
state wealth has become more important than principles of social justice 
and exclusion. The social and economic structure in Dubai, by design, 
creates a stratification system that allows a hierarchical order to develop, 
based on race and nationality. Development in the Emirate is primarily 
geared towards the Emirati citizenry and the transatlantic managerial class 
and possibly that broad base of Asians and Africans guest workers which, 
are on the periphery of the Dubai larbour market. The face of a modern 
Dubai should not be seen through the lens of the glamorous skyscrapers 
and the many superlatives that are used to market the city, but instead 
through the numerous untold stories of human rights violations that have 
been committed to create the new generation of transnational Atlantic 
capitalists. 
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 Chapter Ten: 
Summation, Conclusion and Recommendations 
Economic growth in the region has had a wealth effect in the creation of a new 
generation of high net-worth individuals  
By Michael Tomalin CEO of National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
 
10.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis has been written with a view to analyzing Dubai’s socio-
economic development strategies and performance within the parameters of 
the proposed rentier, developmental and competition state theories. The 
research questions and objectives were addressed in the foregoing chapters 
of the study. This chapter summarizes the thesis, offering a recapitulation of 
the main thematic issues that arose from the research.          
 
It comprises four main sections and a number of sub-sections. Section 10.2 
engages the research question as to whether or not Dubai is a rentier State; 
Section 10.3 addresses the question of whether the city state of Dubai 
displays features of a developmental state. Section 10.4 addresses the 
research question as to whether Dubai demonstrates characteristics of a 
competition state. In Section 10.5, the remaining key findings, not dealt with 
chapters seven, eight and nine, are discussed. Sections 10.6 and 10.7 
conclude the thesis. 
 
10.2. Is Dubai a rentier state? 
 
The rentier state theory is one of the central propositions around which this 
thesis is constructed, giving rise to the following research question: “Can 
Dubai be considered a rentier state?” This section seeks to provide practical 
examples which indicate that Dubai demonstrates features of rentierism as 
a micro-state. An apposite comment in this regard was made by Nabil 
(2004:9): “…Oil resources relieved many governments of the need to tax 
their citizens and allowed governments to redistribute substantial resources 
through vast welfare and social services systems. At the same time, this 
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system of pervasive redistribution of wealth reduced demands from Arab 
citizens for accountable and inclusive public institutions.”  
 
This point of view is also supported by the following statement in BTI 
(2012:18): 
 
…The UAE offers its citizens a comprehensive welfare system including 
social security benefits, free or subsidized housing, a well-developed health 
care system, educational opportunities, and a wide array of other 
subsistence assistance. The Ministry of Social Affairs paid out AED 2.2 
billion ($600 million) in social security benefits in 2008.   
 
As with politics, so it is with economics. Oil has had a far reaching effect on 
the management of the “allocation” economies, subjecting them to two 
distinct logics: one of distribution, the other of diversification (Owen 2008: 
4). Dubai, in a manner similar to that of Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar, has 
earned rent not only from oil but from other sources such as profits from 
foreign investments and the controversial sponsorship system, which 
represents a new form of rentierism. In the city-state of Dubai, as noted by 
Owen (2008:4): “...Instead of citizens paying the state, the state paid and 
supported them in the  form of a mini-welfare state embracing employment, 
free education, free healthcare;” marriage grants, free land and interest free 
loan for housing, subsidized petrol, water and electricity.  
 
The Dubai state is able to finance its social welfare programmes from its 
entrepreneurial activities, carried out by its spectrum of GREs; its federal 
budgetary allocation; the interest from investment in overseas and local 
assets; as well as royalties and other receipts from its dwindling oil deposits. 
As is typical with all rentier states, there is no taxation and the lack of civil 
society prevents the imposition of checks and balances on the state. Chapter 
six, refers. 
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10.3. Is Dubai a developmental state? 
 
The research question posed, concerning whether Dubai may be considered 
a developmental state, finds an immediate answer, “….undoubtedly in the 
state’s philosophy,” (Bolesta 2007:109). The relevant paradigmatic literature 
also affirms that Dubai meets the requirements to be described as a 
developmental state. However, it is also the researcher’s proposition that 
Dubai displays some of the features of a developmental state, which forms 
in part, the central locus of the hybrid theoretical framework. There is 
significant empirical evidence to show that Dubai demonstrates 
characteristics of a developmental state, as mooted in the following 
discussion.  
 
As with the former NICs, Dubai, in the first instance, conforms to the 
conventional theory that a developmental state is “…one whose ideological 
underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy 
its administrative and political resources to the task of economic 
development” (Mkandawire, 2001: 291 cited in UNCTAD Report 2007:60).  
 
Secondly, “…those states, whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, 
autonomy, capacity and legitimacy at the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by 
establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth (in the 
capitalist developmental states), by organising it directly (in the ‘socialist’ 
variant), or a varying combination of both” (Leftwich 2000 cited in 
Gemandze 2006:78). This description of the developmental state fits the 
concept of state led economic development initiatives in Dubai. 
 
Thirdly, “…the ideology of the developmental state is fundamentally 
‘developmentalist’, as its major preoccupation is to ensure sustained 
economic growth and development on the back of high rates of capital 
accumulation” (UNCTAD 2007). Dubai’s strategic developmental plans 
emphasize high rates of economic growth (and improvement in all macro-
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economic variables) and the internationalization of domestic policies and 
services.   
 
Fourthly; In Dubai, as earlier mentioned, socio-economic development 
policies and strategies are drafted by the Executive Council, headed by the 
Ruler of Dubai. In other words, they are drafted by the ruling elite and 
executed by a competent bureaucracy in conjunction with a collection of 
government related entities also known as State Owned Holding Companies 
(SOHCs) (Appendix III) that play a central role in the developmental pursuits 
of this city state. None of the agglomerations of any of the institutional 
structures that constitute Dubai Inc are based on democratic principles and 
public accountability, since, as indicated, the city state is governed by soft 
authoritarianism. As Bolesta (2007:109) noted, the “…political system of a 
developmental state is usually authoritarian or at least heavily guarded from 
the influences of democratically elected politicians.”  
 
Fifthly, the Dubai state characteristically “…is a ‘strong state’ (Chapter six 
refers) that enjoys autonomy from social forces that might otherwise 
dissuade it from the use of its capacity to design and implement policies 
that are in its long-term interest. At the same time it develops some ‘social 
anchoring’ preventing it from the use of its autonomy in a predatory 
manner, securing it the approval of key social actors” (Castells, 1992 and 
Myrdal, 1968, cited in Mkandawire, 2001:290). Essentially, “…what makes 
the developmental state effective is not just autonomy, but ‘embedded 
autonomy’ in which the state is immersed in a network of ties that bind it to 
groups or classes that can become allies in the pursuit of societal goals” 
(Evans 1995 cited in UNCTAD 2007:60). The abovementioned comment 
describes Dubai’s non-ideological approach to holistic development.  
 
Sixthly, Dubai displays features of a developmental state because the state 
plays a combination of roles, including the following:  
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(i) Custodian Role: This role embodies the use of state capacity 
through its institutions to draft, implement and enforce rules, 
legislation and regulations (Cypher & Dietz (2004:214). 
 
(ii)  The Mid-wife Role:  “Greenhouse” policy: Essentially, midwifery 
entails the shifting of production activities into new areas which 
are believed to be conducive to development and which would not 
be areas where private capital would venture if left to market 
forces alone (Cypher & Dietz 2004:215). Dubai as a “….midwife 
state assists in the emergence or the attraction of TNCs through 
foreign direct investments (FDI), which involves the free 
movement of money and goods” (O’ Hearn 1998:4).  
 
(iii) Producer Role:  The Dubai state, in the ten years, has shifted 
from being a minimalist state via its state owned entities, to what 
Cypher & Dietz (2004:214) call “...the demiurge function, of the 
state shifts to creating a certain types of goods via state-owned 
enterprises or via joint venture schemes which link state 
investment funds with private-sector investors.”  
  
The arguments above are merely some of the points that have emerged as a 
result of a comprehensive analysis of the developmental state concept and 
its theoretical underpinnings. In answering the research question posed at 
the beginning of the section, it would be remiss of this researcher not to 
conclude that Dubai cannot be considered to be totally a developmental 
state, but demonstrates a strong developmentalist agenda borne out of its 
development strategic plans.  
 
The third principal research question that forms a central part of the hybrid 
theoretical framework is discussed in the following section. 
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10.4. Is Dubai a competition state? 
 
Dubai’s economic boom, referred to earlier as the Arabian Falcon, has, for 
the better part of the decade leading up to 2008, been subjected to varying 
degrees of scrutiny.  Some economists and observers have ascribed the 
success of this minority micro-state to the plethora of business and macro-
economic variables. This thesis argues that Dubai does demonstrate some 
features of a competition state, with three of these being elaborated upon 
below:  
 
10.4.1. Policy of entrepreneurship 
 
The political economy of Dubai’s development “….has been informed by the 
political elite perceptions of global realities which have underpinned state 
strategies for navigating and mediating processes of globalization” (Evans & 
Lunt 2009:2). Much private and public capital from the Gulf and Dubai in 
particular has been invested abroad, for both financial and political reasons 
(Peterson 2009:5). Dubai, in a manner similar to that of the Federal 
Government of the UAE, Mexico and Ireland, has used the competition state 
orthodoxy as one of its potent development strategies. Evidence for the 
researcher’s theory is noted: “…The state has created funds (popularly 
known as Sovereign Wealth Funds) for future use after oil; these SWFs have 
been invested in lucrative investment opportunities outside the Arab world” 
(Peterson 2009:5). Dubai International Capital, the international investment 
arm of Dubai Holdings is a classic example. 
 
The Government of UAE, and Dubai by extension, occupies “pole position” in 
managing and simultaneously advocating a pro-competition and neoliberal 
agenda. It is paradoxical that whilst the Government of Dubai advocates and 
embraces the Washington Consensus policy prescriptions, the state is 
central to economic activities and socio-economic development planning and 
execution. McKenzie and Lee (1991), Ohmae (1995) and Reich (1991) are 
cited in Abdullah and Nicholson (2009:35) as stating that “…though it has 
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been argued that the role of the state has become diminished in a globalised 
economy”: 
 
[….] Dubai’s ICT industry shows a continuing state role. The role of the state 
in Dubai is visible and provides the leadership, sets the policies, builds 
partnerships, and meets the requirements of some of the stakeholders in the 
industry. The state has emphasised the role of providing the conditions for 
competitiveness and underpinning the market. The analysis revealed that; 
policymaking for ICT industry development adopted by the city state of 
Dubai is committed to competition state policy direction (Abdullah & 
Nicholson 2009:46).  
 
As happened in Mexico, the Emirate of Dubai saw the state apparatus 
pursing “...micro-interventionism ‘side by side’ with ‘sound’ macro-economic 
policies” (Soederberg 2010:84) during the period from 1998 through to 2008, 
just before the advent of the global financial crisis. 
 
10.4.2. Social security solidarity 
 
In Dubai, the social security of the wider expatriate community or guest 
workers and resident family “…is subordinated to the economic needs of 
international competitiveness” (Kirby & Murphy 2007:9), by private sector 
actors in the economy. According to literature on the topic, this is a generic 
feature of the competition states. The same does not obtain or apply to the 
Emirati citizens who are protected by social welfare provisions, created by 
the Federal Government, which are deeply entrenched in Articles 16, 17, 
and 19 of the  constitution. The provision of public services is provided to 
non-citizen residents on a free market, commercial basis; in the parlance of 
the World Bank, public services are provided to migrants on a “user-fee 
basis.” 
 
The Federal Government of the UAE, including Dubai, has embarked on 
massive  policy shifts through a process of labour market reforms, involving 
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the nationalization of the domestic labour market, in order to decrease 
welfare recipients’ dependence on the state (Kirby & Murphy 2009:10) 
(Chapter eight refers). Empirical work carried out by Abdullah & Nicholson 
(2009), reveals that:  
 
“... Local ICT companies receive no financial or technical assistance from the 
government. They compete with MNCs to hire knowledge workers and have 
limited access to educational and training systems Unemployment is high 
among young nationals, particularly among the female population.”  
 
These items represent a few of the clearest indicators that Dubai 
demonstrates features of a competition state as articulated in the 
competition state literature by Cerny (1997, 2004 & 2007), Evans and Lunt 
(2010), and Soederberg (2010).  
 
10.5. Other key findings and conclusions drawn  
10.5.1. Dubai the entrepreneurial state 
 
This section addresses the research question of whether state involvement 
plays a role in the economic development of Dubai. The traditional role of 
government was to promote public goods such as education, defence, 
maintenance of law and order and be an engine of for economic growth 
(Chapter six refers). However, with the emergence and global spread of 
economic neo-liberalism, the role of states globally has been reduced to a 
mere regulatory function. Thus, inevitably public policy management has 
been undemocratically shifted to private sector actors.  
 
Notwithstanding the global norm, post-colonial states of the GCC have not 
succumbed to the hegemonic strength of the economic neo-liberalism; 
instead they have evolved into strong agents of change. For this reason 
Duvall and Freeman, in their article “The State and Dependent Capitalism”, 
argued that: 
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“…In capitalist societies of the twentieth century, the state is deeply and 
directly involved in the processes of economic growth, not only through 
benign facilitation, but through active promotion and direction. Partly, 
through Keynesian demand management, and partly through intervention 
into the sphere of production, the capitalist state plays an important role in 
shaping the course of the economy” (1981:100).  
 
Given that the state had become such an important and all pervasive 
component of the national economy in the late twentieth century (Duvall 
and Freeman 1981:99), the term “entrepreneurial state” was first expressed 
by Marc Blecher to describe the profit seeking activities of an individual 
state bureau in a rural county in the late 1980s (Duckett 1998:153). 
 
The post-colonial states of the GCC and the “…rentier monarchies including 
the ruling family of Dubai have managed to create highly profitable and well-
managed state owned enterprises, confounding expectations of both general 
SOEs inefficiency and the particularly  poor quality of rentier public sectors” 
(Hertog 2010: 261). The empirical evidence contained in the IMF’s yearly 
country reports, have reveal that the SOHCs of Dubai may be referred to as 
“…state entrepreneurialism” (Duckett 1998:153). This researcher’s 
proposition is that the eco-system of Dubai’s SOHCs was created with two 
primary purposes in mind: firstly, to provide an extensive welfare system of 
subsidized public services to its citizens via its rentier structures and 
secondly, to use the newly created entities and institutions as a catalyst for 
achieving the Dubai Strategic Plans of 1996, 2000 and 2015. The vision of 
the future is laid out in the DSPs which become major drivers behind the 
entrepreneurial activities of state and its SOHCs.  (Chapter seven refers.) 
 
The political economy of the rentier, developmental and competition state of 
Dubai, and the UAE in general, hinges on the premise that the state has 
become what Scott (2006:53) noted as “…a direct economic actor, for 
example as the owner of large enterprises.”  He went on to say that the 
Dubai State has “…become a player as well as a referee” (Scott 2006:5), 
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within the economy with regard to the group of the commercial entities 
owned by Government of Dubai state owned entities” (see Appendix III). 
 
The proponents of the traditional role of the state would argue that “….this 
puts state agents in roles that conflict - for example, as a regulator and as a 
player that need not be subject to the discipline of the markets” (Scott 
2006:6). This scenario is juxtaposed against the “…state monopoly of 
coercive powers employed to restrain the private actors from breaking the 
rules and, if need be, to settle disputes” (Ibid: 7). Up until recently, some 
Government Related Entities (GREs) in Dubai were not dissimilar to the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which in 1990 (Kagarlitsky 1990 cited 
in More 2001:40), was the biggest entrepreneur in the economy  developing 
and speculating in property; owning ports around the world; owning and 
operating free zones; owning and financing commercial activities and 
operating hotels. Rahman (2009:27) has the following to say in support of 
this point of view: “…Dubai World is the UAE’s largest holding company and 
one of the world’s largest holding companies. This is a multi-diversified 
company and is fully owned by the Dubai Government which has a history 
of achievements. According to one of their managers, Dubai World is spread 
across five continents and has fulfilled the developmentalist and 
entrepreneurial state vision of the Dubai Government.”  
 
10.5.2. Good governance 
 
The concept of good governance has found its way into the lexicon of 
development literature and language. The Eurocentric development model 
discourse would have us believe that the recent uprising in the Middle East, 
popularly known as the “Arab Spring”, and that the pro-democracy 
movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are 
aware of what is meant by “good governance”. Ironically, the state of Dubai 
is seemingly not cognizant of what the tenets of good governance are, if the 
basic principles of the Wilton Park Conference are to be applied. According 
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to Ijewere (1999:233), this Conference “states that the following are some of 
the basic principles on which good governance must be based: 
 
(i) It must be democratic in the sense of free and fair elections on a 
universal suffrage. This is essential but it is not enough. There 
must be transparency and accountability.  
(ii)  The judiciary must be independent. 
(iii) The system must support an economic programme that is growth-
oriented, inclusive and broad-based.  
(iv) All citizens must feel involved in the nation’s life.  
(v) It must respect the rule of law; there must be constitutional checks 
and balances to prevent misuse of state power; there must be 
protection for individuals’ human rights. 
 
Prior to the Arab spring, the concept of “…exceptionalism in the Middle 
East” (Salamey 2009:249) had to a large degree excused the lack of a 
Western designed mode of good governance at the political level and by 
extension, the legitimization of hereditary or dynastic transfer of power in 
the Arab Gulf States (AGS). The socio-political dynamics, as described by 
Nabil (2004:9), are summarized below: 
 
…Arab governance mechanisms lacked transparency, reflected in limited 
access to government information and carefully monitored freedom of the 
press. They lacked contestability, reflected in some of the most centralized 
governments of all developing countries. And they lacked inclusiveness, 
reflected in rural/urban inequalities in access to public services, gender 
inequalities in voice and participation in society, and in nepotism or 
patronage determining who gets public services or access to lucrative 
business opportunities and who does not. 
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In the Arab world and Dubai in particular, there is what is known as the 
“…management by majlis, the majlis is an Arab tradition, usually involving 
a community leader gathering a group to address people’s concerns, hear 
ideas, communicate plans or simply as a social forum to gather friends and 
family” (Sampler & Eigner 2008:136). In essence, the majlis is the people’s 
parliament and is informed by socio-cultural and religious historical 
traditions and values.  
 
Good governance is increasingly recognized as a cornerstone of sustainable 
economic growth, poverty eradication and development and is directly linked 
to sustainability which integrates social, environmental and ethical practices 
as it helps build long term value for various stakeholders. The Millennium 
Declaration also places a special emphasis on the importance of good 
governance for development (Ameinfo 2010, October 10). In an effort to 
embrace aspects of good governance, the Government of Dubai has 
promulgated a Civil Code (to its legal system) while the creation of the Dubai 
International Financial Authority (with its own legal autonomy) is a radical 
deviation from the traditional roots of Islamic Law (Sharia), in addition to 
the Federal Penal Code (1987) of the United Arab Emirates (Al- Muhairi 
1995:287). This meets some aspects of the Wilton Park Conference’s basic 
requirements of the rule of law as indicative of good governance in a society. 
 
Dr. François Valérian, Head of Private Sector Programmes, Transparency 
International, said,  
 
...there is no good governance without transparency towards the society as a 
whole. Any good government has to be accountable to the citizens, and 
transparent on its use of the national wealth for the public good. Beyond the 
fight against corruption, transparency is a prerequisite for good governance, 
at the national level and also in international institutions such as the G20. 
(Ameinfo 2010, October 10).  
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Dubai is similar to other developmental and rentier states in demonstrating 
that there is no correlation between development and transparency. The 
debt crisis that checked Dubai’s economic development trajectory brought to 
the fore what had always been known about the lack of transparency and 
accountability of the Government of Dubai.  
 
10.5.3. Free zones and their implications for rent extraction 
 
UAE law obliges expatriates who seek to reside and do business in the 
country, either to do so through a partnership with a UAE national in which 
the expat may own up to 49 per cent, or through a sponsorship system that 
allows the expat to own the entire business; although not on paper, provided 
they pay a fee to a UAE national. This fee can range from as low as a 
thousand dirhams a year and go up to several hundred thousand, 
depending on the size of the business (Al Qassemi 2010, The National 
Newspaper October 07). This institutional rent extracting practice does not 
fit into the textbook definition of rentierism; however, it still generates    
revenue for an economic actor engaged in a non-productive activity. This is 
typical across the GCC; furthermore, not only does the state extract revenue 
from processing visas and other services, but citizens are also allowed by 
law to extract rent from residents through the Kafala (sponsorship system). 
 
The diversification of the entire economic structure of the UAE, including 
Dubai’s economy, through the many sector-specific free zones (Appendix IV), 
has serious ramifications for the rentier-seeking citizens. The free zone 
regulations allow individuals and businesses to own 100% of their 
incorporated entities within the free zones. This new development invariably 
cuts off an important revenue stream for local citizens who have made 
careers out of sponsoring expatriates wishing to live and work in the UAE. In 
terms of its wider political implications for the ruling family, it is not likely to 
test the legitimacy of the state as the rentier structure is deeply embedded 
within the society, both at the local and federal levels by the various, 
generous forms of social welfare (etcetera). The members of the tiny Emirati 
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population of less than one million people are legally entwined and 
entangled within the patron-client networks and are thus unlikely to risk 
losing the additional benefits that are afforded to them via the tacit social 
contract mentioned in Chapter two, by protesting the loss of future rent 
extracting opportunities.  
 
10.5.4. Development of Dubai and for whom? 
 
Tourists, residents, observers, academics and citizens to the UAE and Dubai 
in particular, speak of the way the city has been developed. However it is 
unfortunate that they speak out of ignorance of the city’s infrastructure, 
referring to it as development. They may, for example, discuss the 
increasingly wide network of newly built multi-lane roads with long-time 
residents of the city, a citizen or an expatriate, who, referring to the non-
existence of tarmac roads in the 1970s until the early 1990s, speaks 
glowingly of development since then. 
 
Those visitors and conscientized residents, who have spent more time in 
Dubai, especially during the boom time between 2004 and 2008, would have 
noticed that the visible segments of the population were enjoying standards 
of living comparable to middle classes globally. For the citizens (Emiratis), 
their quality of life has been described by The Economist (2011, June 30th): 
“…. as being amongst the world's most pampered. They enjoy cradle-to-
grave welfare lavished by the oil-rich state and the advantages of what has 
long been the Gulf's most open and tolerant way of life.” However, 
unfortunately, for the hundreds of thousands of unskilled and semi-skilled 
migrant workers who have toiled endlessly to transform the city, their lives 
can best be described as those of the wretched of the earth who were 
subjected to some of the worst human rights violations, as described in 
Chapter nine. 
 
For the capitalist, development is assessed in terms of growth and the fact 
that economic growth trickles down to the people. Thus, development in 
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capitalist societies is often assessed according to the theory that a rising tide 
raises all ships; meaning that while growth may be unevenly distributed, the 
mere existence of growth ensures that everyone benefits 
(www.kaieteurnewsonline.com). The trickle-down benefits of growth stopped 
close to the apex of the social structure of the labour force; the primary 
beneficiaries of Dubai’s exponential and sustained growth were the local 
rent extractors who sponsored anyone and everyone who wanted a piece of 
the Dubai gold rush and the transnational professional class who created 
and managed the state institutions, health care and educational 
institutions, IT companies and hotels. As is customary in human history, 
not everyone benefitted from Dubai’s socio-economic transformation. 
(Chapter nine, textbox one refers.) 
 
The research question posed, concerning how the state protected and 
empowered its minority population, has been answered: this thesis has 
demonstrated that the Government of Dubai, guided by federal policies and 
development strategies, has created a development model by directing state 
resources, borrowed or earned, into a well designed RDC hybrid model. This 
model is supported by constitutional provisions and local decrees by the 
ruler of Dubai. 
 
10.5.5. Business- state relationship 
 
This study arrives at a fundamental finding concerning state-business 
power relations, within the context that “…the more the development 
strategy relies on the activities of the private sector, the more influence the 
actors of this sector will have in relation to policy formulation and decision-
making. Furthermore, as a corollary to this, it is assumed the greater the 
economic power of the private sector in relation to the ruler (ruler–merchant 
power balance) the more influence the private sector will have in regard to 
decision-making” (Hvidt 2007:558). Al-Sayegh (1998:101) explains that in 
Dubai, the entrepreneurial or merchant class in the latter part of the 
twentieth century began to broaden their role in the society, which  
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….enabled them to strengthen their position in society; many were powerful 
and contributed to Dubai's development as educators, philanthropists and 
cultural advocators. Some ploughed new wealth into the economy thus 
providing more jobs, i.e. Al-Ghurair, al-Futtaim; others used it to establish 
community services: research centres, public libraries, scientific and 
academic institutions all have been financed with merchants' money. The 
Jumah Al-Majid Center for Culture and Heritage and the Dubai Medical 
College are two examples of community projects financed and patronized by 
wealthy Dubai merchants. 
 
Dubai is characterized by markedly wealthy merchant communities, whose 
leading members play a substantially important role in political and public 
policy-making (Lawson 1994:403 & Peck 1986 cited in Hvidt 2007:566). 
However, this seemingly unequal power balance has been countered by the 
“….smallness of the emirate’s working classes and the fact that they 
continue to consist primarily of highly vulnerable expatriate labourers which 
leaves the commercial elites with virtually no alternative but to remain 
junior partners of the various ruling families” (Lawson 1994:403).  
 
10.6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis brings to the fore a much needed intellectual debate, backed up 
by practical investigation into the social and economic development 
strategies employed by the government of the desert sheikhdom of Dubai. 
The study has established that the unprecedented spatial, economic and 
social development here is shaped by a hybridization of development 
paradigms. In essence, no single development paradigm may be attributed 
to Dubai’s transformation or any political ideological rhetoric or tendencies. 
 
10.7. Recommendations for further research 
 
(i) The evolution of the role of women in the continued developmental 
process of Dubai  
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(ii) It would be remiss of researchers in the Middle East not to explore, in 
the near future, the social and economic costs, to the society as a 
whole, of out-going remittances by the expatriate community to their 
home country.  
 
(iii) In the post global financial crisis period, it has become apparent that  
Dubai may evolve from being an allocation state to a production state, 
thus the above becomes a possible area for further investigation.   
 
(iv) The contradiction between Emiratization and sustained economic 
growth in a labour-importing society suggests itself as a significant 
area for further investigation. 
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 List of Appendices 
Appendix I 
Sample Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
Interview Guide  
Interview Guide for Professional Groups  
i. How long have you been residing in Dubai? 
ii. A description of what constitutes the Dubai Model 
iii. What is regarded as the Dubai Model is seen as a success story for 
developing countries. Why do think Dubai has been able to transform 
itself so quickly?  
iv. The Genesis of the Dubai Model and whether it can be replicated 
elsewhere. How has the U.A.E harnessed expatriate labour to foster 
national development?  
v. Would you consider Dubai a rentier-state or Developmental or 
Competition State or does it display features of all?  
vi. Emiratization as a policy: What are the main tenets of the process and 
what are some of the likely impediments to an effective 
implementation of the process.  
vii. How has the U.A.E harnessed expatriate labour to foster national 
development?  
viii. Emiratization as a policy: What are the main tenets of the process and 
what are some of the likely impediments to an effective 
implementation of the process? What sector of the economy you work 
in? How long and in what capacity? 
ix. What would you regard as the downside of Dubai's Socio-Economic 
Development model and why? 
x. How pervasive is racial discrimination in the work place in Dubai and 
United Arab Emirates?  
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xi. What are some environmental concerns raised based on all the 
construction taking place in the emirate? 
 
Interview Guide for Unskilled and Semi- Skilled Migrant Workers  
i. Duration of residency in Dubai 
ii. Nationality  
iii. Frequency and timeliness of salary  
iv. Number of days worked in a month and payment of overtime 
v. Distance traveled to and from the place of work 
vi. Number of workers in a room 
vii. Number of workers who share kitchen and toilet 
viii. State of their living conditions 
ix. Are they allowed to take annual vacation leave? 
x. Salary range 
(1) Interview Guide for Emirati Citizens 
 
Research Area: Questions and issues around social development, expatriate 
labour, and Emiratisation. 
i. What services do you get from the state without having to pay for it? 
ii. What are some of your concerns about the number of expatriates in 
Dubai? 
iii. What are your thoughts on the emiratization process and is the 
initiative a necessary one? 
iv. Do you believe that foreign labour is beneficial to the society? 
 
 
351 
 
Appendix II: The Dubai Inc Model 
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Appendix III  
List of Dubai’s SHOCs/GREs and their ownership structure 
Commercial Entities Sector Govt 
 Ownership 
        Dubai Holding Financial Services 100% 
Dubai Holding Commercial Operation Group Financial Services 100% 
           Dubai Properties Group Real Estate 100% 
           Jumeriah Group Leisure & Tourism 100% 
           Tatweer Financial Services 100% 
         TECOM Investments Real Estate 100% 
          Dubai Holding Investment Group Financial Services 100% 
          Dubai Group     Financial Services 100% 
          Dubai International Capital  Financial Service 100% 
          Dubai World Financial Services 100% 
          Dubai Dry Docks Transport 100% 
         Economic Zones World  Real state 100% 
Jabel Ali Free Zone Financial Services 100% 
Isitithmar World Financial Services 100% 
Limitless Real Estate 100% 
Nakheel Real Estate 100% 
Port & Free Zone World Financial Services 100% 
Dubai Maritime City Real Estate 100% 
DP World Transport 80% 
Investment Corporation of Dubai Financial Services 100% 
Dnata Leisure & Tourism 100% 
Dubai Aluminum Company Mining and Metals 100% 
Dubai Duty Free Retail 100% 
Dubai Electricity & Water Authority (DEWA) Power & Utilities 100% 
Dubai World Trade Centre Real Estate 100% 
Emirates Airline Transport 100% 
Emirates National Oil Company Oil & Gas 100% 
Emirates NBD Financial Services 56% 
Emirates Islamic Bank Financial Services 100% 
Union Properties Real Estates 48% 
Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Middle East Mining & Metals 51% 
Dubai Cable Company Industrial 50% 
National Bonds Corporation Financial Services 50% 
Emaar Properties Real Estate 31% 
Almak Finance Financial Service 48% 
Dubai Islamic Bank Financial Service 30% 
Tamweel Financial Service 57% 
Deyaar Development Company Real Estate 43% 
Noor Islamic Bank Financial Services 25% 
Commercial Bank of Dubai Financial Services 20% 
Dubai Investments Financial Services 12% 
Borse Dubai Financial Services uncertain 
Dubai Financial Market Financial Services 80% 
         Deira Investment Company Real Estate uncertain 
         Dubai Aerospace Enterprise Transport uncertain 
Emirates Investment & Development Company Financial Services uncertain 
Dubai International Financial Centre Financial Services 100% 
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Appendix IV 
Eco-system of Free-Zones in Dubai 
Number Free Zones   
1 Jabel Ali Free Zone  
2 Dubai Goal & Diamond Park  
3 Dubai Maritime City  
4 Techno Park  
5 Dubai Internet City  
6 Dubai Media City  
7 Dubai Knowledge Village  
8 Dubai Outsource Zone  
9 Dubai Healthcare City  
10 International Media Production Zone  
11 Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park  
12 Dubai Healthcare City  
13 Dubai International Financial Centre  
14 Dubai Academic City  
15 Dubai Airport Free zone  
16 Dubai Silicon Oasis  
17 Dubai Logistics City   
18 Dubai Multi-Commodity Centre  
19  International Humanitarian City  
20 Dubai Studio City   
21 Dubai Flower Center   
22 Dubai Auto Zone  
23 Enpark  
24 Dubai Auto Zone  
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Appendix V 
Call for Hotel Professionals: 
                BIN EID EXECUTIVE SEARCH & SELECTION  
This advertisement was carried in the Gulf News Daily ( March 2004) 
 Resident Manager ( European Candidates Only) 
 Director of Food and Beverages ( European/Arab Candidates Only 
 Director of Sales ( European/Arab Candidate Only) 
 Public Relation and Marketing Manager (European Candidate Only) 
 Restaurant Manager –( Male/Female (European Candidate Only) 
 Bar Manager—Female (European Candidate Only).  
Other Positions 
o Executive Sous Chef (European Candidate Only). 
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Appendix VI   Dark Side of Dubai Extract from the Independent Daily 
Thirty years ago, almost all of contemporary Dubai was desert, inhabited only by 
cactuses and tumbleweed and scorpions. But downtown there are traces of the town 
that once was, buried amidst the metal and glass. In the dusty fort of the Dubai 
Museum, a sanitised version of this story is told. In the mid-18th century, a small 
village was built here, in the lower Persian Gulf, where people would dive for pearls off 
the coast. It soon began to accumulate a cosmopolitan population washing up from 
Persia, the Indian subcontinent, and other Arab countries, all hoping to make their 
fortune. They named it after a local locust, the daba, who consumed everything before 
it. The town was soon seized by the gunships of the British Empire, who held it by the 
throat as late as 1971. As they scuttled away, Dubai decided to ally with the six 
surrounding states and make up the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
       Hidden in plain view  
        There are three different Dubais, all swirling around each other. There are the expats, 
like Karen; there are the Emiratis, headed by Sheikh Mohammed; and then there is 
the foreign underclass who built the city, and are trapped here. They are hidden in 
plain view. You see them everywhere, in dirt-caked blue uniforms, being shouted at by 
their superiors, like a chain gang – but you are trained not to look. It is like a mantra: 
the Sheikh built the city. The Sheikh built the city. Workers? What workers? Every 
evening, the hundreds of thousands of young men who build Dubai are bussed from 
their sites to a vast concrete wasteland an hour out of town, where they are 
quarantined away. Until a few years ago they were shuttled back and forth on cattle 
trucks, but the expats complained this was unsightly, so now they are shunted on 
small metal buses that function like greenhouses in the desert heat. They sweat like 
sponges being slowly wrung out. 
Sonapur is a rubble-strewn patchwork of miles and miles of identical concrete 
buildings. Some 300,000 men live piled up here, in a place whose name in Hindi 
means "City of Gold". In the first camp I stop at – riven with the smell of sewage and 
sweat – the men huddle around, eager to tell someone, anyone, what is happening to 
them. 
       Sahinal Monir, a slim 24-year-old from the deltas of Bangladesh. "To get you here, they 
tell you Dubai is heaven. Then you get here and realise it is hell," he says. Four years 
ago, an employment agent arrived in Sahinal's village in Southern Bangladesh. He told 
the men of the village that there was a place where they could earn 40,000 takka a 
month (£400) just for working nine-to-five on construction projects. It was a place 
where they would be given great accommodation, great food, and treated well. All they 
had to do was pay an up-front fee of 220,000 takka (£2,300) for the work visa – a fee 
they'd pay off in the first six months, easy. So Sahinal sold his family land, and took 
out a loan from the local lender, to head to this paradise. 
        As soon as he arrived at Dubai airport, his passport was taken from him by his 
construction company. He has not seen it since. He was told brusquely that from now 
on he would be working 14-hour days in the desert heat – where western tourists are 
advised not to stay outside for even five minutes in summer, when it hits 55 degrees – 
for 500 dirhams a month (£90), less than a quarter of the wage he was promised. If 
you don't like it, the company told him, go home. "But how can I go home? You have 
my passport, and I have no money for the ticket," he said. "Well, then you'd better get 
to work," they replied.   
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Appendix VII 
Name of the 
Interviewee 
Organization Position Date 
Interview I  Business Owner May 2009 
Interview 2  Security Guard May 2009 
Interview 3  Security Guard May 2009 
Interview 4  Security Guard May 2009 
Interview 5  Security Guard May 2009 
Interview 6  Security Guard May 2009 
Interview 7  Security Guard May 2009 
Interview 8  Security Guard May 2009 
Interview 9  Senior Statistician        September 2011 
Interview 10  Emirati student  December 2011 
Interview 11  Emirati Banker January 2012 
Interview 12  Geographer April 2012 
Interview 13 
 
 Geographer April 2012 
Interview 14  Geographer April 2012 
Interview 15  Medical Engineer April 2012 
Interview 16  Educator June 2012 
Interview 17  Emirati Student November 2012 
Interview 18  Economist November 2012 
Interview 19  A/C technician July  2012 
Interview 20  Attorney at law December 2012 
Interview 21  Medical Engineer January 2013 
Interview22   Project Manager  January 2013 
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Appendix VIII 
List of urban communities constructed between 1998 and 2008  
Institutions Description 
Emirates Hills Residential 
Al Barsha Muti-purpose community 
Arabian Heights Multi-purpose community 
Jumeirah Lake Towers Multi-purpose community 
Dubai Marina Multi-purpose community 
Business Bay Multi-purpose community 
Down Town Dubai Multi-purpose community 
Dubai Pearl Residential community 
Arabian Ranches Multi-purpose community 
International City Multi-purpose community 
Discovery Gardens Residential community 
Palm Jumeirah Residential community 
Dubai Pearl Residential community 
City of Arabia Residential community 
Jumeirah Village Residential community 
Mirdiff Multi-purpose community 
The Springs Multi-purpose community 
The Greens Residential community 
Jumeirah Islands Residential community 
Jumeirah Beach Residence Multi-purpose community 
Motor City Multi-purpose community 
The Meadows Multi-purpose community 
 
